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Abstract 
Foreign Military, Economic, Diplomatic Interventions, and the Termination of Civil Wars: 
An Integrative Approach 
 
Huseyin Ilgaz, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 What are the effects of foreign interventions in ending civil conflicts, especially when 
multiple different intervention types are deployed in a given dispute? Research to date has studied 
the role of third parties exclusively focusing on a single intervention type at the expense of others. 
The current project breaks with that tradition by proposing an integrative framework that 
incorporates various intervention types—military, economic, and diplomatic studies—employed 
in one conflict.  
More specifically, it begins with an interdependence model in which earlier external 
involvements in a conflict inform subsequent ones, demonstrating that interventions used within a 
civil war are interrelated with one another. Next, using mathematical models, it generates 
interventionary patterns in which foreign involvements are sequenced according to their 
chronological orders, integrating multiple intervention types. Finally, it develops an extended form 
of bargaining model that accounts for how each interventionary pattern influences the termination 
of civil wars by shifting the power distribution as it also reveals private information in regard to 
the real capacities of warring parties. Most importantly, the new bargaining framework 
incorporates the asymmetrical aspects of civil wars, enabling to assess how interventions impact 
conflict outcomes based on the party they are targeted.  
Ultimately, the project concludes that external interventions in any form, regardless of its 
target, end up with increasing opposition’s capacity while undermining incumbent, including, most 
conspicuously, any state-sided military assistance. The findings overall highlight the asymmetrical 
implications of foreign interventions in civil wars and the importance of concerted efforts in 
terminating these conflicts—a result that is undergirded by the incorporation of multiple 
interventions into the analysis. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Few issues are more lasting and pressing to the field of international relations than 
interventions. Historically, outside countries have always been involved in civil wars. During the 
Peloponnesian Wars, Athens and Sparta intervened in the internal conflicts of other city-states and 
weighed in with their military power to take sides with one of the warring parties against another. 
During the Reformation period in Europe, outside intervention was one of the main tools external 
powers used in the internal affairs of other European nations, particularly on the basis of competing 
political authority. In the nineteenth century, Russia tried to get involved in Spain’s dynastic 
dispute and did the same in Hungary while Britain was absorbed in Greece and Portugal.  
After the Second World War, the Cold War and the decolonization revived the practice of 
intervention, with the United States and the Soviet Union projecting their power into the domestic 
disputes of numerous states around the world in order to support the existing government or to 
help the opposition.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, internal wars in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Iraq, and the Sudan prompted numerous foreign parties to engage in those countries. Similarly, 
recent conflicts attracted many outsiders and foreign intervention has become common in the civil 
wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.  
In addition to their continuity and frequency as a persistent tool in world politics, external 
interventions take various forms—military, economic, and diplomatic. For example, during the 
first phase of Angolan civil war between 1975 and 1995 involving the central government and the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group, the government was 
helped by Cuba while the opposition enjoyed military support from South Africa. In its long 
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struggle against the Eritrean insurgency, the Ethiopian government was sanctioned with punitive 
economic measures by the United States for its role in human rights abuses. In the course of an 
internal dispute between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front—a separatist Sahrawi 
national liberation movement aiming to end Moroccan presence in the Western Sahara—the 
United Nations undertook repeated mediations, as did the governments of Mauritania and Algeria, 
in search of a diplomatic solution. 
Interestingly, some civil wars attract multiple interventionary practices taking place over 
its duration. The Syrian conflict, for instance, in the wake of the Arab Spring, began in 2011 when 
the Assad regime balked at conceding political rights to the country’s Sunni majority. 
Subsequently, this conflict has prompted many foreign countries to step in, whether by military 
support, the application of sanctions, or diplomatic efforts. The United States and the European 
Union imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on the regime. Iran and Russia began to 
support the government when it was confronted by multiple insurgent groups. Then, the Gulf 
States and Turkey engaged in the conflict militarily by supporting various rebel groups against the 
Assad regime. Mediation was offered by the United Nations, Russia, Turkey, and Iran in order to 
achieve a peaceful resolution between the government and the opposition parties.  
What impact have foreign interventions in civil wars had? More particularly, what is the 
effect of external interventions, especially when multiple types of interventions are used within 
the same conflict? Despite the continuity and persistence of such interventions, we actually do not 
know what the impacts of these interventionary practices when employed together in a conflict. 
Current scholarship focuses exclusively on one type of intervention, neglecting others used even 
in the same war (Diehl and Regan 2015). This historical blind-spot suggests that we should 
examine, for example, the effect of diplomatic mediation after the application of economic 
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sanctions. Are economic sanctions against a government following a military intervention on 
behalf of a rebel group effective in bringing about an end to hostilities?  
In addition, the examination of civil war intervention is challenged by the asymmetric 
nature of these conflicts as the fighting takes place between the (more powerful) state on one side 
and (less powerful) rebel(s) on the other. According to the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict 
Dataset (NSA), in just 5.1% of conflicts did the military capacity of rebel groups exceed that of 
the governments opposing them (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). The Turkish 
Armed Forces, for example, has been fighting against relatively weaker opposition, the Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party (PKK), for decades, beginning in early 1980s and continuing, with interludes, until 
now.  
Asymmetric disputes are largely characterized by some special features, such as the 
adaption of irregular warfare by insurgents and the unequal legitimacy of the two sides. These 
special features have implications for the effects of external interventions. For instance, after the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi government was seen as an “American Puppet” because 
of American support for the regime. Similarly, it also accounts for the Taliban’s contempt for the 
Afghan government as outside powers attempted to assist the regime in its struggle against the 
group. Thus, it is important to ask such questions as “how does asymmetry play out in the case of 
external interventions?” or “is the utility of a supportive military intervention the same for both 
government and rebel sides equally?” These are the questions concerning the influence of outside 
parties in civil wars to which we presently lack precise answers. 
Ultimately, understanding the impact of foreign interventions in ending civil wars is 
essential. But the question is multi-faceted because many forms of intervention exist, as do 
asymmetrical effects of internal disputes.  
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A critical part of understanding the effect of foreign involvement in civil wars rests on 
examining the relations between different interventions in a given conflict. This includes the 
scrutiny of interdependence between multiple interventions and whether a preceding 
interventionary practice is related to the subsequent ones. The Russian military involvement in 
Syria, for example, is followed by succeeding UN diplomatic efforts in the same conflict. Was the 
UN diplomacy partly triggered by the preceding Russian involvement?  
Related to the idea of interdependence between interventions in a conflict, one has to 
explore the sequence of how these interventions are ordered. Are there any certain interventionary 
patterns based on the connections between various interventions in a given dispute? Is there a 
common pattern like the Syrian case where the Russian military engagement was followed by UN 
diplomacy? Are military interventions usually followed by diplomatic mediations in civil 
conflicts? 
Eventually, the main issue about interventions is understanding the effect of foreign 
interventionary practices in ending civil wars, especially when multiple types of interventions are 
used within the same conflict. Highlighting the asymmetrical features of civil wars—does military 
assistance in favor of the regime expedite a state victory—especially when we have contradictory 
cases in Afghanistan and Iraq, among many others. The whole project addresses these questions 
as it attempts to provide comprehensive theoretical and methodological frameworks to capture 
these multidimensional aspects of foreign interventions in civil wars.   
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1.1 Overview of Study 
This research focuses on the effects of external interventions in civil wars and attempts to 
provide a framework in which multiple types of intervention are incorporated into the analysis. It 
starts with examining the interdependence between a variety of interventions—including military, 
economic, and diplomatic—and proposes that a preceding intervention informs the subsequent 
ones.  
Based on this association and statistical findings for it, I identify certain interventionary 
patterns consisting of single or multiple interventions used in civil wars. These patterns provide 
sequences of interventions in which interventions are chronologically ordered, indicating initial 
and subsequent types of interventions employed in a conflict. The patterns thus help integrate 
multiple intervention types in the analysis.  
Finally, drawing on an extended bargaining framework, these patterns of interventions are 
tested for their effects in ending civil wars. Considering the impacts of outside interventions, the 
new bargaining framework accounts for both the change in power distribution between warring 
parties and the revelation of private information about the real capacities of each side.  
The framework also incorporates the idea of asymmetry into the theory and show how 
interventions disproportionately affect government and insurgent sides as a result of asymmetrical 
aspects of internal conflicts. In essence, this dissertation argues that interventions of any type, 
mainly due to the dynamics of asymmetry, benefit rebels, while undermining the state. To put it 
more concretely: external military intervention in favor of the state can be expected to backfire 
and thus undermine the incumbent’s bargaining position with rebels, suggesting the 
counterproductive consequences of foreign involvement for an embattled government. 
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 This project aims to contribute to the international relations scholarship on foreign 
interventions by mainly providing a comprehensive framework to estimate the effects of multiple 
types of interventions used within a single conflict. It makes an important contribution since most 
of the existing literature on interventions focuses on only one type of intervention while 
overlooking the additional and interactive effect of other types employed in the same war. Results 
from this study suggest that including multiple intervention types when analyzing the impact of 
external interventions on the outcome of a civil war enables a more rigorous approach and 
complete understanding of their impacts. 
 In the first part, the interdependence argument introduces a new framework in which the 
interactive association between a variety of interventions is delineated. The findings suggest that 
interventions deployed in the same conflict are related, such that initial interventions in a dispute 
trigger later ones. This finding is unique in the field since the existing studies only focus on a single 
type of intervention, neglecting the interaction between multiple interventions during the same 
conflict.  
 The interdependence argument also yields projections about the likely trajectory of initial 
interventions and attempts to predict subsequent interventions informed by the initial one. It 
employs mathematical models, such as Markov-chains, to make projections throughout a conflict. 
This is also an important contribution to the field by incorporating different prediction tools in 
estimating likely future projections for external interventions.  
 The theoretical framework in the second part focuses on testing the effects of different 
interventionary patterns—composing of either single or multiple interventions. The bargaining 
framework used in this part, besides specifying the material impacts of interventions, involves a 
new component—overrate fraction—accounting for the informational effects of interventions. 
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Furthermore, the framework also incorporates the asymmetrical aspects of civil wars by 
identifying the disproportionate consequences of interventions for each side on their material and 
informational components of military capability. The new framework thus provides a more 
comprehensive and rigorous assessment of foreign interventions, highlighting the additional and 
interactive effects of multiple interventions.  
 The project also aims to produce significant findings for conflict resolution practitioners. 
The interventionary patterns—combinations of different types of intervention—offer possible 
strategies for dealing with civil wars, depending on the desired outcome for each. The patterns 
thus could serve as policy prescriptions for the practitioners of conflict resolution as they intend to 
terminate a given civil war in a particular ending, including negotiated or victory outcomes.  
 Second, the projection model developed in the interdependence argument is also useful for 
practical purposes when policymakers attempt to prognosticate about the likely third-party 
involvement in particular conflicts. It foretells what likely future interventions could get deployed 
in a dispute.  
 The hypotheses developed in two separate chapters of the dissertation will be tested via an 
analysis of all intrastate conflicts that took place around the world from 1945 to 2012. Civil wars 
are drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset (v1-2015) (Harbom, 
Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). This is a yearly dyadic data that captures all state vs. individual 
rebel group contestation within countries. The UCDP Dataset also includes information about 
military interventions and the particular side each intervention is targeted. Economic sanctions 
data is from the Hufbauer (2007) dataset and diplomatic mediation data mainly comes from the 
Civil War Mediation (CWM) Dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011).  
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 There are two dependent variables used in this study. For the interdependence argument, 
the dependent variable is the categorical use of diplomatic, economic, and military interventions. 
Consisting of either non-intervention, single or combinations of multiple interventions, each 
category denotes the intervention(s) used in each year within a given civil conflict. Because the 
dependent variable is both categorical and ordered, I use ordered probit regressions in the analyses.  
 The second dependent variable is used for testing the effects of various interventionary 
patterns in terminating conflicts with different outcomes. It is the duration, corresponding to the 
period until each termination outcome is reached, and measured in years. Each of these conflict 
outcomes—negotiated settlement, rebel victory, or government victory—is part of the set of 
possible alternative outcomes available to combatants during war. In a way, these alternatives 
"compete" with one another to be the first outcome (event) that is observed. Accordingly, a 
competing risks model is used in testing the effects of various interventionary patterns on different 
outcomes.  
1.2 Outline of Chapters 
This study will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on foreign 
military, economic, and diplomatic interventions, highlighting theoretical and methodological 
limitations in the existing research. Chapter 3 is about the interdependence between various 
interventions in civil wars, and it provides an overall analysis of the discussion by delineating the 
theoretical argument and testing it. Besides, this chapter also includes a discussion of the projection 
of interventionary patterns and explains how the statistical findings from the interdependence 
discussion are used to estimate likely interventionary trajectories. Chapter 4 is about testing the 
   9 
effects of these interventionary patterns in ending civil wars with various outcomes. It provides 
both a theoretical argument based on an extended bargaining framework and statistical testing of 
the hypotheses from the argument. Chapter 5 summarizes key findings and their implications on 
research and policy purposes. 
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2.0 Literature on External Interventions in Civil Conflicts 
This chapter provides a survey of existing literature for the project. Most generally, 
intervention literature can be separated into two main streams. The first consists of studies that 
mainly explore the questions about the supply side of interventions, including who is intervening, 
which countries tend to be targeted, and the incentives for the third parties to involve in conflicts. 
The second stream predominantly tends to investigate the demand side and particularly studying 
the consequences of foreign involvement in civil wars. This project primarily focuses on the 
second part. In the literature about the results of third-party involvement, scholars and 
policymakers fundamentally want to know what actually works. That is, researchers attempt to 
look into the impacts of different foreign interventions in civil conflicts.  
The burgeoning literature on intervention has made some progress in addressing the 
question about the effects of external intervention in civil wars, but it has been hindered by 
researchers’ focus only on a single intervention type at the expense of other types taking place 
within the same conflict. That is, a typical study treats an individual intervention as independent 
of other interventions deployed within the same conflict, such as investigating the role of military 
interventions while disregarding the impacts of other intervention types, including economic and 
diplomatic interventions that took place in the very same dispute. Drawing the attention on this 
matter, Diehl and Regan (2015) argue that large number of research conducts their analysis as if 
they were unrelated to one another within the same conflict.  
In an attempt to fill that lacuna in the scholarship, I basically aim to provide a 
comprehensive framework to understand the effects of external interventions in civil conflicts as 
multiple intervention types are integrated into the analysis. To that end, I start with demonstrating 
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that different interventions in a given conflict are meaningfully related and then provide a 
theoretical framework in which the effects of these multiple interventions can be tested. More 
specifically, in the first place, I will provide a framework that accounts for the interdependence 
between various intervention types deployed in a single conflict. In this framework, I will examine 
whether various third-party involvements within a conflict are related one another by focusing on 
the influence of a preceding intervention on the ensuing one(s)–an early military intervention in a 
conflict triggering subsequent military, economic, or diplomatic interventions in the very same 
conflict.  
Next, based on the association between different interventions in a given conflict, I aim to 
produce particular interventionary patterns in which multiple interventions are integrated. More 
precisely, patterns constitute the sequence of several interventions–military, economic, or 
diplomatic activities–and a certain intervention type is followed by other type(s) in a given civil 
war.   
Finally, drawing on the bargaining theory as a comprehensive theoretical framework, I will 
test each of these patterns in order to evaluate their effects in terminating civil wars. Overall, this 
approach is intended to provide a more accurate analytical framework for the effects of external 
interventions, as opposed to the conventional studies that solely focus on each single intervention 
type.  
In the literature chapter, I will start surveying literature on military intervention, including 
both early and contemporary works, then continue with reviewing economic interventions 
focusing particularly on sanctions, and finally examine diplomatic interventions. At the end, I will 
discuss a handful of works that study multiple interventions in their research and underline the 
ways they differ from this project.  
   12 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to review the major theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the current literature, underscoring their limitations and highlighting the areas 
where progress is needed.  
2.1 Literature on Military Interventions  
2.1.1 Early Literature on Military Interventions 
This section discusses prominent studies in the early period of intervention literature. This 
is really important in the context of interventions because the researchers study the same central 
questions over time, employing more sophisticated theoretical and methodological tools. Thus, 
surveying the progress of the literature gives us a clear picture about the gaps in the scholarship 
and the necessary parts to further the comprehension of the impacts foreign actors play in civil 
wars. Furthermore, it helps to lay the groundwork for the conceptual and empirical research for 
studying the idea of intervention effectiveness. Finally, surveying the early work helps to identify 
relevant characteristics of both conflict state and the third parties to incorporate in the 
contemporary research.  
Although the literature section in general focuses on the research that studied the effects of 
interventions, this particular part on early interventions, for a thorough assessment, presents a brief 
outlook for the evolution of scholarship on interventions in a chronological manner. In the second 
part of military intervention literature, I turn the focus on the specific questions explored in the 
project.  
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Literature on military interventions in civil wars goes back to the early 1960s when US 
began to get involved in the Vietnam War. The academic interest in external interventions can be 
traced back to Rosenau’s edited book published in 1964. The essays in the book primarily 
discussed the international aspects of civil wars. The authors largely argued that internal wars take 
place in the context of international system, and external actors get involved in domestic disputes 
through various means according to the prominence of these conflicts within the global politics. 
As the editor, Rosenau discussed the international repercussions of internal conflicts with respect 
to the likely changes within the embattled countries. Most prominently, he predicted that structural 
conflicts in which the existing political regime is largely challenged, such as a Communist 
faction’s struggle for power, would appeal more international involvement when compared to the 
other domestic disputes (Rosenau 1964).  
In one of the chapters within the same book, Kaplan (1964) discussed the impact of 
international system on the likelihood of foreign interventions in civil wars. He argued that the 
system, by its nature, might encourage or discourage intervention, and thus a bipolar system, as 
opposed to a balance of power, would more encourage third parties to get involved in internal 
disputes.  
In his own chapter, Modelski (1964a) discussed about the strategic timing of military 
interventions, and posited that external involvement to internal strife is more likely to come when 
the polarization between domestic parties becomes more salient. He argued that such acute periods 
of hostilities urge domestic parties to seek external assistance due to vulnerability of their survival. 
In another chapter, Modelski (1964b) reflected on the ways how internal conflicts could get 
resolved, and argued that international action to remedy domestic dispute should be directed 
towards building an intermediary ground in order to maintain a degree of communication between 
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parties. His arguments paved the way for the notions of private information and also commitment 
problem in civil wars, which are later expanded by many scholars in the field. Although the authors 
in the book did not empirically test their theoretical arguments, the scholarly insights in the essays 
contributed substantially to the evolution of the scholarship.  
Rosenau in the early period of intervention research stands out in multiple aspects. In 
addition to the first scholarly works on the subject matter, Rosenau’s (1968) article on the concept 
of intervention paves the way for more empirical research based on a robustly-constructed 
definition of intervention. In his article, he emphasized two characteristics of intervention to 
differentiate the concept from broader phenomena in international politics. Underlining the need 
for an operational definition, he argued that an international action is considered to be an 
intervention when it is convention-breaking and authority-oriented. Intervention is convention-
breaking, he proposed, when the behavior of an external actor toward its target constitutes a sharp 
break with other forms that hitherto had been taken. As to the second part, he suggested, an action 
is authority-oriented  “whenever it is directed at changing or preserving the structure of political 
authority in the target society” (Rosenau 1968, 167). Both characteristics, according to Rosenau, 
are necessary conditions to specify an international action and thus avoid labelling all international 
actions as intervention. Explaining the specifics of the definition, Rosenau argued that such an 
approach could differentiate the concept of intervention, for example, from the idea of colonialism 
that involves the continued presence of a third party and, therefore, render it conventional. In 
another example, a Cuban missile crisis, he reasoned, involves unconventional components 
though, it is not primarily directed at the authority structures, but at the policies or capabilities of 
other nations. Thus, it would not be treated as an intervention. Iran nuclear deal–the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)–according to Rosenau’s reasoning, is not an intervention 
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because it is not an authority-oriented act to change internal regime dynamics in Iran–at least not 
directly–even though it is a convention-breaking practice of international community towards Iran.  
Rosenau’s attempts to build a definitional consistency for empirical “comparability and 
theoretical explicitness” of interventionary behavior (1969, 150) contributed to construct a 
conceptual, as well as methodological, baseline to define and operationalize foreign policy actions 
of international actors. Furthermore, without delimiting definition to a particular interventionary 
behavior, the approach enables to carry the definition across different intervention types, including 
military, economic, and diplomatic actions. Each intervention type, according to Rosenau’s 
method, can be operationally defined, and more importantly, be distinguished from other practices 
of foreign policy. Although Rosenau never conducted an empirical analysis of his conceptual 
arguments, his theoretical and methodological insights considerably influenced the development 
of intervention literature.  
Following Rosenau’s advice for a systematic inquiry, Mitchell (1970) investigated the 
factors that attract external states into civil conflicts. He argued that socio-economic, religious, 
ethnic or political identities of a conflict state are the main considerations to account for the third-
party motives about engaging in civil wars. More specifically, he suggested to link these domestic 
attributes of an embattled state to the societal and political dynamics within intervening states in 
order to understand the motivations behind foreign interventions.  
Although Mitchell never conducted an empirical analysis of his theoretical arguments, his 
analytical insights have prompted many theoretical advances in the literature. First, from a broader 
perspective, he draws attention to the dyadic linkages between parties of a conflict and potential 
third parties. This has paved the way for studying civil war dynamics through a more granular 
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dyad-level analysis, as opposed to conflict or county-level inquiries (see, for a recent example of 
how this line of research can be useful,  Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).  
In the second place, his idea of associating potential interveners with the parties of a 
conflict has led to the arguments about spill-over effects of civil wars. From this viewpoint, a civil 
conflict might get internationalized when different external states get involved in the dispute to 
support their affiliated domestic factions based on their ethnic, religious or other alleged links. 
Thus, the conflict, in such a way, can disseminate across other countries, as well as regions (see, 
for recent research examples of this approach, Carment and James 1995, Davis, Jaggers, and 
Moore 1997, Kathman 2011). Relatedly, his propositions about the dyadic linkages between 
parties of a conflict and potential interveners, as well as his insights about spill-over effects, 
advance the idea of interdependence between multiple interventions by different external actors in 
the same conflict. In this line, interventions in support of one side in a conflict can trigger other 
potential external actors to get involved in the same war through different means, including 
military, economic, diplomatic interventions. This might be a promising area in the intervention 
research and has yet to be studied.  
In one of the earlier quantitative studies, Gurr and Duvall (1973) investigated the factors 
in determining the intensity of civil wars; and external military intervention was one of their factors 
of interest. Conducting an empirical analysis using observational data, they found that 
interventions contribute to exacerbating conflict severity by increasing the number of casualties. 
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Despite some controversies about their study,1 it has been an influential quantitative study for the 
further research.  
In another earlier quantitative work, Pearson (1974) attempted to test the Rosenau’s (1964) 
hypothesis regarding structural civil wars. He looked into the probability of military interventions 
taking place in various domestic conflicts between the years 1960 and 1967. In an effort to 
operationalize Rosenau’s taxonomy of conflicts, he categorized the types of internal disputes 
according to their magnitude, varying from non-violent elite instabilities to moderate mass protests 
and up to major violent structural conflicts. As to the left-hand side of the equation, he classified 
military interventions according to the target (i.e. favoring state or rebel side) and the issues of 
concern to intervening governments, including territorial acquisition, affinity with the social 
groups, ideological motives, and so forth. Consequently, he finds support for Rosenau’s hypothesis 
about the relationship between structural conflicts and the likelihood of foreign interventions, 
concluding that more violent (“dislocative” in his accounts) strives attract more external 
involvements. In addition, he evidences that military interventions increase the intensity of conflict 
by producing more death, and the conflict gets prolonged when a third party is involved. Although 
his analysis was based on a small sample of civil wars taking place in only seven years, the findings 
prompted many further empirical research that revisited his results using larger datasets and more 
sophisticated methods.   
 
1 One of the main setbacks in their analysis though is the measurement for the scale of external support by 
using per capita GNP of donor states. By using this scale, the authors implicitly assumed that the level of contribution 
of an external state to a recipient party is directly commensurate with its full-economic capacity, which may not 
necessarily be the case for many of the cases. 
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Later on, Pearson directed his efforts into further data collection and generated one of the 
most comprehensive datasets on military interventions. The International Military Interventions 
(IMI) Dataset covers military interventions–both intrastate and interstate conflicts–globally 
between 1946 and 1988 (Pearson and Baumann 1993). The dataset is frequently used in 
contemporary quantitative intervention research, and has recently been updated to cover also 
between 1989 and 2005 (Kisangani and Pickering 2008).  
In one of the prominent quantitative studies of early literature, Rasler (1983) attempts to 
predict the timing; and the short and long-term effects of interventions, especially in the context 
of the 1976 Syrian military intervention within the Lebanese Civil War. Drawing on Modelski’s 
insights regarding the association between the polarization in a society and the timing of a third-
party involvement, she undertakes a longitudinal analysis to test the hypothesis about the timing, 
but could not find support for it. As to the effects, Rasler finds that the Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon contributed to the intensification of the conflict in the short-term, but it helped to alleviate 
the dispute in the longer term. In the literature, her study stands out one of the first systematic 
longitudinal analyses regarding the effects of external interventions; and also, the short vs. long-
term impacts of foreign involvement.   
In an effort to find out certain patterns in various foreign military actions, Dunér (1983) 
conducts an empirical analysis of sixty two military interventions–in different forms–in seven civil 
wars during the 1970s. He aims to provide an “anatomy of military intervention” (1983, 59) by 
distinguishing between the levels of third-party engagement varying from direct-combat 
intervention as a form of high-level involvement to auxiliary third-party military attempts, such as 
arms supply, military training, financial support as lower-level involvements. By doing so, he 
intends to understand whether foreign involvements in a conflict escalate in a certain manner. 
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Based on simple arithmetic comparisons, he concludes that there are no certain patterns in external 
involvements deployed within civil wars, and thus interventions, for example, do not 
systematically escalate from a lower level of involvement to a higher level in a given conflict. 
Most importantly, though, his study resonates with the concept of interdependence given his search 
for the interrelations between various forms of military interventions, which will be discussed in 
my project from a different perspective. The reasons why he ended up with finding no association 
between multiple military interventions in a conflict might arise from a number of limitations in 
his work. First, he focuses on the actions of only a particular single third party, as opposed to the 
actions of multiple parties involved in a given conflict. However, there might be some interesting 
patterns for the military actions of different actors engaged within the same conflict. Second, he 
tests his ideas using only simple arithmetic comparisons without employing more developed 
analytical methods of the time.  Finally, his research is both temporally–covering only the 1970s–
and numerically–including only 7 civil wars–limited. An analysis with a larger sample over a 
longer time span might provide us with more rigorous analysis.  
In parallel to these progresses in the early research, an alternative genre of research during 
this period also developed with increasing number of case studies about interventions. Along with 
the main interests in the academia during the Cold War era, case studies were mainly occupied 
with international-level aspects of civil wars, such as competition between rival camps, and their 
implications within civil war countries. Typically, case studies focused on a particular military 
intervention in a civil war carried out by one of the major powers. Most of them focused on U.S. 
activities, such as interventions in Indonesia (James and Sheil-Small 1971), Dominican Republic 
(Lowenthal 1972), Vietnam (Gurtov 1974, Karnow 1983, Cable 1986), El Salvador (Baloyra 
1982), Thailand (Girling 1981), and Cambodia (Vickery 1984). Some of these case works studied 
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Soviet interventions, such as in Czechoslovakia (Paul 1971) and Afghanistan (Schmid and Berends 
1985). Another set of works examined other foreign powers intervening in various parts of the 
world during the same period. In this category, cases focused on both the Cold War dynamics and 
typical decolonization politics between the former colonial states as interveners and colonies 
caught in some sort of internal conflicts. Most prominently, these case studies include 
interventions, such as by Britain (Wingen and Tillema 1980), France (Corbett 1972), and Belgium 
(Helmreich 1976). In the final category of case studies, researchers examined the interventions by 
other states, including interventions by Syria (Dawisha 1980), Uganda (Howell 1978), and Cuba 
(Durch 1978). In general, narratives in these case studies mostly help scholars develop their causal 
mechanisms for their particular research questions in regard to the implications of external 
interventions taking place within internal conflicts.  
2.1.2 Contemporary Literature on Military Intervention  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the number of civil wars has surged considerably in many 
regions of the world (Gleditsch, Melander, and Urdal 2016), increasing accordingly the academic 
interest in these conflicts. Drawing on the early intervention literature, contemporary research on 
the role of third parties in civil wars separates into two main research agendas: the motivations for 
military intervention in civil wars and the effects of these treatments on civil wars. The first 
research agenda investigates the conditions under which third parties are motivated to get involved 
in civil wars. Although this group of research is useful in understanding the third-party dynamics 
in internal conflicts, it is not central to the argument in this project. The second agenda focuses on 
the effect of military interventions on the outcome and the duration of civil wars, and thus will be 
the main focus in this section.  
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In general, while some researchers focus only on the duration of conflicts, others 
exclusively study the outcomes of civil wars, including negotiated settlement and victory 
outcomes. Another group of scholars investigate the termination of internal conflicts by examining 
both the duration and the outcome jointly.  
It should also be noted here that the literature section in this project do not survey studies 
on neutral third-party interventions, such as UN peacekeeping operations, even though many 
scholars have analyzed them especially since the end of the Cold War. Such neutral interventions 
typically, but not all, take place after the termination of fighting in some form, including after a 
ceasefire, peace agreement, or even sometimes a victory outcome. This project, however, is 
exclusively focusing on terminating civil wars prior to any form of cessation of fighting, and 
specifically investigating the effects of external interventions on it.  
Amongst the scholars of intervention in civil wars after the Cold War, Patrick Regan stands 
out as one of the most prominent and influential figures for quantitative research. Generating his 
own original dataset,2 he has paved the way for more rigorous research on intervention literature 
and stimulated important debates among scholars about the role of interventions.  
Using his dataset covering the years between 1944 and 1994 of 85 civil wars involving a 
total of 196 interventions, Regan (1996) analyzed the conditions under which outside interventions 
become successful. He assumed that the ultimate goal of interventions is to terminate fighting, and 
correspondingly operationalized the success of interventions (the dependent variable) as the 
cessation of military hostilities–lasting for at least 6 months. In his analysis, he sought to match 
 
2 He uses a baseline of 200 battle-related death ratio for conceptualizing the definition of civil war as 
compared to 1000 or 25 thresholds that are more common in the literature. 
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the intervention type(s), including military, economic, and mixed (military and economic); with a 
number of relevant features of conflict, including the type of conflict and the target of intervention. 
Drawing on the rational decision-making model for the settlement, he posited that more external 
tools–employing both military and economic interventions together (mixed) than each single type–
will contribute more to bringing an end to civil wars. Using logit models, Regan found support for 
his conjecture that mixed strategy, as compared to using only one intervention type, is more 
effective at terminating civil wars. In addition, he found that interventions in favor of the 
incumbent over the opposition are more effective for ending conflicts.  
There are prominent implications of this work on interventions, and I will make a further 
discussion of his work in the following paragraphs.  
Regan’s (2000) book is also an expansion of his 1996 article on the effectiveness of 
interventions on terminating conflicts. In addition to the article, he included discussions about the 
determinants of external nations' decisions to intervene and the comparison between unilateral 
(state) and multilateral (UN) interventions. His results, in general, provide that non-intervened 
conflicts are more likely to end than those with external interventions. Similar to his 1996 article 
findings, he found that a mixture of military and economic interventions, rather than each single 
type are more successful at terminating conflicts.  
In general, Regan’s work on intervention has drawn a lot of scholarly attention. Many 
scholars have revisited the same questions and utilized his dataset to make their own research. 
Despite his valuable contributions to the intervention research, there are a number of drawbacks 
to be mentioned in his works. First, given the third parties’ strategic choices to pick cases for 
intervention (see, for a broader discussion about this concern, Fortna 2008), selection bias is an 
issue in the literature. Although he accepts this general concern in his book, his data still 
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exclusively includes civil wars in which only outside intervention took place, and he does not 
tackle the selection issue in his analyses. Second, for multi-party interventions in which more than 
one third party get involved in a conflict, he codifies each intervener as a separate observation for 
the same conflict. Such an operationalization might skew the results when there are only a number 
of conflicts with numerous external interveners.  
Third, his definition for the military intervention is cut much broader than most of the 
contemporary research. He conceives of military intervention “to include the supply or transfer of 
troops, hardware, or intelligence and logistical support to the parties in conflict, or, as may be the 
case, the cutoff of any such aid currently in place” (1996, 342-343). However, most of the scholars 
generally conceptualize military interventions as the deployment of actual troops on the ground, 
excluding other means, or alternatively, operationalizing such non-deployment tactics as separate 
categories.  
Finally, some scholars challenged his assumption about the goal of military interventions 
as solely ceasing the hostilities between belligerents. Researchers argue that such a generalization 
with respect to the goal of intervention might be too broad, and claim that biased interventions, by 
nature, bear other goals instead, including the acquisition of territory, protecting some minority 
groups and so forth and so on (see, for example, Cunningham 2010).  
Despite all these shortcomings, Regan’s works have largely influenced the intervention 
literature heavily, especially pushing it more towards quantitative analysis.  
Using Regan’s dataset, definitions, and assumptions, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) 
examined the effects of external interventions on civil war duration, with a focus on the level of 
ethnic fractionalization. They argued that external intervention in a civil conflict reduces the cost 
of coordination for a given ethnic group and thus leads to prolonged wars by decreasing the costs 
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of fighting for rebels. Their findings supported the expectation that external intervention is 
positively associated with war duration. The most notable contribution in their analysis is the 
introduction of endogeneity issue into the intervention literature. They treat external intervention 
as an endogenous variable, and remedy for it simply by lagging the variable. However, they do not 
discriminate between the various foreign intervention types, and lump all of the types into a single 
external intervention variable–types include military, economic, mixed, unilateral, and multilateral 
interventions. Secondly, they do not differentiate between the target of intervention–rebel vs. state-
biased–which is important for their proposed theoretical argument regarding the effects of 
treatment on ethnic groups. Finally, they do not distinguish multilateral interventions–such as UN 
interventions–from unilateral interventions considering both conceptually the same. Typically, 
they are considered to be inherently different from one another, particularly in terms of their goals 
(see, for example, Regan 2000).    
Some research presented more disaggregated analysis with respect to the impacts of 
military interventions on particular war outcomes.  Mason and Fett (1996) examined the effect of 
military interventions on the negotiated settlement of civil conflicts. Drawing on the expected 
utility theory, the authors presented a decision-making model by which belligerents would choose 
between continuing to fight in the hope of victory, or conceding to a negotiated outcome. They 
anticipated that factors that lead to a decrease in the probability of winning, an increase in the 
estimated time to victory, and/or a reduction in the value of the payoffs from winning could make 
a negotiated settlement more appealing. In this regard, they expected that external interventions in 
favor of either side would decrease the possibility of a negotiated outcome mainly by increasing 
the likelihood of a victory for the targeted party. Their results, however, did not support their 
hypothesis, and external interventions were found to have no significant impact on war outcomes. 
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Using a similar theoretical and methodological framework, Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999), 
in another article, tested the same argument–this time on both the negotiated and victory outcomes. 
Yet, they did not find statistical support for their expectations about the role of biased interventions 
on particular conflict outcomes.  
Highlighting the role of particular aspects of civil warfare, a number of scholars 
emphasized the role of foreign intervention on the balance of power between domestic antagonists. 
In his volume of essays by prominent scholars, Licklider (1993) argued that the decision to 
negotiate a settlement during a civil war is a function of warring parties’ internal capabilities and 
third-party involvement can therefore influence it. Biased interventions on behalf of either side, 
according to his argument, will likely tip the balance of power, giving the targeted side a deterring 
advantage over the other. The weaker party, given the changed status, might be more likely to 
negotiate then. It is an intuitive theoretical argument on the basis of power distribution, but he does 
not provide any empirical testing for it in the book.  
Over the same discussion, Dixon (2001) analyzed the influence of third-party interventions 
on the civil war termination. Drawing hypotheses from formal models, he proposed that negotiated 
settlement outcome could be precipitated as a function of external interventions as they alter the 
power distribution between sides. According to his argument, these involvements could disrupt 
the balance of power between government and opposition forces, and thus increase the costs of 
war for the unsupported side. This could pave the way for a peaceful termination of conflict. His 
results from statistical testing partly supports his conjectures.  
However, these studies did not incorporate the idea of asymmetry embedded in civil 
warfare that occur between the state and non-state actors. Addressing the asymmetric features of 
power distribution between belligerents, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) investigate 
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the effects of third-party military interventions on the outcome and the duration of civil conflicts. 
The authors argue that third-party interventions will have differential effects on the likelihood of 
a negotiated settlement as to whether the intervention is conducted on behalf of government or 
opposition side. They also posit that balanced interventions, referring the foreign involvements for 
both sides, will increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, while decreasing the chance of 
military victory by either side. Employing competing risks models to differentiate between various 
war outcomes, they however find that interventions on behalf of the government or the rebel group, 
irrespectively, increase the likelihood of the supported group achieving military victory, and at the 
same time, increase the likelihood of a negotiated outcome. Balanced-interventions, according to 
their results, decrease the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Thus, the results from their 
analyses do not support their main hypothesis about the uneven impact of biased interventions 
with respect to the targeted side.  
There are a number of methodological issues to be raised about their study. First, war costs 
variable in their analysis is calculated by dividing the final battle-related death numbers of the state 
forces to the initial total population. But weirdly, they added, similar to Gurr and Duvall (1973), 
intervener’s overall population to the state when intervention takes place, which might lead to 
some controversial consequences. For example, think of a case in which a highly populous country, 
such as China, is the intervener in favor of an incumbent in a civil war. In this case, the cost of war 
will be quite minuscule, no matter how grave the actual battle-related deaths are. This may not be 
an appropriate proxy in this case.  
Secondly, while the third-party intervention variables are time-varying covariates, the rest 
of their explanatory variables, including economic development and democracy, are 
operationalized as time-invariant. This incongruence might distort the coefficients and standard 
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errors for intervention-related variables given the within-group and between-group heterogeneity. 
Third, the authors use a dataset that goes back to the early 19th century. However, the 
characteristics of civil war, as well as the nature of intervention, has changer over these two 
centuries in the face of notable changes in the international system–changes that come with the 
end of Cold War, to say the least (see, for example, Kaplan 1964, Howard and Stark 2018). Yet 
the authors do not control for such systemic changes in their analysis, such as using a dummy for 
distinguishing between the Cold War and the afterwards.  
Despite these drawbacks, Balch et al.’s article is a good analysis of how to differentiate 
between war outcomes, and especially the idea of balanced interventions3 is somewhat related to 
the notion of interdependence between foreign involvements in conflicts and will be delineated 
further in this project by linking different types of external interventions in a given civil war.  
Similar to Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008), Gent also (2008) focused on the 
asymmetric consequences of biased military interventions depending on the targeted side. 
Relaxing Regan’s (2000, 1996) assumption about the goal of interventions as conflict termination, 
he argued that third parties do not randomly intervene in disputes, and military intervention is 
conducted when governments face strong rebel groups. Given this selection effect, he posited that 
state-biased interventions may not have substantive impact while interventions in favor of an 
opposition group will increase the likelihood of rebel victory. Drawing on the formal models, he 
develops his theory and then tests the hypotheses using observational data. Gent eventually finds 
 
3 The notion of balanced intervention assumes that states as strategic actors intervene in embattled countries 
in order to counterbalance when their interests are at stake in the face of another preceding external intervention in the 
same conflict. That is, once an intervention takes place in support of either side, another intervention is also likely in 
favor of opposite side in the conflict. 
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support for his prepositions that the effects vary according to the targeted side based on the power 
distribution between sides, and state-biased interventions are less effective since the rebel forces 
in these conflicts are already expected to be strong. The main innovation in Gent’s work is the idea 
that interveners act rationally, and thus, external actors choose which conflicts to intervene. It is 
an important departure from Regan’s central assumption that interveners get involved in conflicts 
irrespectively only with the purpose of settling the disputes.  
However, a key drawback in Gent’s study is the distribution of his data across the main 
variable, relative rebel capability. In an examination of civil wars from 1945 to 2002, Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) highlight that the number of cases in which rebel groups are “much 
stronger” than the government is just two. Hence, his main assumption about the balance of power 
in civil conflicts accounts for only very few cases in which rebel groups are more powerful than 
incumbent forces. Thus, he might be drawing too strong conclusions grounded on insufficient 
number of real-world cases. From a methodological standpoint, the article has also another major 
shortcoming: In order to operationalize the relative rebel capability, he uses an annual size of the 
state’s army, and the measure of rebel troop size only at the beginning of each conflict. While this 
measure allows to capture the temporal variation for state’s army, it does not for rebel forces, 
which is time-invariant. Thus, this measurement discrepancy in operationalizing parties’ troop 
sizes might have also caused some misestimation in his results.   
Expanding on Balch-Lindsay et al. and Gent’s arguments about the differential benefits 
with respect to the targeted side, Sullivan and Karreth (2015) focused on the utility and limitations 
of military forces. They argue that conventional forces introduced by an external state in favor of 
insurgents increase rebel group’s fighting capability whereas intervention in support of a 
government will not be directly translated into the battlefield on the grounds that rebel groups 
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typically adopt unconventional warfare tactics vis-à-vis relatively stronger state military. Using 
observational data from internal conflicts from 1945 to 2010, the authors find support for their 
predictions.  
In most of these studies, power distribution between belligerent parties became the central 
measure that the arguments speculated about. In an effort to specify an alternative measure for the 
relative strength between sides, Hultquist (2013) used a new measure originally constructed by 
Wood (2010). This is a dyadic ratio of rebel troops divided by a scaled number of government 
forces, where state troops are scaled by the number of insurgent groups that a government 
confronts. Using this new variable, Hultquist argued that the power parity between incumbent and 
opposition forces increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement while the conflicts with much 
weaker and stronger insurgency are less likely to end up with a peaceful outcome. He finds support 
for his main argument and also reports that biased interventions undermine the odds of a victory 
for the opposite party.  
Adding a new perspective to the discussion, Cunningham (2010) investigates the 
relationship between the outside military interventions and the duration of civil wars by focusing 
on the third parties’ motivations. According to Cunningham, existing research assumed that the 
third parties intervene either to settle the dispute, such as (Regan 1996, 2000), or to help the 
targeted side win, such as Gent (2008). Different from these assumptions, Cunningham argued that 
external states might also intervene to pursue their own parochial interests, rather than 
aforementioned goals. In this case, some interveners get involved in a civil conflict independent 
from the goals of domestic belligerents, such as gaining territory for their national interests. He 
posited that interventions with such a separate agenda are likely to prolong the duration of war 
mainly due to the addition of a new player to the decision-making process–also known as veto 
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player theory originally developed by Tsebelis (2002). Testing his hypotheses using Cox 
regressions, he found support for his claim that interventions with a separate agenda protract the 
duration of fighting.  
Focusing on the identity of the third party, Kim (2012) discussed the impact of military 
interventions on civil war duration and outcome by differentiating between unilateral (state) and 
multilateral (UN) interventions. He posited that unilateral interventions are motivated exclusively 
out of self-interest while multilateral interventions are carried out in pursuit of humanitarian 
concerns. Kim argued that variation in terms of the identity of external interventions will have 
different consequences on the outcome and the duration. However, he does not find support for 
his argument. The results show that there is not differential impact on the outcome with respect to 
unilateral and multilateral interventions, and both types prolong the conflict in which they are 
deployed.  
Another strand of literature focuses on the commitment problem in civil wars originally 
developed by Walter (1997), and highlights the role of military interventions in unfolding this 
strategic interplay between players. Fearon and Laitin (2007) discussed the role of commitment 
problems in shaping power-sharing arrangements, as they differentiate between central-seeking 
and separatist conflicts. The authors treat external military interventions as shocks to relative 
power when foreign actors enter or exit a conflict, and argue that such upsets in the power structure 
between belligerents lead to conflict cessation. Examining 30 randomly selected conflicts to test 
their hypothesis, they find support for their claims. However, it is only a tentative testing, and begs 
for more analytical scrutiny.  
A number of scholars primarily tackle empirical issues in the military intervention 
literature. Thyne (2008), for example, highlighted the model misspecification problem, and 
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focuses on the role of third-party interventions on the duration of civil wars. He argues that existing 
research may suffer from model specification due to unobserved factors. According to his 
argument, these factors, such as parties’ resolve to fight, might be contributing to war duration 
while these factors are not typically involved in empirical models. He tests his argument by 
simultaneously estimating models predicting the likelihood of intervention and the duration of civil 
wars, and then checks the correlations of the error terms from these two models. He finds that error 
terms are correlated, and thus concludes that the unobserved factors that contribute to the duration 
of war may also be determining whether interventions will occur, thereby casting doubt on the 
conclusion that intervention leads to longer civil wars.  
In general, Thyne’s argument is useful in terms of addressing an important gap in the 
literature. However, his estimation models generate statistically significant results for UN 
interventions, but not for unilateral state interventions. This particular result is somewhat 
interesting because it implies that states do not pick out their targets selectively to intervene 
whereas the UN does it. However, the literature on international relations is pretty confident on 
the idea that states are rational and strategic players for their foreign policy decisions (Putnam 
1988, Fearon 1998, 1995, Gent 2008). Nevertheless, his remarks about the use of more 
sophisticated and rigorous empirical models, as well as more comprehensive conceptual 
framework, are useful in driving the intervention scholarship towards more refined analyses.  
So far in this section, I have discussed the extant literature on military interventions, 
beginning with the early works and then moving to the contemporary research. Note that the 
research typically focused solely on military interventions, and later in the chapter, I will present 
a few studies that attempt to incorporate multiple intervention types in their research.  
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 To sum up, early research on military interventions set the stage for later scholars mostly 
by their theoretical and conceptual insights into the central questions about the consequences of 
foreign interventions in civil conflicts. Modern research has frequently revisited the questions 
raised by these earlier scholars and built their conjectures by extending earlier theoretical 
arguments and testing them through more sophisticated methodological techniques.  
In general, a strand of research has sought to understand the effects of military interventions 
on the duration of civil conflicts while some others focused solely on war outcomes. Another genre 
of scholars also attempted to examine the outcome and the duration of disputes jointly in their 
works. Research on the war duration mostly agrees on the conclusion that military interventions 
prolong conflicts when they are deployed, but fails to come to terms on the causal mechanism 
about how it works. Studies examining war outcomes however often present competing results in 
regard to the impacts of third-party military efforts.  
The scholars also often contest over the role of military interventions when it comes to the 
different war outcomes, targeted side, and the way it influences conflicts. The distribution of power 
between government and rebel forces–i.e., the asymmetric aspect of civil wars–albeit less 
developed, has become one of the key arguments in the research offering intuitive insights about 
the implications of foreign involvement.   
2.2 Literature on Economic Sanctions  
Economic sanctions are increasingly becoming a prominent tool international community 
employs in civil war contexts, and debates about its effectiveness are alike on the rise.  
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To begin with, economic sanction is defined as coercive measures imposed by one country, 
an international organization or a group of countries against another government or any particular 
group with the purpose of bringing about a change in a specific policy (Escribà-Folch 2010). The 
earliest research on economic sanctions in general have been skeptical as to the efficiency of 
sanctions (Wallensteen 1968, Galtung 1967, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1985). Scholars in the 
later periods attempt to provide more nuanced scrutiny regarding the impact of such measures, 
debating what kind of sanctions are more effective, under what conditions sanctions could be 
expected to work, and also the impact of sanction threats. Unlike myriad studies on understanding 
the role of military interventions, there is a dearth of literature considering the effect of economic 
sanctions particularly in the case of civil wars.  
A book by Cortright and Lopez (2000) is based on hundreds of interviews with officials 
from the United Nations, target, and sender countries; and offers a comprehensive assessment of 
the effectiveness of UN sanctions. The authors provide detailed narratives about the role of 
economic sanctions, and argue that the crucial factor is the will and the ability of sender to enforce 
sanctions. In their book, they also highlight the significance of smart sanctions, including financial, 
arms embargoes, and travel restrictions on a particular select elite in a target state. Testing their 
argument using numerous interviews, they find support concluding that rigorously-enforced 
sanctions are more likely to be effective than limited and unenforced measures in bringing about 
an end to civil conflicts. One key takeaway from the book is the idea that sanctions must be 
analyzed as an element in a larger international community’s toolkit that needs to be accompanied 
by other measures.   
Focusing on the implications of economic sanctions in a civil war context, Gershenson 
(2002) explored the implications of the policy on target governments by differentiating between 
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weak and strong measures taken by the sender. He argued that stronger measures with costlier 
consequences on a target would lower the expected utility from victory and thus could generate 
greater impact in extracting concessions. Furthermore, he argues that weak sanctions imposed 
against an incumbent regime could even hurt the opposition side by encouraging more violence 
from the government. Drawing on formal-theory testing, he eventually concludes that economic 
sanctions sustained by strong commitment is essential to achieving desired outcomes in internal 
disputes. 
In one of the earlier quantitative studies on the role of sanctions in civil conflicts, Strandow 
(2006) investigated the likelihood of UN sanctions bringing two contending parties to the 
negotiation table in order to resolve their disputes. Drawing on the bargaining theory, he argued 
that conflict resolution comes as a result of revelation of private information, which converges 
disputants’ beliefs over their relative power distribution. That is, parties will continue to fight as 
long as they are uncertain of the power distribution, and sanctions primarily affect targets’ beliefs 
by providing information about their relative power. In this sense, sanctions enable to approximate 
each party’s estimated (believed) probability of winning to the real probability of winning and thus 
make it possible for each side to assess the war outcome more objectively. This helps bring 
disputants to the table and settle their disputes.  Using monthly data about civil wars in Liberia and 
Ivory Coast, he finds that [consistently-implemented] sanctions increase the likelihood of conflict 
resolution in civil wars.  
Although Strandow’s study is one of the initial quantitative research on the effectiveness 
of sanctions in civil wars, the number of observations in his data sample is too small to conduct a 
rigorous empirical analysis about the question. Furthermore, his models do not include crucial 
control variables, such as the type of conflict, intensity etc., that are typically used in the research 
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examining the duration and the outcome of civil wars. Instead, he univariately tests the 
effectiveness of different economic sanctions against various conflict resolution measures.  
Using the same bargaining framework as Strandow, Escribà-Folch (2010) explored the 
impact of economic sanctions both on the duration and the outcome of civil wars. He argued that 
sanctions can shorten the duration of civil wars by overcoming information asymmetries, 
dampening the utility of victory, and increasing the costs of continued fighting. Relatedly, he 
expected that multilateral sanctions imposed by any international organization, as compared to 
unilaterally imposed sanctions by a state or a group of states, are more effective in decreasing 
conflict duration. He argued that international organizations are more capable of enhanced 
enforcement and also enjoy more credibility for their commitments to maintain their sanctions. 
Using new data on sanctions, he demonstrates that economic sanctions by international 
organizations shorten the duration of intrastate conflicts and increase the likelihood of negotiated 
settlement outcome in these disputes while unilateral sanctions are more associated with military 
victory outcome.  
However, later on, Lektzian and Regan (2016) revisit Escribà-Folch’s findings and notice 
that the results in favor of multilateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions in regard to conflict 
duration are washed out when a variable for the presence of external military intervention is taken 
out of his models. That is, when the variable for concurrent military intervention during economic 
sanctions are not included in the analysis, the effect of multilateral sanctions, reported statistically 
significant in Escribà-Folch’s model, renders insignifanct. Thus, the factors shorterning conflict 
duration, according to Lektzian and Regan’s argument, are not exclusively attributed to economic 
sanctions. Instead, they suggest that whenever economic measures are implemented in conjunction 
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with military interventions as an enforcement mechanism. I will discuss more about this issue later 
in the following parts.  
There is also another line of research on economic sanctions that is less relevant to the 
impacts of these policies in civil wars, but still important in comprehending the effectiveness of 
sanctions. Drawing attention to the undesired consequences of economic sanctions, Wood (2008) 
investigated the impact of these policies on the human rights conditions within the target country 
(but not necessarily in civil war contexts). He argued that the imposition of economic sanctions 
deteriorates human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase the 
level of state-sponsored repression. According to his argument, this colleteral damage comes as a 
result of incumbent’s desire to stabilize the regime by attempting to stifle popular dissent. 
Conrolling for the presence of internal conflict in the model, he finds that the result still holds in 
civil war contexts.  
In an effort to comprehend the role of economic sanctions on the domestic dynamics within 
a target state, Marinov (2005) questioned whether sanctions destabilize target governments. He 
suggested that an economic sanction generates political costs for the head of targeted government, 
and thus destrabilizes the incumbent leaders. Using a large panel of cross-country time-series data, 
he found evidence for his propositions about the disruptive impacts of economic sanctions. 
Although his argument does not specifically focus on civil conflicts, the argument still seems 
applicable in these contexts as well. It would be especially interesting to see how sanctions function 
during a domestic dispute when the incumbent is challenged by a center-seeking insurgency.  
It is also important to note that initial quantitative studies on sanctions largely relied on 
data collected by Hufbauer (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1985, Hufbauer 2007). The dataset is the 
most detailed dataset on the global use of sanctions and each case is specified with a number of 
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descriptive information, including target states, sanctioners, the features of the sanction, the 
outcome of the policy etc. But the dataset does not specifically survey civil war countries.  
A major addition was introduced to economic sanctions datasets after Fearon’s (1998) 
seminal work about bargaining. In his article, Fearon highlighted the importance of costly 
standoffs in negotiations between disputants as the parties bargain harder to get a better deal. Some 
scholars applied this argument in the context of economic sanctions, and suggested that the threat 
of sanctions can also be part of the bargaining between sender and target countries. Drezner (2003), 
for example, argued that potential targets might adjust their questioned policies even in the face of 
sanction threats without implementing actual sanctions. To match this theoretical argument, a new 
dataset was released on the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) (Morgan, Bapat, 
and Krustev 2009) and captures sanctions–also including the threats of sanctions–between the 
years 1971 and 2000. Differentiating the threat and the implemented sanctions, the dataset enables 
to test the effectiveness of sanctions in changing target’s behaviour in the face of economic 
sanctions. Recently, the TIES dataset have also been extended to cover the 1945-2005 period 
(Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014).  
Thanks to the availability of this dataset, Hultman and Peksen (2015) inquired the 
differential effects between the threats and imposition of economic measures on the intensity of 
conflict. The authors tested their argument using African civil wars from 1989 to 2005. The results 
demonstrate that threats of economic sanctions play a similar role to the imposed measures, and 
both policies increase the intensity of conflict alike.  
Hultman and Peksen’s study overall furnishes a good example of a fine-grained theoretical 
argument and a rigorously-tested empirical analysis for the future research on external 
interventions. However, there are some empirical and conceptual issues with the study. First, the 
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authors use data only from African civil wars. This particular region might be characteristically 
distinct from other parts of the world in terms of responding to the international communities’ 
economic sanctions due to the relatively dire economic conditions plagueing most of the continent. 
Secondly, their outcome variable is conflict intensity and it is measured by the number of fatalities 
in battle-related violence, including government troops, rebels, and civilians killed in battle-related 
activities. However, theoretical explanations for government and rebel group troops might be 
distinctly different from collateral damage. Thus, the authors might, instead, differentiate between 
these specified groups and develop different arguments for each particular category.  
To wrap up, the literature on economic sanctions in the context of civil wars suffers from 
inadequate scholarly interest; and inconclusive and even contradictory findings about the effects 
of economic sanctions. Most importantly, researchers, in their analyses, focus solely on the impacts 
of economic sanctions without incorporating other outside interventions deployed in the very same 
cases. This may generate methodological problems, such as spurious correlation and misestimated 
coefficients. At the end of literature chapter, I will further discuss the gaps and suggestions to 
address them, as well as what this project might offer for it.  
2.3 Literature on Diplomatic Interventions  
There are multiple forms of diplomatic interventions available to the international 
community to employ in disputes and mediation is the most common form used in civil wars 
(Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009). Data on diplomatic interventions in civil wars by Regan and 
Aydin (2006) indicate that mediation is by far the most visited form constituting around 82% of 
the all codified diplomatic interventions in the dataset. Thus, in this project, I will be mainly 
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focusing on mediation in lieu of all diplomatic intervention forms due to its prevalence over the 
other forms in civil conflicts, as well as the data availability.  
In general terms, mediation is commonly conceptualized as a process where domestic 
antagonists seek or accept the assistance of a third party to settle their dispute (Hoeffler 2014). 
Mediations are crucial particularly in civil wars due to a number of reasons. First, there is an 
asymmetry between the embattled parties, namely the state and a rebel group. This disparity stems 
first from the legal status of parties as the government is a legitimate actor accepted by its people, 
as well as by the international community, while insurgents typically lack such a status. A dialogue 
with the rebels might be considered as recognizing their legitimacy and thus providing them equal 
status to the state. Under these circumstances, such asymmetry typically precludes parties holding 
bilateral negotiations without a third party involvement (see, for further discussions, for example, 
Zartman 1993, Dixon 2001, Bercovitch and Jackson 2001, Melin and Svensson 2009, Clayton 
2013).  
Second, commitment problem emerges as an obstacle when domestic disputants attempt to 
resolve their issues. This particular problem arises due to parties’ inability to convince the other 
side for their commitment to the terms of settlement (Walter 2002, 1997). Mediations, therefore, 
enhance the possibility of credible commitments to settle conflicts once an external actor shoulder 
part of the burden by monitoring and even enforcing disputants’ commitments to the terms of 
likely agreements.   
Finally, mediations help overcome information asymmetries. According to the theoretical 
perspective that views the war as a bargaining process, opponents typically tend to overstate 
information about their capabilities in order to obtain better settlement deals (Powell 2004, Wagner 
2000). The misinformation might thus preclude sides to compromise. As part of an information-
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revealing mechanism, mediation can contribute belligerents to overcoming the information 
asymmetry by enabling the channels of communication and thus help to resolve an ongoing 
conflict (Beardsley 2006).  
Surveying the existing scholarship on diplomatic intervention, there is a myriad of 
literature on mediation in general. In the earlier studies, the process of mediation was widely 
regarded as heuristic implementation of bargaining tactics by third parties behind closed doors, 
and thus, it lacked systematic analysis (Bercovitch 2009). Especially after the introduction of 
International Conflict Management (ICM) Dataset by Bercovitch et al. in 2004, the mediation 
research on interstate mediation has largely received more empirical scrutiny. However, mostly 
due to available data on conflicts between states, the mediation research has focused almost 
exclusively on interstate conflict (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009). One of the initial datasets on 
civil war mediation was collected by DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna (2011) covering post-
WWII period and paved the way for more analytical progress. Another dataset on intrastate 
diplomatic interventions was developed by Regan, Frank, and Aydin (2009) spanning years from 
1945 to 1999. Although the definition of civil war is differently conceptualized in this dataset,4 
there are still many scholars out in the field using this dataset despite associated difficulties about 
merging with other datasets. Finally, there is Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Conflict (MILC) 
data project concerned with internal conflict mediation, as well as prevention measures (Melander 
et al. 2009). It is a product of Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and covers global cases for 
 
4 Regan, Frank, and Aydin operationalize civil war different from mainstream definitions that rely on 25 or 
1000 battle-related deaths. In their dataset, a conflict is recognized as a civil war when it reaches 200-casualty 
threshold. 
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only 12 years between 1993 and 2004. It is an event-dataset that covers all measures, including 
mediation and other forms of diplomacy taken by third parties in intrastate conflicts.  
Research on civil war mediation has examined the impact of multiple factors that may 
influence the outcome of a third-party intervention. These features can be summarized under two 
conceptual groups. The first pertains to the characteristics of third parties, domestic disputants and 
conflicts. The second group encompasses the timing of intervention attempt.   
Within the first strand of the mediation literature, Olson and Pearson (2002) examined the 
association between the mediation success and the identity of the third party while controlling for 
relevant features of conflict. Central to their argument is the idea that an insider mediator who 
comes from a country of origin located within conflict region might fare better in leading to the 
settlement of a dispute compared to outside parties. Employing step-wise statistical analysis, they 
found inconsistent results once different sets of control variables are introduced into their models. 
Eventually, the authors concluded that the relationship between the identity of mediator and the 
success of diplomacy is a complex process involving various interactive factors. Overall, it is an 
important work given that it is one of the early empirical inquiry of the issue. However, the study 
suffers from a number of methodological drawbacks, including, most saliently, the small number 
of observations for the analysis collected from only 14 civil wars.  
The extent of third-party resources is also considered as an important asset to the success 
of mediation. Touval (1994) examined the mediation attempts carried out by the UN, and discussed 
the reasons why the organization fails to successfully settle disputes through mediation. He 
featured the inherent characteristics of the organization, particularly focusing on the lack of 
resources that render it incapable for effective mediation. More specifically, the organization does 
not have the credibility over mediated parties, he argued, because it lacks the necessary political 
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and material resources to pressure disputants for a settlement. Given the binding restrictions by 
Security Council for the use of resources, Touval asserted, the UN is unable to flexibly maneuver 
in order to manipulate disputants’ positions during mediations. Yet, he did not test his arguments 
in the article.  
Relatedly, emphasizing the resources of external actors in the mediation, Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson, and Wille (1991a) compare the efficacy of major countries to the other relatively 
weaker states in mediating conflicts. They argue that major states are better in mediation given 
their vast resources. On a similar discussion, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) demonstrate that 
international conflict management is mostly conducted by the permanent members of the Security 
Council of the UN who have been the key states of international system since the end of WWII.  
Similarly, Greig and Regan (2008) underscore the importance of resources allocated by the 
third parties for mediation, and claim that major powers with their superior resources available for 
diplomatic process play a key role in bringing success to their mediation attempts. The findings 
from their statistical testing support their expectation about the prominence of major states in 
diplomacy.  
A number of scholars speculated about the role of external party neutrality for mediation 
success. Svensson (2007a) investigates the differential effects of biased versus impartial mediators 
in settling internal wars. Focusing on the incumbent’s concerns about commitment problems, he 
suggests that government-sided mediation help to overcome incumbent’s some of the concerns 
about the implementation phase and thus contribute to diffusing conflicts. Using statistical models 
to test the argument, he finds support for his predictions.  
Svensson’s argument of neutrality has prompted many scholarly discussions about the role 
various international actors, including international and regional organizations in mediating 
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internal conflicts. However, Svensson’s study suffers from a number of conceptual and 
methodological issues. One of the main drawbacks in the Svensson’s study is the way how he 
operationalizes biased and neutral mediations, which is the gist of his argument. He codifies 
mediation as biased if a procurer of mediation provides any support to disputants before the actual 
talks take place. That is, the author does not specify third parties in terms of their biasedness during 
mediation talks, but instead, focuses on the course of the war before the negotiations take place. 
Although this method might partially help find a proxy for biasedness, it does not reflect fully the 
underlying psychological nature of his argument about overcoming commitment problems. The 
attitudes and the partiality of a third party during the negotiation process, according to his own 
argument, is central to identify the tone of outside parties.  
Secondly, the coefficient for state-biased mediations in Svensson’s study is found 
significant and positive; and it is not significant for rebel-biased interventions. However, the 
argument in his work implies that state-biased mediation is the mirror image of rebel-biased 
mediations. That is, rebel-biased interventions, according to his argument, seems to be detrimental 
to any mediation outcome, decreasing the likelihood of success in the diplomatic attempt. 
However, the coefficient for mediations in favor of rebel groups is found insignificant, implying 
that one cannot determine its effect through his model. The argument about rebel-biased 
interventions, at least, requires more theoretical explanation in the article.  
The second major strand in the literature focuses on the timing of diplomatic efforts in civil 
conflicts. Most famously, the role of intervention timing is known as ‘ripening’ and referred to the 
concept of ‘mutually hurting stalemate (MHS)’. According to Zartman (1985), disputants are most 
likely to accept mediation and cooperate for conflict resolution only after certain conditions are 
met. Zartman argues that “when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they 
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cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek a way out” 
(Zartman 2000, 228). Put differently, hurting stalemate occurs when opponent sides have reached 
an impasse in their conflict such that neither is likely to prevail or achieve their goals through force 
(see Greig and Diehl 2006). Thus, the best time for mediation in a civil conflict comes when 
domestic parties find themselves in such a stalemate. Although Zartman never conducted empirical 
testing for these arguments, his ideas triggered huge scholarly discussions in the field.  
To test Zartman’s theory, Mooradian and Druckman (1999) follow MHS approach to 
examine the case of Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Employing time-series data, they analyze the 
change of violence before any mediation between the parties. They found that mediation attempts 
become more effective after about eleven months following a high-casualty fighting incident 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis as belligerent sides. The authors conclude that these results 
support Zartman’s MHS argument and high-casualty incidences serve as the agent for mutually-
hurting stalemates in conflicts.  
In a related research, Rasler (2000) proposes that political shocks cause a de-escalation 
process in intractable civil conflicts and a following mediation is helpful to settle it. According to 
the argument, these conflicts are ripened in the wake of political shocks and ensuing diplomatic 
interventions contribute to terminating such disputes. Testing his arguments by Middle East KEDS 
data about Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he finds that shocks, such as the Gulf War, served as a 
political shock to the conflict, and subsequent mediations between Israel and Palestinians produced 
substantial change in de-escalating the conflict.  
In a more extensive testing of Zartman’s theory, Schrodt, Yilmaz, and Gerner (2003) 
undertook to operationalize Zartman’s ripening and MHS concepts. Using time-series event data 
about the conflicts from Israel-Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Sierra 
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Leone cases, they sought to figure out which conflict characteristics can be associated with 
ripening and MHS concepts. After their nuanced empirical scrutiny, they demonstrated that 
ripeness can be measured by indicators of conflict level, such as intensity, while MHS is associated 
with conflict duration.  
A number of scholars have also attempted to provide an overall assessment of mediation 
literature. Clayton and Gleditsch (2014) explored the predictive power of explanatory variables 
commonly used within the literature in regard to the onset and the outcome of mediation in civil 
wars. The authors employed a two-stage model in which the first stage estimated the mediation 
onset as the second stage aimed to predict the outcome for these diplomatic attempts. The results 
showed that the explanatory variables can well predict the likelihood of mediation onset, but they 
are less competent in estimating the outcome. Eventually, the authors concluded that mediation 
outcome is more associated with unobservable characteristics, such as the resolve to fight, or 
private information, rather than the explanatory variables often used in the literature. Overall, this 
study is a good example of how to evaluate the ability of existing scholarship in addressing certain 
research questions.  
In another effort to assess the competency of literature in a real-world case, Greig (2013) 
examines the utility of relevant conflict variables in understanding the challenges faced by the 
third-party intermediaries in the Syrian conflict. After examining the features of conflict under the 
light of existing scholarship, he concludes that the conflict is an intractable one by the scholarly 
standards and proposes that it is unlikely to resolve the Syrian conflict exclusively through 
diplomatic means. Greig also underscores the characteristics of the belligerents and the combat 
techniques adopted by the sides to be the key features for understanding the mediation outcome in 
conflicts.  
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Finally, some scholars raised concerns about the methodological shortcomings in 
comprehending the effectiveness of mediation efforts. Gartner (2013) argues that it is the selection 
bias problem that creates deceptive results about mediation success, particularly highlighting the 
role of regional organizations in diplomacy. He suggests that scholars should discriminate between 
hard (difficult to resolve) and easy cases to obtain more accurate results about the role of mediation 
in resolving civil conflicts.  
Consequently, the burgeoning research on diplomatic interventions provides us with 
insights about the utility of mediations in settling civil wars. However, scholars typically focus on 
the effects of mediation in their analyses without incorporating the other interventions deployed in 
the same conflicts, which likely produces inconsistent findings about the effectiveness of 
diplomacy. This is critical especially in the case of mediations since the other third-party activities 
in the lead-up to diplomacy are likely to influence the efficacy of mediations, and thus needs to be 
integrated into the analysis. For example, the research studying Zartman’s notion of “ripeness” is 
currently limited to the use of mediation as a response to internal conflict dynamics, such as the 
intensity and the duration of a dispute. However, it would benefit greatly from incorporating the 
role of other intervention types–military and economic activities–as the agents of ripening process. 
Ultimately, the survey of diplomatic intervention literature reveals a gap in the scholarship that the 
study of intervention effectiveness requires a comprehensive framework in which multiple 
intervention types are integrated and analyzed together.  
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2.4 Literature on Multiple Intervention Types  
There are two important studies in the literature that examined the effects of multiple 
intervention types, rather than solely focusing on a single intervention type. In their path-breaking 
article, Regan and Aydin (2006) investigate the role of external interventions on the duration of 
civil conflicts. The authors argue that the effect of structural interventions–military and economic–
can be assessed better once diplomatic interventions are also integrated in the analysis. They posit 
that structural interventions influence the power distribution between disputants by supplying a 
greater incentive to fight and thus increase the conflict duration. On the other hand, diplomatic 
interventions shorten the length of conflict by conveying private information about the capabilities 
of belligerents. A better analysis, according to the authors, is therefore possible only when 
diplomatic interventions are incorporated into the analysis. Undertaking a cross-sectional testing, 
they partially find support for their argument in a way that the effect of economic interventions 
renders statistically significant–otherwise insignificant–if a variable for diplomatic interventions 
is plugged in the model. The coefficient for the military interventions however remains 
insignificant even after introducing diplomatic intervention variable into the model. Based on these 
finding, the authors eventually conclude that controlling for diplomatic intervention is crucially 
important in understanding the effect of external interventions in civil wars.  
Regan and Aydin’s study is an important research about the role of interventions in civil 
conflicts. Conceptually, it is the first in the field to include multiple intervention types into the 
analysis. The results confirm that the findings about the impact of each intervention type might 
change substantially when the role of diplomatic interventions is included. Methodologically, the 
authors incorporate a variety of time variables through which one can assess somewhat the right 
timing for diplomatic interventions. For this purpose, they intuitively use both linear and non-
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linear forms of time covariates for diplomatic interventions, and find results supporting their 
expectations about the inverted-U relationship between the timing of a diplomatic intervention and 
the duration of a civil war.  
Nevertheless, there are certain gaps in their analysis to highlight. First, the direction of 
intervention is not specified in any of their models. There are numerous debates in the literature 
explaining the differential effects of biased interventions based on the side the treatment is 
targeted. Second, GDP is used in their analysis as a proxy for country’s general capacity. Yet it is 
a disputable measure for such specific purpose, and the literature suggests more representative 
measures, including, amongst many others, GDP per capita and composite index of national 
capacity from COW project. Finally, the article clearly reveals the need to include different 
intervention types into the analysis. However, the theoretical framework they are proposing 
basically predicts the effect of diplomacy on conflict duration and the impact of mediations on 
other intervention types. Thus, they do not necessarily provide a comprehensive theoretical 
framework in which multiple intervention types can be incorporated and tested for their overall 
effects.5  
In another important study, Lektzian and Regan (2016) investigate the role of economic 
sanctions and military interventions on conflict duration. Emphasizing the inability of standalone 
sanctions as an effective tool to foster peace in a civil conflict, the authors argue that sanctions can 
decrease the duration of conflicts only if complemented by military interventions as an 
enforcement tool. Testing their hypothesis in statistical models, they find support for their claims.   
 
5 I will continue discussing more about Regan and Aydin (2006) article in the chapter on interdependence.  
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Lektzian and Regan’s article is important especially demonstrating the ability of synergetic 
effects of foreign interventions on civil wars and also the need to study interventions by integrating 
multiple types together. However, there are a couple points that the article needs to address. First, 
temporal difference between economic sanctions and military interventions in a given conflict is 
not considered. That is, the authors disregard the interval between a sanction and a military 
intervention in a given conflict, and only focus on the presence of such external involvements 
irrespective of their performed times. However, the effect of each intervention type naturally has 
influence on a conflict for only some certain time period, and then the impact could naturally peter 
out over time. Second, the analysis does not account for the interdependence between such foreign 
involvements. Second, the authors do not control for the dynamics between disputant parties, such 
as the relative power between belligerent forces. In the literature, such features are critical to 
determine the duration of conflict especially in the face of external involvements.  
Third, Lektzian and Regan use a country-level data as opposed to a dyadic data, which may 
not be the most appropriate unit of analysis to analyze the dynamics in civil conflicts where the 
fighting takes place between a government and a particular rebel group. A dyadic dataset including 
state-rebel group dyad, as compared to a country-level data, might provide with more nuanced 
results. A country at a given month might be conflicting with, for instance, three rebel groups at 
the same time. It is difficult to tease out which rebel group receives military interventions or gets 
targeted in such foreign involvements when a country-level dataset is used. Finally, the study 
focuses on only two particular intervention types without providing a more general framework to 
customize it for different combinations of intervention types.  
Eventually, these two important articles are intuitive for the scholarship on intervention 
because they cast light on the need for an integrative research in studying foreign interventions in 
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civil wars. In both articles, the effects of particular intervention types change as an additional type 
is introduced into the analyses, revealing that failure to do so leads to spurious findings in regard 
to the impacts of these treatments. At the same time, it demonstrates that there is a need for more 
comprehensive theoretical frameworks in which various multiple interventions are integrated and 
then analyzed for their effectiveness in the context of civil wars.  
2.5 Conclusion: Where Is Progress Needed?  
Overall, findings from the existing studies regarding the role of third-party involvement, 
including military, economic, and diplomatic interventions, provide mostly inconsistent results 
with respect to the outcome of civil conflicts. The impact of interventions with regard to the 
duration of conflict is better conceptualized and tested compared to the discussions on the outcome. 
More specifically, despite a multitute of research on military interventions, it is not yet clear how 
military interventions affect the results of internal conflicts. There are contesting conclusions from 
a variety of scholars in the field. Similarly, the question is not yet resolved for diplomatic 
interventions either. As to economic interventions, there seems to be a greater concern because 
there is not even adequate scholarly work to evaluate the consequences of sanctions especially in 
the context of civil wars.  
Based on the existing literature discussed above, there are three main gaps on the role of 
third parties in civil wars that can be addressed with this project. First, the existing research 
typically focuses on a single type of intervention and examines it independent from other 
interventions types that take place in the very same conflicts. A research in this manner, to say the 
least, generates misleading results regarding the effects of intervention type of interest because it 
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simply omits the impacts of other intervention types, as well as the interplay between these 
interventions in the same conflict.  
Relatedly, the idea of interdependence between intervention types in the same conflict is 
not sufficiently studied in the literature. Interdependence here refers to the notion that prior 
intervention in a conflict informs subsequent ones in the same conflict. Given the scholarship’s 
attention only on a single intervention type, examining interdependence between interventions 
stays way out of sight in the literature. However, any research without considering the dynamics 
of interdependence might suffer from underestimation or overestimation problems for the effects 
of a given intervention type due to the likely associations amongst external interventions.  
To illustrate with a striking example, say, researchers are willing to understand the role of 
UN diplomatic interventions in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, and they are disregarding the effects 
of Russian military intervention in the same conflict. It is evident, at least for Syrian case, that 
there are consequences of Russian military intervention on the onset and the outcome of UN 
diplomatic intermediaries. An analysis short of this association between the Russian military 
intervention and UN mediations would seemingly be missing a good deal of information regarding 
the role of external interventions in the Syrian conflict.  
Other existing research introducing multiple interventions in their studies provide more 
intuitive findings. In the studies of Regan and Aydin (2006) and Lektzian and Regan (2016), for 
example, statistical significance of intervention variables change once a variable for other 
intervention type is included in the analysis.  
An interdependence framework could enable us to construct interventionary patterns based 
on the systematic association between different intervention types. The patterns can allow 
integrating multiple interventions together by sequencing them according to their probabilities 
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about which intervention types are more likely to come after certain initial intervention type. Most 
importantly, this might help us test the effectiveness of interventionary patterns, consisting of 
multiple intervention types. Using these patterns constituting both structural and diplomatic 
interventions, we can explore, for example, whether a conflict becomes “ripe”–referring to 
Zartman’s proposition–through structural interventions, so that mediation afterwards can kick in 
the process for conflict settlement.   
Finally, the scholarship on external interventions lacks a comprehensive theoretical 
framework to account for the effects of various third-party attempts in civil wars. Short of such 
general theories encompassing multiple interventions, the literature is producing inconsistent 
findings regarding the impacts of interventions. A theory that aims to explain the causal 
mechanism about how different interventions synergistically impact the outcome of a civil conflict 
might also provide us with more insights about how international community can contribute to 
ending these disputes. The theory could vest practitioners with appropriate roadmaps knowing 
what the consequences will be out of certain strategies, even constituting multiple intervention 
types.  
The survey of literature also informs us about some particular lessons to be adopted in 
intervention research. First, a dyadic analysis specifying state and each rebel group is the most 
appropriate unit of analysis when studying the role of external interventions in the case of civil 
wars since interventions typically target particular parties in a given conflict. Secondly, especially 
early literature on military interventions reveals that the intensity of conflict needs to be included 
in the analysis. Third, a set of individual characteristics, including the power distribution between 
parties and conflict type, are essential to integrate into models. Fourth, the idea of asymmetry needs 
to be incorporated into any theoretical framework in the context of civil wars. It seems to be one 
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of the central points of controversy in the literature about studying the effects of foreign 
involvement. Finally, research would benefit more if they use a more granular dependent variable 
disaggregating conflict outcomes into more specific categories, including negotiated settlement 
and victory by each side. Each of these outcome categories might be differently affected by any 
external treatments and thus needs to be incorporated into the analysis.  
Consequently, this project aims to address these main gaps in the literature by providing a 
comprehensive explanation for the role of external interventions in civil wars. To that end, it will 
begin by investigating the interdependence between third-party attempts and thus provide a 
theoretical and empirical framework to integrate multiple interventions in the same conflict. Using 
interdependence framework, it will construct interventionary patterns constituting multiple 
interventions by sequencing them according their probable orders. Finally, the project will attempt 
to present a theory of intervention that can account for the impact of multiple intervention types 
and eventually test the effectiveness of each interventionary pattern in terminating civil conflicts. 
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3.0 Interdependence Between External Interventions in Civil Wars 
This project overall aims to understand the role of foreign interventions in civil wars. 
Prevalent in most of the contemporary internal conflicts, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, 
Yemen, Syria, external interventions come in different forms, such as military, economic, and 
diplomatic measures; and are usually on the news headlines apparently playing significant impacts 
on each war. Yet, the survey of literature—in the previous chapter—reveals that the scholarship 
does not fully grasp the effects of these outside treatments into conflicts. Most importantly, the 
research typically focuses on a single intervention type at the expense of other types deployed in 
a given civil war and thus faces both theoretical and methodological challenges in comprehending 
the impacts third parties exert in conflicts.  
 To address these drawbacks, this project largely aspires to provide a more comprehensive 
framework in which multiple interventions are integrated for conducting a better analysis. To that 
end, this chapter aims initially to demonstrate that different interventions in a given civil war are 
interrelated with one another. Then, based on these findings from interrelations between 
interventions, it moves forward to estimate structural patterns in which multiple interventions are 
sequenced and integrated. Finally, the next chapter provides an integrative theory and tests the 
effects of these interventionary patterns in terminating conflicts.  
 A comprehensive understanding in regard to the role of foreign powers in civil wars is 
crucial for scholars and practitioners alike. And the ongoing Syrian conflict illustrates well the 
need for such an approach to get more insights about what the international community can do 
about ending it.  
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3.1 Syrian Civil War and the Interdependence between Foreign Interventions 
Syria descended into civil war in 2011 as President Assad chose to repress public protests 
calling for his removal, thus pitching the country’s Sunni majority against his Shia Alawite sect; 
and also drawing in regional and world powers. The Syrian military initially suffered grave defeats 
in the face of challenging insurgents during 2012. To make the conditions worse for the incumbent 
regime, the United States and the European Union, in the wake of increasing civilian violence, 
imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on the Syrian government, prohibiting a range of 
numerous financial, trade and business relations with the regime. Afterwards, Iran attempted to 
prop up the government side through gradually increasing support in many forms, including 
military assets. By early 2013, Syrian government forces, bolstered by Iranian support, started to 
recover, but this time, Gulf states rushed to support the insurgents.  
 Since mid-2014, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, with the support of 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other regional partners, have conducted major air strikes against the 
self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIL), which is one of the major relevant belligerent groups in this 
intertwined conflict. In addition to the air strikes, the United States deployed a small number of 
Special Operations ground forces to support Kurdish forces fighting ISIL in many of their bastions. 
Meanwhile, Russia, upon the request of the Syrian government, began launching air strikes in 
September 2015 against what it claimed were ISIL targets. However, Russia’s strikes have 
primarily hit Mr. Assad’s opponents in their military engagements.  
 In the years since, US-supported Syrian Kurds grew stronger, alarming Turkey. In return, 
in August 2016, Turkey, backed by the United States and allied with one of the major rebel groups 
in the contention against Assad regime, intervened to seize strategic towns on its border inside 
northern Syria mainly in order to stunt the spread of Kurdish forces. In the meantime, diplomatic 
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efforts to reach a peaceful resolution since the inception of the conflict have been conducted at 
times by a number international, as well as regional actors, and such efforts have been intensified 
especially after the introduction of Russian intervention on behalf of the regime. However, such 
peaceful attempts have yet to produce any substantial success to accomplish a political transition, 
other than temporary ceasefires at times for evacuating civilians. Peaceful attempts for terminating 
the conflict are dismal. Initiated by the U.N., Geneva talks on Syria have yet to accomplish a 
political transition as the incumbent Assad regime and a number of insurgent groups find it difficult 
to come up with any acceptable terms for settling the dispute.  
 This has been a brief story of Syria’s civil war, which is still unfolding. What the conflict 
in Syria and other numerous internal wars suggest is that interventions by third parties in ongoing 
conflicts have a substantial impact on the evolution of such strives. More interestingly though, the 
actions of third parties seem to bleed over into more external involvement, thereby creating a 
strong empirical case for the need to consider foreign intervention phenomena as an evolution of 
interrelated moves rather than discrete events committed in isolation. Thus, understanding the 
connections between external interventions, including various forms of engagement and over a 
temporal spectrum may be necessary for theoretical integration (Diehl 2006). In this respect, the 
conflict in Syria raises a number of questions with respect to the foreign interventions in a domestic 
dispute. Does each of the interventions in the same conflict occur independently of one another or 
does an earlier outside interference inform a subsequent one? Are there interconnections amongst 
various foreign actions of different types? Does an earlier involvement by one of the exterior actors 
in a conflict induce engagement of other outside parties in the same strife? Are there certain foreign 
intervention patterns that come after particular types of earlier third-party participation? Such 
interdependence amongst various interventions manifests itself explicitly in the Syrian War in the 
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face of successive foreign involvement at various phases of the conflict in many forms, including 
military, economic, and diplomatic activities. The current chapter attempts to confront such 
questions directly in the context of civil wars.  
 I suggest that foreign involvement in a given conflict is informed by earlier interventions 
in the same war. More specifically, I propose that each of the external interventions, including 
military, economic, and diplomatic actions within the same dispute, happen in connection to one 
another, whereby preceding ones trigger later interventions. Building on this interdependence 
framework, moreover, the chapter also suggests that one can derive certain interventionary patterns 
that consist of multiple interventions sequenced according to their chance of following certain 
types. A pattern, for example, comprising military interventions and ensuing economic sanctions.  
 The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief summary of relevant 
scholarship. I then introduce my theoretical argument based on state-dependence theory and 
present the main hypothesis to be tested. Next, I discuss the statistical model and data used to test 
the conjecture. Afterward, using mathematical models, I generate certain interventionary patterns 
based on the probabilities from the statistical testing. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the 
findings and implications.  
3.2 Literature  
A more detailed survey of literature is provided in the previous chapter and thus only a 
brief summary of relevant parts will be presented here underlining the implications of gaps in the 
literature on the existing research.  
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 Foreign interventions in civil wars might take place in many forms during the life of a 
conflict. However, in contrast with the realities of civil war contexts in which various numbers and 
types of outside interventions are introduced in the same dispute, such as the case in the Syrian 
conflict, the previous studies have typically treated each external intervention in an isolated 
manner without considering the role of previous attempts on the occurrence of subsequent ones.  
 The overwhelming majority of current research on the third-party interventions in civil 
wars has focused exclusively on a single type of outside involvement, including military 
interventions (Regan 1996, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008, Cunningham 2010, Gent 
2008), economic sanctions (Hultman and Peksen 2015, Marinov 2005, Escribà-Folch 2010, 
Gershenson 2002, Strandow 2006), and diplomatic interventions (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, 
Frazier and Dixon 2006, Clayton and Gleditsch 2014, Svensson 2007a).  
 The key problems in failing to incorporate multiple intervention types into the analysis are 
as follows: First, on the very basic level, the current research on intervention remains considerably 
short of understanding the actual dynamics behind the role of external parties in civil wars. 
Although this isolated research provides insights about the impact of each intervention strategy, 
the historical record suggests that civil wars sometimes receive multiple interventions, including 
various combinations of military, economic, and diplomatic practices within the same conflict. 
Thus, focusing only on a single type independent from and at the expense of other ones is contrary 
to the very nature and the realities of civil wars.  
 Second, the typical scholarship is conceptualizing the role of a single intervention type 
without considering the existence of other intervention forms. Such a conception treats other 
intervention types within the same conflict as non-events. More specifically, theoretical 
frameworks that focus on an individual type, such as military intervention, inherently equate 
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diplomatic or economic interventions with nonintervention (Corbetta 2015) even though the latter 
ones are also introduced in the very same conflicts. Pointing to the problem in 1969, Rosenau 
remarked that ‘‘If one is interested in military intervention, operationalization may be 
accomplished in terms of the movement of a specified number of troops into or near the target 
society. Such a definition does not encompass other forms of intervention, but the omission of 
these does not mean that other forms do not occur’’ (Rosenau 1969, 156). The introduction of 
Iranian proxy forces in the Syrian Civil War, for example, seems somewhat to be a function of a 
weakening Assad regime in the face of international economic sanctions and thus be connected to 
the sanctions imposed.  
 Third and relatedly, from an empirical standpoint, such a disregard for integrating multiple 
intervention types might lead to spurious findings for the effects of any particular intervention 
type. Alternatively, such an analysis is likely to produce biased inferences by overemphasizing or 
underestimating results about the statistical and substantive significance of any intervention type 
of interest. 
 Fourth, according to the extant research, each type of intervention strategy has its own 
distinctive effect on civil wars. Military interventions, for example, are typically viewed to provide 
structural leverage for a targeted side, thereby tipping the balance of power towards the supported 
party (Regan 2000, Hultquist 2013, Sullivan and Karreth 2015). Economic interventions are 
mostly seen to play into the dynamics about information asymmetries between disputants (Escribà-
Folch 2010, Strandow 2006). As for diplomatic interventions, the utility of such endeavors is 
considered to be relevant mostly within the framework of overcoming commitment problems in 
the context of civil wars (Walter 1997, Svensson 2007a). For example, research that seeks to 
comprehend the effectiveness of diplomatic intervention in civil wars might suffer from 
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inconsistent findings due to its failure to incorporate the existence of a military intervention and 
its influence within the same conflict. This is mainly because external military involvements are 
somewhat viewed as enforcement mechanisms for alleviating commitment problems and thus 
might boost the chance of diplomatic attempts. Consequently, the research on foreign involvement 
would benefit from integrative frameworks in which various intervention types are integrated 
together to assess their synergistic impacts on conflict outcome.  
 Nevertheless, as reported in the literature chapter, there are few studies in the literature 
addressing the possibility that multiple intervention types are employed within the same conflicts. 
Regan (2000) explores the impact of foreign military and economic engagements on terminating 
civil conflicts. Regan and Aydin (2006) investigate the role of mediations to understand the 
effectiveness of military and economic interventions on the duration of civil conflicts. Lektzian 
and Regan (2016) inquire about the role of military interventions in complementing economic 
sanctions with respect to conflict duration. However, this strand of studies, albeit valuable 
contributions to the field, accounts only for particular intervention types of their interests without 
addressing the general idea that multiple interventions in any form within a conflict are 
interrelated.  
 Consequently, explanations focusing on a single intervention type and treating each third-
party participation as a neatly independent event might preclude us from comprehending the role 
of external involvement in civil wars. An interdependence framework that integrates multiple 
intervention types in a given conflict might enable us to move beyond the limitations of previous 
literature on interventions and thus provide us with a broader scope of the mechanism how foreign 
parties influence civil wars.  
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3.3 Theory  
3.3.1 State-Dependence Theory  
The argument in this chapter about interdependence is built on two central considerations. 
First, various foreign interventions types in civil conflicts are interrelated, and secondly, this 
relationship can be manifested through temporal dependence. By identifying interdependence 
between interventions and using it to construct interventionary patterns, I aim to provide a more 
comprehensive account of third-party involvement in civil wars, which will be then used in the 
following chapter to test how external actors influence the outcome of domestic disputes.  
 Interdependence, in this sense, can be viewed as the idea of unpacking interventions. That 
is, the discussion about interdependence breaks down the monolithic concept of intervention into 
smaller temporal pieces, thereby allowing one to focus on each bit separately to derive intuition 
about the prospects for the subsequent one. More specifically, the discussion here first focuses on 
the status of intervention at a given time and analyzes it to identify the probabilities of the potential 
external involvements for the subsequent period. This piece-wise analysis is repeated for each 
certain bit of time to predict the following bit, which continues over the life of a conflict. 
Ultimately, it yields a whole repertoire of trajectories comprising different combinations of 
external interventions that can be deployed in civil wars.  
 To account for this interplay between various intervention types over a conflict duration, I 
will draw on state-dependence theory that provides a neat conceptualization of how events may be 
related in time. In state-dependence theory, “the current outcome of a dynamic process depends 
on prior outcomes, even after controlling for covariates” (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2005, 1895). 
According to Heckman (1981), state-dependence is the conditional probability that a case will 
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experience an event in the future is a function of past experience. In the context of foreign 
involvement, the present state—i.e. the status—of interventions in a given civil war is partly 
determined by preceding external involvements within the same conflict.  
 The state-dependence theory is primarily used in behavioral sciences and economics to 
account for the current choice of a decision-making process (see Ahmad 2014, Dubé, Hitsch, and 
Rossi 2010). In conflict studies, Owsiak (2014, 2015) proficiently employed this theory to 
understand the interdependence between various diplomatic methods in interstate disputes.  
 The time frame for the state-dependence framework is identified in a more specified way 
to differentiate the theory from other similar concepts based on the experiences of distant historical 
records, such as path-dependency. Page (2006) provides a clear conceptual explanation about 
competing theories that can account for the historical causality depending on various time frames. 
Adapting from Page, Owsiak clarifies that, “in state-dependent processes where one goes next 
depends on one’s current state of being, but not the full history of events [as in the path-dependent 
processes]” (2014, 58). Path-dependency, as compared to more dynamic processes in state-
dependence, is mostly useful in theorizing institutional change, which requires a more distant 
historical investigation to establish far-reaching institutional bases (see Streeck and Thelen 2005, 
Page 2006).  
 Based on these considerations, the process for external interventions in civil wars is 
considered to fall within the state-dependence category. The reasoning behind this conclusion is 
mainly due to the dynamic nature of interventions in civil conflicts. The circumstances in these 
conflicts are inherently embedded in uncertainty and rapid changes. Given such fleeting 
conditions, external involvements in such disputes are mainly shaped by the most recent 
developments in the theater of war, including the available foreign interventions within the same 
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conflict. To illustrate, a recent change in power distribution between belligerents in a civil war 
with the introduction of a new outside party, Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict supporting 
the government for example, might provide a basis for other potential actors’ decisions, such as 
the United States, to get involved in the same conflict. Thus, the most recent intervention typically 
provides the most relevant information for potential third parties to decide for their subsequent 
move. In this sense, anticipated interventions in a conflict are partly shaped by the available 
external involvements in the very same conflict, along with other relevant individual and 
contextual factors.  
3.3.2 Foreign Intervention Types in Civil Wars 
External interventions in civil wars consist of a gamut of various third-party activities from 
military combatant missions at the highest level of engagement to peaceful diplomatic negotiation 
offers at the lowest (Regan 2000). For the purpose of this analysis, however, I will focus on three 
main types of foreign involvement: military interventions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic 
mediations. There are a number of reasons why I focus on only three types. First, these types are 
overarching categories under which a broad range of third parties’ actions in internal conflicts are 
typically organized (Corbetta 2015). Given the novelty of interdependence discussion in the field, 
an initial step that uses main categories will establish a foothold for more nuanced prospective 
analyses. Secondly, data availability is an issue when studying interventions (Hoeffler 2014). 
Given the covert nature of some alternative third-party activities (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and 
Cunningham 2011), such as economic aid or military equipment assistance, a number of empirical 
problems, including systematic measurement error amongst others, could arise. This might 
threaten the validity of the statistical results. As to the diplomatic interventions in particular, 
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mediation is the most common form of instrument the international community uses in civil wars 
(Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009, Frazier and Dixon 2006) and data about this particular form of 
diplomatic intervention is more accessible compared to other intermediary techniques. The 
discussion in this project therefore relies on the conceptualization and the operationalization of 
these three primary types of external commitment in civil conflicts.  
3.3.3 Interdependence Between Interventions in Civil Wars 
The gist of the interdependence argument is the proposition that there are interplays 
between different foreign interventions in a given civil conflict based on a variety of justifiably 
practical reasons, and state dependence theory can profitably and parsimoniously account for this 
relationship through simple temporal dependence, which will be operationalized in the next 
section.  
 There are numerous reasons why different types of interventions, including military, 
economic, and diplomatic activities, are expected to be interdependent in a given conflict. Some 
examples are as follows: First, interventions during the life of a conflict do not happen in isolation 
(Hoeffler 2014, Diehl and Regan 2015). Mediation attempts, for example, can be accompanied by 
the use of armed forces in order to address the concerns associated with commitment problems 
(Walter 2009, 1997, 1994, Winkel 2013). In this case, the ability of diplomacy is intended to secure 
through the dispatch of military, and thus, both involvements are interlinked.  
 Similarly, many studies emphasize the enforcement aspect when it comes to economic 
sanctions (Hultman and Peksen 2015, Escribà-Folch 2010, Gershenson 2002). Briefly, economic 
sanctions are considered to become more effective in shortening civil conflicts when they are 
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enforced. In the context of civil wars, the efficacy of sanctions is bolstered when complemented 
by external military engagement (Lektzian and Regan 2016).  
 Another reason might stem from the motivations about why third parties get involved in 
civil wars. Foreigners engage in these disputes for a variety of reasons, varying from purely 
humanitarian concerns to parochial national interests (Cunningham 2010). In order to achieve its 
given objective, policymakers in intervening entities might choose from a diverse menu of 
strategies to employ in a conflict. Indeed, these strategies could involve expedient combinations 
of different interventions in order to enhance the success of their policy goals. The termination of 
the civil war in the South Sudan, for example, illustrates a good case for this. According to 
Fleischner and Kumar (2014), much of the international community’s effort  in the negotiations 
about conflict termination between the two belligerent sides–President Salva Kiir and former Vice 
President turned rebel leader Dr. Riek Machar–has focused on finding the right combination of 
leverage to elicit commitments from both sides. One source of leverage became the threat of 
multilateral economic sanctions against key leaders which was accompanied by the deployment of 
military force from regional countries.  
 Relatedly, some scholars proposed broader frameworks, such as ripening theory (Zartman 
2000, 1985) or softening-up process (Greig and Diehl 2006), in order to resolve civil conflicts. 
These arguments largely aim to satisfy the conditions for a particular desired outcome through 
multiple processes. In ripening theory, for example, Zartman specifies elements of ripeness, and 
associates it with the notion of hurting stalemate (see, for a broader discussion, Mooradian and 
Druckman 1999, Schrodt, Yilmaz, and Gerner 2003). According to Zartman, a hurting stalemate 
occurs when opponents have reached an impasse in their conflict such that neither side is likely to 
prevail through the use of force. Under these postulations, an economic sanction on a government 
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side, for example, might precipitate the conditions for hurting stalemate since the incumbent might 
so feel the impasse due to constrained resources, and thus might look for a way out of the stalemate 
by opening up to negotiations.  
 Similarly, rational choice—another broader framework—treats war as essentially an 
information asymmetries problem (Fearon 1995). Fighting between antagonists provides each side 
with information about real capabilities, and resolution comes when they can objectively predict 
the likely outcomes of war (Powell 2004, Rauchhaus 2006). In this case, economic sanctions, for 
example, help reveal private information about the real capacities, thereby giving chance to third-
party mediations and eventually to a negotiated settlement (see, Strandow 2006, Escribà-Folch 
2010).  
 Finally, an example of interdependence manifests itself well in the case of balanced 
interventions6 in which each of the warring parties in a given conflict receive balancing external 
support (see, for a broader discussion, Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, Balch-Lindsay, 
Enterline, and Joyce 2008). The idea behind the balanced interventions is that if one party is 
supported by an external actor, it is very likely that the other party will also receive a 
counterbalancing backing from outside.7 Since the inception of the Syrian Civil War, for instance, 
there have been many occasions of such counterbalancing moves by numerous foreign powers, 
including Gulf countries, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and the U.S.  
 
6 A number of scholars refer to the same event under different names, Mitchell (1970) as counter intervention, 
Dunér (1983) as both-sided intervention, Corbetta and Dixon (2005) as interventions for both sides, and Salehyan, 
Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) as countervailing intervention.  
7 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) suggest that balanced interventions are more common when 
the initial intervention is rebel biased.  
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 Ultimately, the above reasons about why different interventions in a given conflict are 
associated can be reduced down to a simple analytical framework of state-dependence. This 
framework mainly proposes that interventions in a civil war are linked, and the association between 
them can be proficiently displayed through temporal dependence. More specifically, it suggests 
that external interventions in a given conflict are interdependent in such a way that the preceding 
intervention type determines the probabilities for subsequent interventions in the same conflict.  
 The preceding theoretical proposition then generates a generally testable hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: External Interventions in a given civil war increase the probability of 
subsequent interventions in the same conflict 
3.4 Empirical Analysis  
3.4.1 Modelling State-Dependency 
In a state-dependent context, the current conditions for a particular covariate will determine 
its conditions for the next step. To test a state-dependency hypothesis, a given state8 of process at 
time ! will determine the probability of being in a particular state at period ! + 1, conditional on 
the observable characteristics. Applied in the context of the interventions, the presence of a 
 
8 The phrase “state” here referring to “condition” or “status quo” somewhat creates confusion when used in 
the same context within the realm of international relations that traditionally uses the word “state” to describe a 
sovereign political entity. I would like to draw the reader’s special attention for differentiating the two by focusing on 
the contexts in which they are used.  
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particular intervention in a conflict will determine the occurrence and the type of prospective 
interventions in the same conflict.9 In statistical terms, let $%(!) be the state (i.e., status) of 
intervention at time ! in a given conflict (, )%*(! − 1) is the type of intervention(s) , that was 
deployed in the prior period, and -% a vector of observed relevant individual and contextual 
covariates of a given civil conflict. The current state of intervention in the conflict ( is then simply 
determined by  .($%(!)) = 	)%*(! − 1) + -%(!) + 1%(!) 
where $% is the current status–presence and the type–of interventions, including no intervention, 
diplomatic, economic, and military activities in a given civil war (. )%*(! − 1) indicates whether 
there was any intervention in an individual conflict (() within the previous period (! − 1), and, if 
there is, which intervention types (,) were them. -% denotes the individual and contextual 
covariates for the characteristics of conflict, country, and parties to the dispute at a given time (!). 
Finally, 1% is the unobserved component and will be specified by an aggregate error measure.  
 To sum up, I expect a meaningful association between successive foreign interventions 
deployed in a given civil war. To test the conjecture, I propose a model in which current 
interventions are estimated mainly through each of previous period’s interventions, controlling for 
the relevant features of conflict. A statistically significant coefficient for each of the lag 
intervention variables suggests that preceding interventions in a given conflict inform subsequent 
interventions in the very same civil war providing support for the interdependence argument 
developed in this chapter.  
 
9 Alternatively, the presence of a particular intervention in a conflict at an earlier time will determine the 
occurrence and the type of current interventions in the same conflict. 
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3.4.2 Data 
I draw data primarily from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset 
(v1-2015) (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). It spans the years between 1946 and 2012 
and contains all active civil war years that meet the UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war. A civil 
war is coded as an active year when a conflict produces at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year 
(Kreutz 2010). There are 2385 conflict years in the dataset.  
 Data for military interventions come from the same UCDP Dyadic Dataset which identifies 
interveners that deploy military troops within civil war states (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). 
These are all biased military interventions in favor of either conflict parties and does not include 
either neutral interventions, such as UN peacekeeping operations, or other types of military 
activities, military aid etc., in which there is no direct troop participation. Military intervention is 
dichotomously measured, coded 1 if intervention takes place in a conflict year or continues through 
it, and 0 otherwise. There are 394 military intervention years (approximately 16 percent) in the 
overall dataset.  
 Economic sanctions data is from the Hufbauer (2007) dataset, which defines sanctions “to 
mean the deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade 
[including both exports and imports] or financial relations” (2007, 3). It excludes cases related to 
national security controls that are essentially designed to restrict the sale of weapons and military 
equipment. From Hufbauer’s global sanctions dataset, I used cases imposed in the context of civil 
wars where the explicit goal of the sender state(s) is provided as to bring an end to a civil war, to 
ease state repression, and to weaken or destabilize an incumbent government. An updated version 
of his dataset encompasses years between 1946-2012, and reports a total of 452 sanction years in 
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active conflicts (more than 18 percent). It is coded 1 if a sanction takes place in a given year or 
continues through it, and 0 otherwise. 
 Diplomatic intervention data mainly comes from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) Dataset 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011), which uses the definition of mediation provided by 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991b, 8): “a process of conflict management where disputants 
seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or state, or organization 
to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking 
the authority of law.” The original dataset is updated by the authors to capture the years between 
1946-2012. In addition to the CWM dataset, diplomatic intervention variable is condensed by 
Svensson’s (2007a) updated replication dataset to span years between 1946 and 2014. There are 
238 active conflict years (approximately 10 percent) in which mediation takes place or continues 
through it, and such diplomatic attempts are coded 1, and 0 otherwise.  
3.4.3 Dependent Variable 
Building on these three types of intervention data, the categorical use of diplomatic, 
economic, or military interventions is the dependent variable of interest. The categories vary 
according to the approximate costs borne by a third party employing it. Military interventions are 
typically the most costly engagements compared to other types whereas diplomatic interventions 
generally are the lowest (Regan 2000, Lahneman 2004). Given the assumption of increasing costs 
and commitment of these interventions (see, for a similar postulation and usage, Corbetta 2015, 
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Owsiak 2014), there are eight categories in the dependent variable that captures any single or 
multiple interventions happening in a year.10 Table 1 provides explanations for each category.  
3.4.4 Independent Variables 
 To capture the state-dependency of earlier interventions, I lag each of the individual 
intervention variables. These variables are the main predictors to hold statistically significant if 
the state-dependency theory is to justify the interdependence argument between intervention types. 
That is, a statistically significant intervention lag variable indicates its association with the current 
state of intervention.  
Because the dependent variable is both categorical and ordered, I use ordered probit 
regressions in the analyses. The unit of analysis is the yearly conflict country-rebel group dyad.  
 Given the theoretical model, I have data on three types of independent variables: features 
of civil war country, internal characteristics of conflict, and the settings for the international 
system. I operationalize the variables as follows:  
  
 
10 The categories of interventions are aligned according to their costs, ranging from diplomatic interventions 
as the least costly to economic interventions and to military interventions as the costliest type. Accordingly, multiple 
interventions in a given year are also categorized under the same assumption. For example, if there are both military 
and diplomatic interventions in the same year, it is coded as a lower category (5) than the year in which there are both 
military and economic interventions employed (6).  
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Table 1 The Categories of Dependent Variable 
Category 
Number Description of Category 
Number 
(percent) of 
Observations 
0 No Intervention 1336 (56%) 
 
1 Diplomatic Intervention 232 (9.7%) 
2 Economic Intervention 347 (14.6%) 
3 Both Diplomatic and Economic 
Interventions 
105 (4.4%) 
4 Military Intervention 238 (10%) 
5 Both Diplomatic and Military Interventions 61 (2.6%) 
6 Both Economic and Military Interventions 52 (2.2%) 
7 All three types, including Diplomatic, Economic, and Military Interventions 14 (.59%) 
 
3.4.5 Control Variables 
3.4.5.1 Variables for Features of Civil War Country  
Polity scores and GDP per capita are used as the key variables to capture the conflict-
country characteristics.  
Polity Score: The level of democracy data are taken from the Polity IV dataset (p4v2015) 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2000). It is prorated and transformed to vary from 1 to 21, where 1 denotes 
the lowest score for a political regime (i.e., least democratic). The data captures years between 
1946 and 2014.  
GDP Per Capita: This is the main measure in my models to capture the state strength 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). 
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The data is taken from Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2016). It 
spans years between 1946-2014 and the values are transformed by taking the natural log of each 
observation. However, a number of scholars criticized the use of GDP per capita on the grounds 
that this measure indicates the power potential of governments, but not exactly the measure of how 
well the government is able to mobilize and make coherent use of this potential (see, for example, 
Gurr 1988, Fjelde and De Soysa 2009). Thus, in addition to GDP per capita to capture the state 
capacity, I also use a set of alternative measures in the additional models reported in Appendix A.  
3.4.5.2 Variables for Characteristics of Conflict 
Intensity of civil war, type of conflict, and the relative rebel strength are the primary 
variables to measure the conflict characteristics. 
 The Intensity of Civil War: This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 
conflict has at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. The data is from the UCDP Dyadic 
Dataset (Version 1-2015) (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008).  
 Type of Conflict: This is used to differentiate the type of conflict. In other words, the stated 
incompatibility is what the parties are fighting over (Themnér 2015). The data is from the UCDP 
Dyadic Dataset (Version 1-2015) (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008), and coded 1 for 
territorial, 2 for governmental conflicts.  
 Relative Strength: This is a composite measure from the Non-State Actor (NSA) data set 
that includes relative troop sizes, mobilization capacity, arms procurement, and territorial control 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). It is an ordinal scale between 1 and 5, where 5 refers 
to rebels that are much stronger than the government. It captures years between 1946 and 2011.   
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3.4.5.3 The Variable for Settings of International System  
 Post-Cold War: The international system may by its nature encourage or discourage 
intervention. The role of interventions in various forms has changed during and after the Cold War 
mainly given the zero-sum politics of the era, bipolarity of international systems, and the primacy 
of sovereignty vs. human rights (see, for a broader discussion, Öberg and Strøm 2007, Sousa 2014). 
It is coded 1 for the post-Cold War period, and 0 for before. 
 Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 2 below.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Ordered Int (DV)  2,385 1.22 1.7 0 7 
Military Int 2,385 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Economic Int 2,385 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Diplomatic Int 2,385 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Polity Score 2,376 10.8 6.45 1 21 
GDP per capita (ln) 2,363 6.18 1.44 3.05 10.8 
Intensity of Civil War 2,385 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Type of Conflict 2,385 1.54 0.5 1 2 
Relative Strength 2,266 1.68 0.68 1 5 
Post-Cold War 2,385 0.47 0.5 0 1 
 
The empirical testing in the following section is conducted as follows. First, drawing on 
state-dependence framework, the argument about interdependence will be tested and established 
through alternate sets of controls (discussed in the Robustness Checks section and reported in 
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Appendix A). Then, based on the conclusions about interdependence, interventionary trajectories 
will be constructed to highlight the interdependent sequence of intervention types.  
3.4.6 Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results of ordered probit regressions, with robust standard errors 
clustered on the dyad (state-rebel group), in which categorical intervention is operationalized as 
the outcome variable across all models. Overall, the results of the analyses support the theoretical 
argument about the interdependence between successive interventions in a given conflict. The 
results are reported in Table 3. The findings for state-dependence are tested against multiple 
robustness checks, including alternative sets of independent variables, new sets of independent 
variables regarding the attributes of third parties, alternate model specification, and various 
methodological concerns, such as unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and postestimation 
checks. These results are briefly discussed throughout the analysis and are elaborated in the 
Robustness Checks section and reported in Appendix A. Note that the crucial point concerning 
testing for state-dependence is the fact that coefficients for associated lags require holding 
significant against alternate control variables (Heckman 1981, 1991).  
 In Table 3, Model 1 is the regression for only the lags of each individual intervention type, 
including military, economic, and diplomatic, without any controls. Model 2 incorporates the 
controls into Model 1, and will be the main model throughout the analysis to compare the findings 
from other estimations.   
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Table 3 Is there an Interdependence Between Interventions? 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Intervention Variables   
   
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.763*** 0.636*** 
 (0.08) (0.1) 
   
Lag Economic Int 2.124*** 2.121*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
   
Lag Military Int 3.168*** 3.021*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
   
Conflict-Country Features   
   
Polity Score  -0.011 
  (0.01)    
GDP per capita (ln)  0.070** 
  (0.03    
Conflict Characteristics   
   
   
Conflict Intensity  0.193** 
  (0.09)    
Type of Conflict  0.212** 
  (0.09)    
Rel. Strength  0.196*** 
  (0.08)    
International System Aspects   
   
Post-Cold War  0.089 
  (0.08) 
Cutoff Points (not shown here)   
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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The coefficients for lagged interventions in both models, either with or without controls, 
are statistically significant (p <.01). The magnitude of lag intervention coefficients does not vary 
much across two models.11 Taken together the results from the models in Table 3, it provides that 
there is state dependence between intervention types, and thus, the hypothesis is supported by the 
statistical outcomes. The results are also checked against alternative control variables, which is 
satisfied by the findings in the additional models presented in Appendix A. The results from these 
additional models will be discussed more in the following paragraphs.  
 The underlying interdependence argument highlights that external interventions in the 
same conflict are state-dependent, whereby a preceding intervention affects the probability and the 
type of subsequent ones. So, what is this association supposed to mean according to the results of 
the statistical analysis? To give a better sense of the findings, I will give an overview of the 
substantive results by exploiting the marginal effects for relevant covariates and discuss an 
estimation for one of the conflict cases in the dataset.  
 In general, given the state-dependent relationship between the preceding and the current-
year12 interventions, a previous-year intervention, in conjunction with other covariates, increases 
the probabilities of onset for the current-year intervention types. Substantively, after a preceding 
military intervention (when other interventions are fixed to 0 and the rest of the covariates are held 
at their means), the probability change of having an intervention in the following year is 16 percent 
more for a diplomatic intervention, 41 percent more for an economic intervention, and 51 percent 
 
11 Nevertheless, there are considerations associated with making comparisons across nested models based on 
the raw magnitude of coefficients, which will be discussed briefly later in the following paragraphs (see, for a broader 
discussion, Mare 2006). 
12 “Year” is the temporal disaggregation throughout the models. 
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more for a military13 intervention when compared to the probabilities for no military intervention 
in the earlier year (other interventions are still fixed to 0 and the rest of the covariates are still held 
at their means).14 Similarly, a preceding economic intervention increases the probabilities by 18 
percent for diplomatic, 47 percent for economic, and 19 percent for military interventions in the 
following year. Likewise, a diplomatic intervention in the previous year increases the likelihood 
of interventions by 10 percent for diplomatic, 11 percent for economic, and less than 1 percent for 
military interventions. By the same token, both a military and an economic intervention in the 
earlier year, for example, increase the likelihood of successive military intervention by 98 percent, 
economic sanction by 66 percent, and diplomatic activity by 29 percent. Ultimately, these results 
demonstrate that different types of interventions are state-dependent with one another in time, and 
thus the occurrence of any type of intervention in the previous year affects the probabilities for 
current-year interventions. Most interestingly, this suggests that the type, as well as the presence, 
of a preceding intervention can tell us something about the likely direction of third-party 
involvement in a conflict, which can be projected in the longer-run predictions. I will discuss this 
point more in the next section about trajectories.  
 So, how to contextualize these results? One can apply these findings to estimate the 
presence and the type of intervention for a given conflict year. I will estimate retrospectively, for 
 
13 It could be argued that the probability of the following year military intervention mainly stems from the 
duration of ongoing military interventions. I will address this issue in the following parts of the discussion.  
14 The probability change computations were performed using Spost9 commands (most with prvalue) in Stata 
(Long and Freese 2001). The outcome probabilities hereafter, unless indicated otherwise, were conducted with all 
interventions fixed at 0 other than the intervention of interest, and remaining covariates are held at their means in the 
previous year.  
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example, whether there would be an external intervention, and if there is, which type of 
intervention it would be in the year 2000 in the Sierra Leone conflict between the government and 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels.  
 Once the coefficients are plugged into the model (! = year 2000 and ! − 1 = year 1999); 23$45	67	89!5:;59!(69%(!)< = 3. 02 ∗ B(C(!D:$	89!(! − 1 + 2.12 ∗ EF696G(F	89!(! − 1 + .636 ∗ I(4C6GD!(F	89!(! − 1 +. 07 ∗ KI.	4F_C9%(!) + (−.01) ∗ .6C(!$	MF6:5(!) +. 19 ∗ O697C(F!	89!59P(!$%(!) +. 21 ∗ 3$45	67	O697C(F!%(!) +. 196 ∗ Q5C. Q5R5C	M!:%(!) +. 089 ∗ .6P!TUVWXD:%(!) + 1%(!) 
where the type of intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War between the government and 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group in the year 2000 is estimated by the presence of 
military, economic, and diplomatic interventions in the year 1999 of the same conflict, as well as 
the relevant individual and contextual characteristics in the year 2000. The type of intervention for 
the year in the conflict is determined according to the cutoff points and where the value for the 
year falls into these thresholds. The estimate in the year 2000 of the Sierra Leone conflict is 6.91, 
which places in the cut7 threshold (6.86), which is the highest category in the dependent variable. 
So, this conflict is correctly estimated to experience all three types of interventions in the given 
year. By the same token, I calculated predicted values for those observations that were included in 
the analysis. Almost 80 percent of the predicted values match with the observed ones.   
  Another aspect of the model is the relative importance of each covariate in determining 
the subsequent status of interventions. For this purpose, I compare the standardized coefficients of 
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all covariates in Model 2, which is the main model.15 In the model, in addition to lag variables for 
military, economic, and diplomatic interventions, I incorporate covariates regarding the 
characteristics of the embattled country, including the level of democracy and the GDP per capita 
as a proxy for the state capacity; features of conflict, including intensity, the type of dispute, and 
the relative strength of antagonists; and finally, the aspects for the international system, including 
a measure for the presence of the Cold War. The results for standardized estimates are reported 
below in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Unstandardized and Standardized Estimates (Model 2) 
DV: Categorial Intervention b z P>|z| bStdX bStdY bStdXY SDofX 
Lag Diplomatic Intervention 0.64 6.55 0.00 0.22 0.36 0.12 0.35 
Lag Economic Intervention 2.12 17.22 0.00 0.88 1.19 0.49 0.41 
Lag Military Intervention 3.02 14.35 0.00 1.09 1.69 0.61 0.36 
Polity Score     -0.01 -1.49 0.14 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 6.50 
GDP pc (ln)     0.07 2.18 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.06 1.49 
Intensity           0.19 2.18 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.42 
Type of Conflict 0.21 2.36 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.50 
Relative Strength      0.20 2.61 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.62 
Post-Cold War 0.09 1.11 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.50 
  
 
15 In order to obtain standardized estimates, Long and Freese’s (2001) spost9 programs for Stata are used for 
deriving standard coefficients; specifically, the listcoef command is used.  
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Given the specifics of latent values in ordered probit estimations, it is suggested to use 
either Y-Standardized (bStdY –in the 6th column of Table 4)  or fully standardized coefficients 
(bStdXY –in the 7th column) to compare covariates (see, for a broader discussion, Mare 2006), 
which provides very similar outcomes in our model. According to Y-Standardized coefficients, 
highlighted in bold within Table 4, a diplomatic intervention in the earlier year has an effect that 
is almost 6 times greater on the interventions in the subsequent year than a 10-point change in the 
polity score, while an economic intervention has an effect that is 20 times greater and a military 
intervention has an effect that is 28 times greater than the same compared measure, i.e., a 10-point 
change in the polity score. Similarly, intensity level, the type of conflict, and the relative rebel 
strength variables are also relatively much less impactful than each of the lag intervention 
covariates. This demonstrates that the type and the presence of earlier interventions are the most 
primary predictors to determine the likelihood of third-party participation in the successive year. 
Unsurprisingly, military intervention in the earlier year outweighs other intervention types in 
predicting the intervention probabilities for the next year.  
 The results so far are promising, but there is a caveat to these findings. Is the 
interdependence mainly driven by the duration of interventions over time? To address the issue, I 
have employed additional models in which a new ordered dependent variable is operationalized 
only for the new occurrences of each type of interventions for each year, excluding the continuing 
years of interventions other than the initial year, even if the intervention persists over multiple 
years. Both military and diplomatic interventions still hold the sign and remain within the same 
significance level of baseline results (p <.01), but the effect of economic interventions differs. The 
full results are presented in the Appendix A. 
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 However, the main problem with operationalizing through the onsets only is about 
narrowing the scope of the original research question. That is, the question with the new 
operationalization then becomes whether interventions only affect the likelihood of new onsets, 
which captures only some portion of the main discussion. Interventions, according to the empirical 
findings, affect the likelihood that another intervention also persist over multiple years, not only 
the onset of new interventions. Thus, the duration component is integral to the interdependence 
argument. 
 Relatedly, the concern regarding the duration arises only due to the association between 
consecutive years of a one-type intervention that continues over time. However, the 
interdependence argument captures a variety of relationships between interventions, including 
both different and same types, as well as continuing years of each intervention.  
 Ultimately, the underlying state-dependent relationship between interventions over time 
still holds regardless. The concern that multi-year interventions might undermine the 
interdependence argument does not hold up from both empirical and substantial standpoints.  
 Consequently, the results of the analyses indicate that civil war interventions of various 
types are interrelated with each other in such a way that an earlier intervention influences the 
probability of subsequent ones. These findings generally comport with previous studies, but the 
analysis here provides a broader theoretical framework to explain the relationships that exist 
between interventions.  
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3.5 Constructing Trajectories  
The analysis so far has demonstrated that successive interventions in the same civil conflict 
are related. Thus, these findings provide the basis for predicting how interventions might evolve 
over the life of a conflict, which will be captured by the term interventionary trajectory, or just 
trajectory hereafter. Trajectory refers to an interventionary path in a given conflict where it begins 
with an initial type, including non-intervention, diplomatic, economic, and military intervention. 
Then the initial intervention type shapes the probabilities of subsequent intervention, which 
similarly affects the probabilities for the next one, and so on. Such pattern persists over the course 
of a conflict. Eventually, exploiting these probabilities, certain trajectories can be constructed by 
mainly relying on the initial type of intervention, and extending its projections in a temporally 
sequenced manner.  
 The idea of projecting interventionary trajectories carries characteristics consistent with 
the methodological concept of Markov chain. First, both the idea of trajectory and the underlying 
mechanism of Markov chain methodology relies on state-dependent processes, in which solely 
current conditions, not the history of events as in the path-dependence, determine the next step by 
exploiting the probabilities derived from the initial state of determinants. Secondly, Markov chains 
undergo transitions from one category to another on a category space, with the probability of the 
next category depending on the current one. For interventionary trajectories, the number of 
categories is defined by the types of external interventions in civil wars, and each of these types, 
i.e. categories, switch from one another conditional on the present intervention type in a given 
conflict. Markov chains, therefore, provide a powerful probabilistic methodological tool to 
trajectory analysis for the discussion.  
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Table 5 Transition Matrix after the Initial Intervention (n=1) 
  Subsequent Intervention  
  No 
Intervention 
Diplomatic 
Intervention 
Economic 
Sanction 
Military 
Intervention 
C
ur
re
nt
 In
te
rv
en
tio
n  
No 
Intervention 0.8283 0.1152 0.0581 0.0014 
Diplomatic 
Intervention 0.6223 0.2143 0.1683 0.0094 
Economic 
Sanction 0.1204 0.2986 0.5258 0.1936 
Military 
Intervention 0.019 0.2742 0.4704 0.5143 
 
 Markov chain depends on the multiplication of the transition matrices with the probability 
vector that represents the starting distribution. Adapted from Moore and Siegel (2013), let . be 
the transition matrix of a Markov chain, and let Y be the probability vector that represents the 
starting distribution. Then the probability that the chain is in state P%  after 9 steps is the (th entry in 
the vector: Y(Z) = Y.Z. That is, I begin with running the baseline model using ordered probit 
regression. Then, I derive probabilities for each category in the dependent variable (presented in 
Table 1).16 and 17 The transition matrix for the first state (P[) as a sample is reported in Table 5.  
 
16 The probability change computations were performed using Spost9 commands (most with prvalue) in Stata 
(Long and Freese 2001). The outcome probabilities hereafter, unless indicated otherwise, were conducted with all 
interventions fixed at 0 other than the intervention of interest, and remaining covariates are held at their means in the 
previous year. 
17 Here, I calculate probabilities only for each individual type of intervention, including diplomatic, 
economic, and military interventions. I do not derive probabilities for concurrent interventions occurring in the same 
year (such as military and diplomatic intervention taking place in the same year). In that, for each category, I sum the 
probabilities coming from both the individual category and concurrent interventions. That is, the probability of 
   85 
The first column of the table reports the titles of previous intervention types and the 
succeeding columns show the titles of subsequent intervention types and their probabilities 
conditional upon the type of earlier intervention deployed. If there was an economic sanction in 
the past year, for example, the likelihood of a current diplomatic intervention is .2986 and for a 
military intervention is .1936 in the subsequent year. Note that Table 5 only presents transitioning 
probabilities for one year. Likewise, I calculate transition matrices for fifteen years18 by 
multiplying initial transition matrix with the most recent period cumulative transitioning 
probabilities.19 Transition matrices for the remaining years are reported in Appendix A.  
 Next, I multiply each of these transition matrices over a duration of 15 years with the 
probability vector that refers to the starting distribution (i.e. initial type of intervention). The 
trajectory probabilities are reported in Appendix A. These probabilities demonstrate how 
interventions evolve for 15 years in a conflict based on the initial type of intervention and thus 
provide the basis for constructing trajectories. Drawing on these probabilities, I plot the graphs for 
each panel.  
 
diplomatic intervention, for example, is the sum of the probability of the category 1 (diplomatic intervention) in the 
Table 1 and probabilities of concurrent diplomatic interventions from category 3 (economic and diplomatic), category 
5 (military and diplomatic), and category 7 (military, economic and diplomatic).  
18 The average conflict duration is 7.5 once one-year conflicts are excluded from the sample. Still, I calculated 
for 15 years in an effort to be able to observe the state of equilibrium.  
19 For the purpose of producing transition matrices as well as overall Markov chain operations, I used the 
multiple multiplication function in MS Excel.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the trajectories after each initial intervention type, including diplomatic, 
economic, and military, respectively.20 The horizontal axis denotes the years within a given civil 
war and the vertical axis captures the probabilities for the types of external intervention ranging 
between 0 and 1. (P(intervention type)=1 is for the initial type of intervention at the beginning of 
each trajectory.)21 
 Based on the initial type of intervention, the trajectories consisting of single and multiple 
forms of intervention are derived out of probability curves reported in Figure 1. The results for 
trajectories are presented in Table 6 and discussed more below.  
Beginning with a diplomatic intervention in the initial year (1st year), depicted in the upper 
graph, the most likely intervention in the successive year (2nd year) still appears to be a diplomatic 
intervention. Then in starting with the 3rd year, an economic sanction is the most likely intervention 
for the rest of the period, which is followed by a diplomatic intervention in the second place. 
Military interventions come in the third place with a relatively lower likelihood, albeit 
increasingly, compared to both economic and diplomatic interventions.  
  
 
20 Graph for an initial non-intervention trajectory is not included in Figure 1. It is reported in Appendix Figure 
1. However, the trajectory after no-intervention start is included. Also, the curve for no-intervention probability in 
each graph is omitted for the sake of clarity and parsimony.  
21 Note that the initial interventions, for the sake of simplicity, constitute only individual types of 
interventions, and do not capture concurrent interventions in which multiple intervention types are employed initially 
within a given conflict. However, trajectories could still allow for such concurrent interventions.  
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Figure 1 Trajectories after an initial diplomatic, economic, and military intervention, respectively 
 
Consequently, the trajectory out of initial diplomatic interventions produces two distinct 
paths: First and most likely, diplomatic intervention is succeeded by economic interventions 
(diplomatic-economic trajectory), also capturing the concurrent diplomatic and economic 
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interventions in the same year, and secondly, an initial diplomatic intervention is followed by other 
diplomatic interventions, including the continuing ones (only diplomatic trajectory).  
Table 6 Proposed Trajectories after Each Initial Intervention Type 
Initial 
Intervention 
Type 
Projected Trajectory 
Diplomatic 
1. Only Diplomatic 
2. Diplomatic-Economic 
Economic 
3. Only Economic 
4. Economic-Diplomatic 
Military 
5. Only Military 
6. Military-Economic 
7. Military-Diplomatic 
8. Military-Economic-Diplomatic22 
No 
Intervention 9. No-Intervention 
 
 Second, after an initial economic intervention, illustrated in the middle graph of Figure1, 
the likelihood of additional economic intervention in the successive years is always greater. The 
probability of diplomatic intervention is also close to economic intervention over the course of a 
conflict and both types converge more over time. However, the likelihood of military interventions 
after an initial economic sanction is relatively lower when compared to the other two types. 
Eventually, the trajectories after an initial economic intervention are proposed as follows: First, 
economic intervention is followed by other or continuing economic sanctions (only economic 
trajectory), and secondly, an economic intervention is succeeded by subsequent diplomatic 
 
22 Includes both Military-Economic-Diplomatic and Military-Diplomatic-Economic trajectories. 
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interventions (economic-diplomatic trajectory), including synchronous economic and 
diplomatic interventions within the same year.  
 Third, an initial military intervention, depicted in the lower graph of Figure 1, is most likely 
followed by an economic intervention in the second year and the same picture continues in the 
successive years as well. However, the likelihood of economic intervention looks like a polynomial 
curve, increasing in the second and third years, then decreasing slowly until the eighth year and 
then increasing again. In the meantime, the probability of a diplomatic intervention continually 
increases over years, which seems to converge with the economic intervention curve. 
Consequently, four trajectories are observed after an initial military intervention: First, military 
intervention is followed by other military interventions–or persisting ones–(only military 
trajectory); secondly, a military intervention is succeeded by subsequent economic interventions 
(military-economic trajectory), also capturing concurrent military and economic interventions 
in a given year; thirdly, an initial military intervention is followed by later diplomatic interventions 
(military-diplomatic trajectory), also including synchronous military and diplomatic 
intervention in the same year; and finally, a military intervention at the beginning might be 
followed by both economic and diplomatic interventions–irrespective of their sequences–which 
come right after an initial military intervention (military-economic-diplomatic trajectory), also 
capturing concurrent combinations of two or three of these intervention types.   
 Finally, an initial no-intervention pattern, reported in the Appendix A, is most likely 
followed by no other interventions. Thus, an additional trajectory is proposed consisting of no 
interventions taking place over the life of a conflict, which is the case for almost half of the civil 
conflicts in the dataset.  
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3.6 Robustness Checks 
I performed a number of analyses to check the robustness of the findings. First, an 
important part of the state-dependency discussion is checking the validity of the results through 
alternative variables. In order to understand the authenticity of causal mechanism in the state-
dependence framework, Heckman (1981, 1991) among others, has emphasized the importance of 
distinguishing between true and spurious state-dependence in models. In true state-dependence, 
the change in the probability of a given process under scrutiny is interpreted as causal whereas in 
the case of spurious state-dependence, the probability change of the current process has no causal 
relationship with the previous state of the process. In the latter case, it is rather unobserved 
characteristics of the subject, and this unobserved heterogeneity23 is not captured by the observed 
covariates that produce the dependence over time. In this case, some conflicts are simply more 
prone to experience particular types of interventions than others irrespective of their prior 
experience with certain interventions and observed covariates, and maybe due to their intrinsic 
characteristics.  
 To differentiate between true and spurious state-dependence, the model within this project 
aims to test the causal relationship between the preceding intervention and the subsequent ones 
while controlling the individual and contextual covariates of the conflict. Thus, the results from 
the model will prove whether the argument about interdependence between interventions still 
holds against alternative competing arguments captured in other covariates.  
 
23 The argument about unobserved heterogeneity by decomposing the aggregated error measure, 1%, will be 
discussed later in this section. 
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 For this purpose, I have described and operationalized alternative variables for conflict-
country and conflict characteristics in Appendix A. The results are reported respectively in 
Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2.  
 In Appendix Table 1, I have used life expectancy, CINC scores, Relative Political Capacity 
(RPC), and Gov't Expenditure/GDP variables as alternatives for GDP per capita to proxy for state 
capacity. In addition, I have also controlled for the strategic importance of a conflict country 
through proxies, including total trade, gas, and oil reserves of these countries. In Appendix Table 
2, I have alternated the binary conflict intensity variable with a continuous battle-related-deaths 
(BRD) measure; type of conflict covariate with another conflict categorization differentiating 
ethnic and non-ethnic disputes; and the variable for categorical relative strength of antagonist sides 
with a rated measure of relative troop numbers. In addition, I have incorporated a new variable 
accounting for the yearly number of dyads combating against a government.  
 Overall, lag intervention variables, throughout all models both in Appendix Table 1 and 
Appendix Table 2, retain the sign and stay within the same significance level of baseline results (p 
<.01). More promisingly, even the magnitudes of these variables do not change much across 
models. Nevertheless, there are problems associated with making comparisons across nested 
models based on the raw magnitude of coefficients, which have been briefly discussed before (see, 
for a broader discussion, Mare 2006).  
 In addition to the alternate country and conflict measures, I have also incorporated 
variables with respect to the relevant characteristics of third parties, including the senders of the 
economic sanctions (whether they are sponsored by the UN or not) and the state capacity of the 
military intervener (whether it is a major power, i.e., a permanent member of the UN, or not). 
Finally, I have checked the findings by decomposing the military interventions by their targets 
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based on whether it is a state or rebel-biased intervention. The results from these models are 
reported in Appendix A Table 3. The lag intervention variables still retain the sign and stay within 
the same significance level of baseline results (p <.01). 
 Secondly, I replicated the main analyses using a multinomial logit model that treats each 
intervention type without any intrinsic order (no-intervention category is chosen to be the 
base/reference category for the types of interventions). The findings are reported in Appendix A 
Table 5. Overall, the coefficients on the lag intervention variables mostly retain the same signs and 
stay within a standard error of the main model. However, post-estimation tests after multinomial 
estimation suggested that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption did not hold 
for most variables.24 These results support the overall findings in my interdependence argument. 
The IIA assumption, from an empirical standpoint, requires that odds of one outcome versus 
another should be independent of other alternatives, which denotes, from a theoretical perspective, 
the independence between intervention types. However, in my project, I argue that the categories 
in the dependent variable, namely the types of interventions, are interdependent. Thus, there is an 
inherent clash between my main argument about the interdependence and the multinomial 
estimation assumption about the independence of these categories. Post-estimation results 
demonstrate that multinomial model assumption does not hold, supporting the main argument that 
intervention categories (i.e. types) are not independent of each other.  
 
24 In order to perform post-estimation test for IIA assumption, I have used Small-Hsiao test of IIA for Stata, 
specifically, mlogtest, smhsiao command is used. For the purpose of replication, as suggested by Long and Freese 
(2001), I set the seed by a high number before the test. 
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 Third, I performed post-estimation tests after ordinal probit estimations mainly used in my 
analyses.25 The results suggested that the parallel regression assumption did not hold. 
Proportionality assumption, another name for the parallel regression assumption, states that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. In other words, it assumes that the 
relationship between each of the explanatory variables and, say, the lowest category of response 
variable is the same across each of the higher categories. However, according to Scott and Freese 
(2006), this assumption is often violated in practice and violating this assumption may or may not 
really “matter.” In addition, the alternative for ordinal estimation, in this case, is a multinomial 
model, which has already been proven problematic as a model specification for the analysis. Thus, 
I chose the ordered probit regression because the practical implications of violating proportionality 
assumption are minimal and also ordinal estimation provides a more parsimonious and 
interpretable results than those estimates from a multinomial regression. 
 Fourth, I employed random effects probit model to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the dyadic level.26 The results are reported in Appendix A Table 6. The coefficients on the lag 
intervention variables retain the same signs and stay within a standard error of the baseline results 
meaning that the findings from the original ordinal estimation are robust to the dyadic-level 
specific effects. This is particularly important for this project because of the unit of analysis chosen 
 
25 For the purpose of testing parallel regression assumption, I have performed an approximate LR test, 
specifically using omodel probit [baseline variables] command, and also a Wald test, using brant, detail command 
after ologit [baseline variables] estimation. The latter test does not work after oprobit estimation. I also had to recode 
the final category in which all three types of intervention are represented as the only military and economic 
intervention. Otherwise, the brant test could not be computed given the fewer number of observations in this category.  
26 For random effects probit model, I used xtoprobit estimation.  
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for the inquiry. That is, I am examining the argument at a dyadic level that enables me to focus on 
the relationships between a conflict country and a rebel group, which does not necessarily capture 
the dyadic association from external intervener. Thus, it can be argued that there is no structural 
state-dependence and the coefficient(s) on the lagged intervention variables are picking up some 
unobserved differences across conflict state-rebel group dyads that are associated with the dyadic 
relations between a potential intervener and a rebel group or between a potential intervener and a 
conflict-state, which are not accounted for in the original model specification. However, results 
from the random effects probit model show that the results are robust to such unobserved 
heterogeneity at the dyadic level.  
 Fifth, in order to tackle further the unobserved heterogeneity associated within dyads, I 
performed a number of fixed-effects ordinal models. Such models assist in controlling for and 
removing unobserved heterogeneity when this heterogeneity is constant over time (Allison 2009). 
That is, the relationship between the preceding interventions and the current ones might reflect an 
individual-specific effect for a given dyad, such as historical animosity between a conflict-state 
and a rebel group, as in the Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conflict. For this 
reason, the residual errors of the original ordinal model (composite error, εi) may include 
measurement error related to these individual-specific fixed effects (Ui component of the 
composite error, εi). If these fixed effect errors are correlated with the explanatory variables (such 
as the intensity or the type of conflict), it might lead to an endogeneity problem. Thus, a fixed-
effect model can eliminate the problem.  
However, Stata does not have an inbuilt command to estimate fixed-effect ordinal models 
(see, for a broader discussion, Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann 2015). In order to partly 
overcome this problem, I have employed various fixed-effect ordinal models developed by 
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different scholars. Initially, adopting from Allison (2009) in specifying hybrid models, I estimated 
a random-effects ordinal model by including among the explanatory variables the mean of the 
time-varying covariates. The results are reported in Appendix A Table 6 FE(1) Model in the 
Appendix Table 6, and the variables of interest are specified with an initial letter “M”.  
Next, I have used the Blow-Up and Cluster (BUC) estimator proposed by Baetschmann, 
Staub, and Winkelmann (2015). In their method, using the original dataset, they create an extended 
dataset where each individual observation is repeated according to the number of categories of 
ordinal dependent variable, each time using a different cutoff to collapse the dependent variable 
(this is the reason for the increase in the number of observations reported in Appendix A Table 6 
FE(2) Model  in the Appendix). Finally, Riedl and Geishecker (2014), after comparing linear and 
nonlinear ordered response estimators in terms of consistency and efficiency measures by running 
Monte Carlo simulations, suggest that a linear fixed-effects model essentially delivers the same 
results as the other nonlinear ordered response estimators, such the BUC model. I, therefore, ran a 
linear fixed-effects model, and the results are reported in Appendix A Table 6 FE(3) Model in the 
Appendix. In all three alternate FE models, the coefficients on the lag intervention variables as 
well as most of the control variables retain the same signs and stay within a standard error of the 
baseline results. 
 Finally, checking for serial correlation is important to distinguish between structural state-
dependence and a model with autocorrelated choice errors. If the model errors are autocorrelated, 
the probability of subsequent intervention, for example, might depend on the entire history of the 
intervention. However, a state-dependent model relies on the current status of intervention to 
predict the subsequent intervention. Thus, the political implications of the two models are 
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different. If the relationship represents a form of state-dependence, an ongoing intervention in any 
form in a civil conflict portends new types of external participation for the same dispute.  
However, the autocorrelated errors model does not allow for such utility since the 
relationship between the observations of intervention variables persists over larger periods of time 
based on the likelihood of individual specific effects coming from some characteristics of conflict, 
civil war country, and dyad. Most importantly, endogeneity can arise as a result of autocorrelated 
error terms, which might bias the findings.  
One special challenge regarding the autocorrelation problem in my project comes from the 
fact that my data captures the duration of interventions that might last over many years, which 
might induce serial correlation. Thus, I need to check for autocorrelation beyond a number of 
statistical postestimation tests in the empirical spheres. In order to distinguish between a model 
with a state-dependence term and a model with autocorrelated errors, I implement the suggestion 
of  Chamberlain (1985). I consider a model with the all explanatory variables in my main model, 
excluding the lags of intervention variables (i.e. state dependent terms), but including a new 
independent variable: lag of number of dyads as the total number of rebel groups fighting against 
a government. In a model with structural state dependence, the new lag variable can influence the 
type of intervention in the current year. In contrast, in a model with autocorrelated errors, a new 
lag variable does not influence the persistence of intervention type over time. In my case, the 
addition of lag number of dyads improves the log marginal likelihood by 798 points, which 
provides strong evidence in favor of structural state dependence over autocorrelation.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
Is there an interdependence between external interventions in the same civil conflict? I 
argue that outside involvement, including military, economic, and diplomatic interventions, within 
the same dispute, are interrelated in such a way that earlier interventions increase the likelihood of 
following ones. Analyzing data from all civil wars between years 1946 and 2012, I find strong 
support for the argument. In addition, drawing on the theory about state-dependence, it has been 
shown how interdependence between interventions could play out in these disputes with respect 
to the country, conflict, and international system characteristics. Furthermore, using the 
interdependence framework between interventions, I have produced certain trajectories that 
demonstrate how interventions could evolve into different types over the life of a conflict, mainly 
based on an initial intervention.  
 This chapter makes several empirical and theoretical contributions. First, I introduce a new 
theoretical framework in which different types of interventions are blended into each other to 
provide a broader picture of external participation in civil wars. Given the exclusive focus on a 
single intervention type within the scholarship about investigating the role of external 
interventions, this new theoretical perspective might shed more light on understanding the impact 
of third parties by addressing the conceptual and empirical problems associated with the existing 
approach.  
 Second, interdependence framework in this research equips us with a parsimonious model 
that represents a realistic picture of civil war conditions with respect to outside involvement. 
Drawing on the state-dependence theory, the model is designed to predict the expected external 
interventions in a given civil war through a simple temporal-dependence model by deriving 
probabilities from the most recent status of interventions in the same conflict (controlling for the 
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domestic and international features). It is a substantial contribution both for academic and policy 
spheres when difficulties associated with resolving ongoing civil wars are considered.  
 Finally, interdependence is a piece of a larger project to comprehend the role of external 
actors in civil wars. Interventionary trajectories derived from interdependence framework will be 
tested for their effects on the termination of conflicts in the next chapter. Exploring the relationship 
from a such a comprehensive and integrated perspective would further enhance our understanding 
of the ways in which third parties impact the course of civil wars. 
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4.0 The Effects of External Interventions in Terminating Civil Wars 
The project overall examines the role of external interventions in ending civil wars. In the 
previous chapter, it proposes an interdependent framework that allows multiple interventions 
within the same conflict could interact with each other. Then, structural interventionary trajectories 
are projected based on this interdependence model. These trajectories vary from a “no-intervention 
pattern” to “single-intervention ones” (only diplomatic, only economic, and only military 
intervention) to “multiple-intervention patterns” (such as economic-diplomatic, military-
diplomatic, and military-economic-diplomatic patterns). Finally, this chapter tests the effects of 
these trajectories according to their abilities in terminating conflict.27 
 The literature on the effects of external interventions has been largely discussed in the 
literature chapter. Briefly, the existing literature presents competing results for the role of third 
parties in stopping internal conflicts. One of the main reasons behind this inconsistency stems from 
the way how external interventions are investigated. The scholarship typically focuses on a single 
type of intervention at the expense of others while the anecdotal evidence is at odds with this 
procedure. To address this gap, this project overall presents a comprehensive framework in which 
multiple interventions are incorporated and then tested for their effectiveness in civil wars. This 
chapter particularly proposes a theory for the impacts of interventions in ending conflicts and 
conducts the empirical testing.   
 
27 One of the projected trajectories, diplomatic-economic interventions, is excluded from the analysis since 
there is no corresponding data point for it in the sample complied for this project. 
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 The chapter draws mainly on a newly-modified form of bargaining framework in exploring 
the role of various interventionary patterns for conflict termination. The new framework draws on 
the current bargaining model that primarily focuses on the real capacities and the costs of war; and 
reframes it to include a parameter–overrate fraction–that specifies parties’ misestimated 
capabilities. This novelty enables the model to process the informational asymmetry component 
over the course of war besides its typical focus on power distribution. The new version incorporates 
both power and information aspects of interventions that are associated with different intervention 
types. Moreover, the new parameter–overrate fraction–allows us to customize the model to reflect 
the asymmetric nature of civil wars. This feature conceives the counterproductive impacts of 
interventions especially when foreign actors get involved in a conflict in favor of an embattled 
government, which could shed light on the implications of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the 
Saudi involvement in Yemen. Eventually, drawing on the new bargaining framework, I test the 
effects of different combinations of multiple interventions in ending conflicts. 
 I organize the chapter as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical argument, 
which is based on the intrawar bargaining framework, and present the hypotheses to be tested. I 
then discuss the statistical model and data used to test the hypotheses. Next, I present the results, 
and finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings, considers their theoretical and policy 
implications, and suggests future research routes.  
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4.1 Theory  
4.1.1 Bargaining Model of War  
The theoretical argument expands on existing bargaining models. Bargaining, in general 
terms, is the negotiation between parties deciding what each will give and take in a transaction. 
Bargaining models are the studies to explain this give-and-take deal in terms of informational 
problems. When applied in the context of warfare, bargaining model strikes a dilemma between 
the cooperation due to the existence of potential gains from acting jointly in the face of increasing 
costs; and the conflict given each actor’s temptation to maximize its share at the expense of the 
other party (Powell 2002). Within this cooperation vs. conflict dilemma, private information as to 
the capabilities of the protagonists becomes central when rational leaders might have incentives to 
withhold or overstate their capacities in order to gain a better deal. Bargaining model of war thus 
analyzes this strategic interaction between adversaries and treats it partly as a function of private 
information.  
 One strand of literature uses bargaining models to explain the onset of war as a failure of 
bargaining process caused by the information asymmetry between disputants. Most famously, 
Fearon (1995) describes the reasons why states end up with fighting although going to war is ex 
post inefficient given the costs of war from a rationalist standpoint. According to his argument, 
what prevents disputants to reach an ex ante agreement, is primarily the parties’ incentives to 
misrepresent their capabilities and resolves. Ex ante bargains thus may not allow the disputants to 
clarify disagreements about relative power or to avoid the miscalculation of resolve (Fearon 1995, 
391). In this case, protagonists depict an inaccurately favorable estimate of the likely outcome for 
themselves, and thus, a war eventually begins. He argues that disputants could reach a negotiated 
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settlement without engaging in fighting if both had complete information about the other side’s 
position, thereby allowing both sides to make a reasonable estimate of war outcome. Such a 
symmetric, i.e., transparent, calculation, according to this argument, could avoid the costs of war.  
 This way of modeling war as a game-ending move has proved useful for the research (see 
also Powell 1999). However, this simplification limits the scope of the analysis mainly to the 
origins of war (Powell 2002, 2004). These models are also temporally limited and lack dynamism 
(Smith and Stam 2003, Powell 2006). It exclusively focuses on the prewar bargaining and 
disagreements over the relative strength of two parties leading to a breakdown in bargaining. And 
that is the end of the bargaining. Given its perspective, this prewar bargaining model builds on 
parties’ current state of knowledge, including the margin of misrepresentation, and attempts to 
determine whether there is a bargaining range between them. This is a static viewpoint since the 
model is impervious to any updates during the bargaining process. Clausewitz, however, wrote 
that “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” (von 
Clausewitz 1976, 605). Similarly, Schelling pointed “War is always a bargaining 
process…”(Schelling 1966, 142). In this line of thinking, bargaining begins before there is any 
fighting, and then still continues during the fighting, and ultimately concludes only when the 
disputants agree to a settlement or one of them wins. Therefore, models that offer a treatment of 
intrawar phase as a bargaining process are useful in accounting for the dynamic nature of the 
interaction between conflict and bargaining. (Powell 1999).   
4.1.2 War as a Bargaining Process 
The idea of bargaining during the course of war has received considerable attention in the 
literature (Wagner 2000, Filson and Werner 2002, Smith and Stam 2003, Slantchev 2003, Powell 
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2004). These models treat war as a process during which protagonists continue to bargain while 
they fight. Most importantly, these analyses attempt to display the strategic interaction between 
parties as it relates to both the transmission of information and the military contest.   
 In this view, a war begins when the bargaining breaks down over divergent beliefs about 
the relative strength of two disputants. As fighting starts and progresses, it reveals information 
about the parties’ real military capacities. During the course of combat, belligerents get to learn 
about their relative strength more objectively and accordingly update their beliefs about the likely 
outcome of the war. It therefore reduces the parties’ uncertainty regarding each other’s capability 
and the likely outcome (Wagner 2000, Mason 2009). As the parties’ beliefs converge, they have a 
more accurate estimation of power distribution, and thus the outcome. In the meantime, sides are 
constantly reassessing their likely bargaining positions in response to new information that comes 
with the progress of war. If neither side wins, the bargaining and fighting continue until the 
disputants reach an agreement (Reiter 2003).  
 Ultimately, intrawar models explain both the military contest and the bargaining process 
that accompanies it. One of the reasons for using this model is that it allows studying the factors 
that affect the duration and the outcome of war (Powell 2004). Introduction of outside actors into 
the ongoing conflict might be one of the factors that change the level of information, as well as the 
power distribution between sides. 
4.1.3 Interventions as an Information-Revealing Mechanism  
External involvements into conflicts come in different forms, including diplomatic, 
economic, and military interventions. According to Regan and Aydin (2006), outside interventions 
are broadly categorized into two main groups: structural interventions–military and economic 
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activities–that aim to impact the military capabilities; and non-structural ones–diplomatic 
attempts–that have no effect on the combatants’ capacities. 
 From the bargaining point of view, diplomatic interventions function as information 
providers. Mediators transfer information between combatants regarding capabilities and resolves 
(Regan and Aydin 2006, Gurses, Rost, and McLeod 2008, Savun 2009, Wallensteen and Svensson 
2014, Smith and Stam 2003). This affects the sides to update their state of knowledge about the 
other party’s capacity and thus revise their beliefs regarding the likely outcome of the conflict.  
 Structural interventions–military and economic–on the other hand, can have two different 
effects (Wagner 2000): influencing military capacities and revealing information about relative 
capabilities that come along with the new assets. Both effects will influence the disputants to 
update their estimates of their rival’s capabilities and resolve, and their expectations about the war 
outcome.  
 Ultimately, given the introduction of new assets to the parties and the information 
conveyed, both structural and diplomatic interventions enable the two sides to reassess their 
positions for bargaining. 
4.1.4 Asymmetric Nature of Civil Wars 
4.1.4.1 Asymmetry Warfare and Military Interventions  
So far in the discussion, we have discussed the bargaining theory in general, war as a 
continuation of the bargaining process, and the role of outsiders’ involvements as part of the 
information-revealing mechanism while structural interventions also influencing the relative 
strength. An important component in understanding the effects of external interventions in the 
context of civil wars is the fact that intrastate strives are fundamentally asymmetric because it 
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involves the state on one side and non-state actor(s) on the other (Mason 2009, Arreguin-Toft 
2001, Butler and Gates 2009, Hultquist 2013).  
 This asymmetric nature brings along implications for the potential effects of foreign 
interventions on the respective side’s ability. On one hand, there is a consensus in the literature 
about the effectiveness of rebel-biased assistance, concluding that biased military interventions in 
support of insurgents enhance rebel side’s military capacity (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 
2008, Gent 2008, Akcinaroglu 2012). On the other hand, there are equivocal empirical results in 
regard to the efficacy of state-favoring interventions. Gent (2008), Akcinaroglu (2012), and 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) provide evidence that state-biased interventions have no 
effect on government victory. Other research however finds that interventions in support of 
government reduce the time until the state defeats opposition (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 
2008).  
 The disparity between the utilities of external military intervention in favor of respective 
side stems partly from the asymmetry in the military tactics parties employ during the war. Most, 
but not all, civil wars are characterized by the preponderance of state military capacity vis-à-vis 
rebel forces (Dixon 2001, Regan 2002). According to the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict 
Dataset (NSA), only in some 5.1% of conflicts rebel groups’ military capacity exceed that of their 
governments (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). Given this imbalance of power, rebel 
groups typically adopt irregular military tactics to compensate for the limits of their military power 
(Lyall and Wilson 2009, Butler and Gates 2009, Sullivan and Karreth 2015).28 This type of warfare 
 
28 Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) contend the prevalent idea in the scholarship that irregular warfare is the 
stereotype in civil conflicts by analyzing the role of international system in specifying the warfare type in civil 
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is characterized by relatively small groups of combatants conducting mobile and surprise tactics 
in an effort to debilitate the military capacities of the state (Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare translated 
by Samuel Griffith 2000). Guerillas utilize natural terrain for defense and hide among civilians, 
which makes it difficult for the government forces to identify and target them (Buhaug, Gates, and 
Lujala 2009). Guerrilla tactics thus compensate for the disparity in relative capabilities.  
 Owing to these unconventional techniques, rebel groups can absorb the power imbalance 
between the sides. Insurgents, for example, can remain hidden and avoid fighting under the 
disadvantageous conditions while they get to pick the right time for inflicting costs on the 
government (Hultquist 2013). Much in the same way, the introduction of external forces on the 
battlefield in favor of the state can be negated by rebels’ resorting irregular tactics, such as hit-
and-run ambushes, and by avoiding direct costly battles. 
 Another challenge that comes with irregular warfare is the force ratio–a concept about how 
many troops are required for a military unit to prevail over its opponent for each specific combat 
operation (Quinlivan 1995). Traditionally, military planners assume that combatants required a 10 
 
conflicts. They conclude that post-Cold War civil wars predominantly used irregular warfare as compared to the 
internal conflicts during the Cold War. In their analysis, however, they operationalize civil wars by using 1000 battle-
related death (BRD) ratio, which affects the number of civil wars fought between 1946 and 2004. Most importantly, 
it is more likely that civil wars adopting conventional warfare produces more BRD (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, 
Balcells and Kalyvas 2014) and thus more likely to reach the 1000-threshold. These wars, therefore, are more likely 
to be included in their analysis. A reinvestigation using UCDP Dyadic Dataset (with 25 BRD ratio) for the same time 
period gives much higher number of civil wars (446 vs. 147 overall, 313 vs. 133 only for post-Cold War period). This 
discrepancy in two tallies might probably be one of the reasons why the authors reached to an unorthodox conclusion 
regarding the adoption of conventional warfare in civil wars.  
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or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win (Department of the Army 2006).29 and 30 Yet, according 
to the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency manual, no fixed ratio of incumbent troops to rebels ensures 
success. This disproportionality brings along substantially extra costs for the intervening states and 
is still far from promising any accomplishments given the opposition’s likely indirect war-fighting 
strategies. 
 Consequently, there is a discrepancy between the effectiveness of an external intervention 
in favor of government and rebels. This is associated with the asymmetric nature of internal 
conflicts. Given the insurgents’ unconventional combat techniques and disproportionate force 
requirements, the incumbent may not efficiently translate the supportive external support into 
battlefield in terms of military capacity while this is not the case for military interventions in favor 
of insurgency. 
4.1.4.2 Asymmetric Warfare and Information Asymmetry  
In addition to its disparate effects on enhancing parties’ combat capability, asymmetry has 
also implications for military interventions functioning as an information-revealing tool. A civil 
war involves the state and non-state actors contesting over claims to the sovereign right to rule 
(Mason 2009). As discussed above, the state typically has the power superiority over rebels. 
Despite the disadvantageous distribution of power, rebels nevertheless take up arms and start 
challenging an incumbent in pursuit of their cause. In return, the government responds to these 
 
29 There are still ongoing debates about specifying certain force requirements in insurgency operations 
(Goode 2009).   
30 Typically, this ratio in conventional warfare is 3 to 1 advantage for attacking side over defending side to 
prevail.  
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demands by invoking violence. The implicit calculation in this interaction is the idea that the state 
typically does not yield to the opposition’s demands peacefully partly because it holds the power 
advantage over the rebels. To make things more deterring for the insurgency, the government also 
tends to overstate its military strength. Following Fearon’s (1995) argument, there is a combination 
of private information regarding relative power (embedded in all conflicts) and the strategic 
incentive to misrepresent it. Given this equilibrium, the incumbent, over the course of war, aims 
to hold this supremacy of power, including both the objective relative military strength and the 
overstatement attached to it. 
 Upsetting this equilibrium, however, a state-sided military intervention is to reveal a 
critical information against the incumbent that the state is in need of external assistance. Typically, 
a third-party intervenes when it is utterly needed for its targeted side to influence the power balance 
(Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2015, Gent 2008, Regan 2002). Thus, such an intervention puts 
the government in a position of neediness and weakness, undermining the narrative that the 
incumbent is superior to the opposition. This poses a strong signal indicating that the state cannot 
cope with the rebels on its own, and a sign that the state cannot maintain the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence—a feature identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state 
(capacity). It thus exposes part of the private information that the state feels imperative to keep 
hidden regarding its military (in)capability.  
4.1.5 The Outcome of War: Win, Lose, or Negotiated Outcome  
Wars, including both interstate and intrastate conflicts, end in two main categories: a 
military victory by either side or a negotiated outcome (Mason and Fett 1996, Mason, Weingarten, 
and Fett 1999, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). In his oft-cited book, Blainey (1988) 
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emphasized that to understand why wars started one had to understand why they stopped. This 
also applies to the civil war contexts and to the bargaining interaction between the state and non-
state actors.  
 To begin with, the main dilemma in civil wars is the idea that rebels, despite their inferior 
military capacity, challenges the incumbent and eventually engages in war (see, for a broader 
discussion, Lichbach 1995). So, how could a weak opposition hope to win a war against a stronger 
enemy–a sovereign state? In his path-breaking article about the interstate wars, Wagner (2000) 
argues that a weak state can hope to gain concessions from a strong state even though it would be 
unable to win the war. This argument also lends itself to understanding the dilemma in civil wars. 
That is, civil wars happen because there is a chance of a negotiated outcome and the opposition, 
as the typical weaker side, hopes to obtain concessions through contestation. More specifically, 
rebel groups attempt to gain concessions through mostly engaging in a war of attrition and thus 
inflicting costs on the state over time (Smith and Stam 2003, Smith and Stam 2004, Sullivan and 
Karreth 2015).  
 Secondly, negotiated outcomes are important to the opposition because they provide 
legitimacy to non-state actors. Recognition is often the central demand these groups ask for 
(Zartman 1993, Dixon 2001, Melin and Svensson 2009). Rebel movements strive to be recognized 
by their own government, as well as by the international community (Mason 2009). To sit at the 
same table with the government for a diplomatic settlement is typically viewed as a great success 
for the rebel group (Clayton 2013), attenuating the asymmetry of legitimacy between sides. 
 Ultimately, while the state in a civil war typically favors a victory outcome vis-à-vis an 
opposition, a rebel group considers either a victory or even a negotiated settlement as preferable 
outcomes given the disparity of power and legitimacy between sides. 
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4.1.6 Modeling the Conduct of Civil War as a Bargaining Process 
The discussion above provides us with notable propositions for analyzing the effect of 
external interventions on civil war termination. First, the bargaining framework attempts to 
represent the strategic interaction between disputants, and most importantly, the conduct of war 
can be illustrated through this framework. Secondly, fighting over the course of war reveals private 
information regarding the capabilities of belligerents and each side is constantly reassessing its 
bargaining position according to the new information about the progress of war. Third, foreign 
interventions function as part of this information-revealing process, while structural interventions 
also influence the military capacity of the targeted side. Fourth, civil conflicts are typically 
asymmetrical warfare, which has implications for the effects of external interventions. Most 
importantly, asymmetry dampens the utility of state-biased military interventions for the 
incumbent while also signaling government weakness. Finally, whereas the state ultimately 
pursues to defeat rebel groups, a negotiated outcome might be a desirable outcome for the 
opposition given the typical disproportionate power distribution, as well as the insurgents’ 
incentives for recognition.  
 Based on the above considerations, in this part, I analyze the effects of external 
interventions on changing the probabilities of certain outcomes. In general, the outcome of war is 
mainly a function of the prospect of winning. More specifically, the likelihood of a victory 
outcome for either party becomes higher when the expected utility of continuing the war increases 
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for the respective side.31 Conversely, the possibility of a peaceful outcome becomes greater when 
the expected utility of continuing the war decreases. 
 Each side’s expected utility from continuing the war depends on the probabilities of its 
winning and the costs of the war. .\] is government’s probability of winning the war and .^ ] is 
for insurgents. The superscript t is used to emphasize that the expected utility for each side will 
change over time as the war progresses. The costs of the war include both military and political 
consequences as the party continues fighting over time. Following Wittman (1979) and Mason and 
Fett (1996), the payoffs from continuing to fight are:  
E(_%` ) = .%](_%a) + (1 − .%a)(_%b) − c O`%`d`efg  
where E(_%` ) is the expected utility of continuing the war, _%a is each party’s estimate of the payoff 
from victory, .%] is each actor’s estimated probability of winning, _%b is each party’s estimate of 
the cost of defeat, 1 − .%] is the estimated probability of defeat, O`% is the actor’s estimate of the 
costs of conflict that will accumulate from the beginning of war (!% = 0) until the time to win the 
war (!]).  
 Most importantly, .%] is the subjective probability of winning, and in this analysis consists 
of two components: Objective probability of winning (.′%]) and overrate fraction (."%]). 
Objective component reflects the real probability of winning based on the actual military capacity 
of the respective side. Overrate fraction is the portion that comes from each side’s tendency to 
 
31 Note that an increase in the likelihood of a victory for rebels also increases the probability of a negotiated 
outcome, as well as a victory, given that a negotiated settlement, as discussed before, is one of the preferable outcomes 
for an opposition. I will highlight this point later in the following paragraphs. 
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overstate its actual capacity in order to gain a better deal in the bargaining (i.e., private 
information). Put into mathematical symbols; .%] = .′%] + ."%] 
where .%]is the subjective probability of winning, and consists of both .′%] and ."%]. .^ ] need 
not be equal to 1 − .\] as the probabilities are partially based on respective side’s beliefs and 
private information–i.e., overrate fraction. Over the course of a conflict, .\] and .^ ] are subject 
to adjustment as a function of change in .j%] (as the power distribution shifts) and ."%] (as the 
new information is introduced).  
 Each party’s expected utility from continuing the war depends on its estimated probability 
of winning and the costs of the war. Over the course of fighting each belligerent side is constantly 
reassessing its estimated probability of winning (.%]) in response to the progress of war. The 
change in the military capacity (through .′%]) and the transmission of new information regarding 
the opposite party’s military capability (through ."%]) are the main inputs for this continuous 
assessment process. As the war continues, it also inflicts costs over time for each side.  
 In general, an event that results in one party increasing its estimated probability of winning 
will increase the utility from continuing the war and thus increase the odds of victory outcome for 
the respective side. Conversely, an event that results in one party decreasing its estimated 
probability of winning will reduce the party’s expected utility from continuing the war and 
therefore increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement outcome.32 The party with decreased 
 
32 Wittman (1979), in an interstate conflict setup, argues that decrease in one state’s probability of winning 
does not necessarily result in a greater chance of negotiated outcome because an increase in the probability of state’s 
losing means and increase in the probability of opposite state’s winning and thus this opposite state’s expected utility 
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winning probability is expected to accede to a peaceful settlement due to the costs of war as the 
fighting continues. That is, the actor with reduced probability of winning is better off with a deal 
at time t compared to a settlement at time t+1 given the costs of fighting.33  
 When applied to a civil war context as asymmetric warfare, there need to be some 
adjustments in the bargaining between state and non-state actors. An event that results in a 
government increasing its estimated probability of winning will typically lead to the incumbent 
continuing the war in order to win. However, an event that results in a rebel group increasing its 
estimated probability of winning may lead to the insurgents either continuing the war to win or 
willing to reach a negotiated settlement given the uneven power distribution and rebels’ incentive 
for legitimacy. Put the other way around, an event that results in a state decreasing its estimated 
probability of winning will reduce the state’s expected utility continuing the war and thus increase 
the likelihood of either a settlement outcome or a rebel victory. Finally, an event decreasing the 
insurgents’ estimated probability of winning will depreciate the opposition’s expected utility of 
continuing the war and therefore increase the odds of government victory. Note that an estimated 
probability of winning (.%]) comprises .′%] and ."%] components, and also it is assumed that an 
event which results in one side increasing its estimated probability of winning will also result in 
the other side decreasing its estimated probability of winning. Below, this model will apply to the 
effects of various intervention types in generating particular war outcomes. 
 
from continuing the war increases. However, this may not hold for a civil war context given rebels’ incentives to reach 
a negotiated outcome (discussed above), and will be reflected below.   
33 A similar setup is used in Rubinstein model as an infinite-horizon, noncooperative setting where both sides 
are better off agreeing to an offer sooner, thereby avoiding the costs associated with the discount rate imposed later 
over time (see, for a broader discussion, Rubinstein 1982, and Powell 2002).    
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4.1.7 The Effect of External Interventions on Civil War Outcomes: Hypotheses 
A negotiated settlement in civil wars could come essentially when there is a decline in the 
probability of winning, including a loss in military capacity and a reduction of overrate fraction. 
Again, a victory outcome is more likely when there is an increase in the odds of winning for either 
side. External interventions factor in this equilibrium by influencing the military capacity through 
structural interventions–military and economic–and shrinking the overrate fraction through each 
intervention type. 
 Mediations are characteristically designed to provide the flow of information between 
disputants. This reduces the overrate fraction (."%]) for both sides and generates convergence on 
the objective capabilities between actors. A decrease in ."%] will result in a decline in the overall 
estimated probability of winning (.%]) for each side. Eventually, given the association between 
the probability of winning and the expected utility, both parties will expect less payoff from 
continuing the war. In addition, given the costs of fighting over the duration of war, a settlement 
at time t could leave each side better off than a settlement at time t+1, considering the reduced 
odds of winning. The preceding theoretical framework generates the following hypothesis:  
 Hypothesis 1: Diplomatic interventions increase the likelihood of a negotiated outcome.  
 Economic sanctions in civil wars are typically imposed on the incumbent (Lektzian and 
Regan 2016) and designed to bring an end to the conflict by denying material resources to the 
government (Hufbauer 2007), which undermines the state’s military capacity. Furthermore, 
sanctions also function as part of the information-providing process (Strandow 2006, Escribà-
Folch 2010). They publicly expose that the state is weakening and also that the international 
community (at least some of them) is troubled by the government’s action against the opposition, 
which overall diminishes the overrate fraction. 
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 This reduction in both state’s military capacity and the overrate fraction overall decreases .\] and thus E(_\`) while increasing .^ ] and therefore E(_^`). Against this new backdrop, rebels 
could decide either to continue fighting in order to win or to prefer a negotiated settlement due to 
the incentives for gaining recognition and legitimacy. 
 Moreover, economic sanctions followed by diplomatic interventions could, even more, 
contribute to the probability of peaceful settlement as diplomacy produces more decline in the 
overrate fraction by further information flow between parties. This theoretical argument generates 
the following expectation: 
 Hypothesis 2: Economic sanctions increase the likelihood of a negotiated outcome, 
especially when followed by diplomatic intervention; decrease the likelihood of a state victory; 
and increase the likelihood of a rebel victory. 
 I discussed above the differential effects of biased military interventions for each side, 
highlighting that rebel-favored interventions are effective in increasing the target’s military 
capacity whereas state-sided interventions are not. I also discussed about how state-biased military 
interventions could be counterproductive by disclosing the incumbent’s incapacity. 
 More specifically, state-biased interventions are not efficiently translated into improving 
government’s military capacity (.′\]) while signaling about the incumbent’s weakness to fighting 
against an insurgency, reducing the overrate fraction (."\]). Given the overall decline in .\], 
state’s expected utility from continuing the war will be decreased. On the other side, a decrease in .\] means an increase in .^ ], increasing the expected utility of war for the rebels. In this case, 
insurgents could decide either to continue the war in order to prevail or to comply with a negotiated 
settlement. Military interventions followed by diplomacy could, even more, increase the likelihood 
of a negotiated outcome.  
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 Hypothesis 3: State-biased military interventions increase the likelihood of a negotiated 
outcome, especially when followed by diplomatic interventions; decrease the likelihood of a state 
victory; and increase the likelihood of a rebel victory.  
 More efficiently translated on the battlefield, rebel-biased military interventions enhance .′^] and thus increases .^ ] while decreasing .\]. This results in raising the utility of continuing 
the war for the opposition while reducing for the incumbent. Furthermore, economic sanctions 
after a pro-rebel military intervention could make things worse for the government as they deny 
resources from the state while also exposing debilitating state capacity, which overall results in a 
smaller .\]. Given these changes, rebels could pick either to continue fighting in order to win or 
to prefer a negotiated settlement.  
 Hypothesis 4: Rebel-biased military interventions increase the likelihood of a negotiated 
outcome, especially when followed by diplomatic interventions; decrease the likelihood of a state 
victory, especially when followed by economic interventions; and increase the likelihood of a rebel 
victory, especially when followed by economic interventions.  
 Note that the common conjecture standing out in this analysis is that external interventions 
in any form undermine state-favoring outcomes (state-victory) while increasing the probabilities 
for the outcomes favoring rebels (rebel-victory and negotiated settlement). 
4.2 Empirical Analysis 
The theoretical argument developed in the previous section builds on the intrawar 
bargaining framework and provides us with the hypotheses about the effects of various external 
interventions on conflict termination in particular outcomes. The core of the argument is that 
  117 
interventions affect the estimated probability of winning for disputants in an asymmetric setting, 
thereby changing the probabilities of distinct outcomes for the respective side. As part of the 
analysis, the estimated probability of winning is decomposed into two components: the objective 
probability of winning–reflecting the real military capacity–and overrate fraction–representing the 
private information held by each side. Military and economic interventions influence both 
components while diplomatic interventions only affect the overrate fraction by enabling the flow 
of information between parties. Given the asymmetric nature of civil wars, government-sided 
military interventions are not efficient to boost the incumbent’s military capacity while they 
disclose state’s inability to deal with its own domestic issue. In the meantime, the costs of war 
function as a discount factor over time for each side as parties evaluate their decisions whether to 
continue the war for a victory or to accept a settlement as a function of altered bargaining positions.   
4.2.1 Data  
To test the hypotheses, I draw data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
Dyadic Dataset (v1-2015) (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). I turn it into a cross-
sectional dyadic dataset containing all active civil wars between 1946 and 2012. A civil war, 
according to the UCDP/PRIO definition, is coded as an active year when a conflict between two 
parties, one of which is the government of a state, produces at least 25 battle-related deaths in a 
year (Kreutz 2010, Gleditsch et al. 2002). Consistent with the UCDP Datasets, I use the structure 
of dyad episodes to identify the beginning, termination, and the duration of each internal conflict. 
An episode begins in the first year that the conflict meets the UCDP criteria of active armed 
conflict. The episode then continues for consecutive years until the final year when there are fewer 
than 25 battle-related deaths. Given my interest in different outcomes for any war termination, I 
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treat each episode as a new conflict. That is, a new civil war is coded if a conflict restarts after at 
least a one-year break in fighting. There are 652 civil conflicts included in the dataset.  
 The data for conflict outcomes comes from the UCDP Termination dataset v.2-2015 
(Kreutz 2010). It contains information about the means of termination, including a victory for 
either side, a peace agreement, ceasefire, low activity outcomes, and actor ceases to exist. The 
UCDP Termination dataset is compatible with the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, and thus provides 
information regarding how each episode ended in a particular outcome. In the dataset, 7 percent 
of the conflicts end in a peace agreement, 18 percent in a government victory, and almost 8 percent 
end in a rebel victory. For the purpose of this analysis, I only use peace agreements as the category 
for negotiated settlement outcomes since ceasefires might be strategically manipulated by the 
belligerents for other purposes, including gaining time for remobilization and reorganization, 
temporarily avoiding pressure from international actors etc., rather than reaching a final peace 
agreement (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Osborn 2013). The duration, until each termination 
outcome reached, is the dependent variable and is measured in years.34  
4.2.2 Model Specification  
Given the focus of this study on distinguishing between the durations for different 
outcomes in civil war termination, a Competing Risks Duration Model (CRDM) is the appropriate 
model specification for the analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, Brandt et al. 2008, Wright 
and Greig 2012, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). Competing events are those in which 
 
34 The duration in this analysis is year-based and calculated starting from the first calendar day of a given 
year when the conflict reaches the required criteria of armed conflict (25 battle-related deaths/a year).   
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a variety of outcomes compete with each other to deliver the event of interest, and the occurrence 
of one type of event will prevent the occurrence of the others. In this case, the probability of each 
competing outcome is regulated by the other competing events (StataCorp. 2017b).  
 There are particular reasons why CRDM is the right model for the analysis. First, CRDM 
provides the estimation of a duration model for each of possible termination outcomes, including 
a negotiated settlement, a state victory, and a rebel victory.35 These outcomes are mutually 
exclusive, and they compete to end the war. That is, once we have observed a conflict terminating 
in one of these outcomes, it is no longer possible to observe it ending in any other outcomes for 
the same episode. Second, the average duration in civil wars varies much depending on the type 
of termination outcome (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999, Smith and Stam 2004, DeRouen and 
Sobek 2004).36 CRDM thus enables us to predict the effects of interventions in determining the 
distinct durations for each outcome. Third, since the duration and the outcomes of the civil conflict 
are related, a model processing both jointly provides more efficient estimations (Brandt et al. 
2008). CRDM allows incorporating durations for each competing outcome as a dependent variable 
and thus estimates the effects of covariates on these two joint phenomena. Fourth, CRDM is a 
survival analysis and estimates a duration model for each of the three possible outcomes, treating 
 
35 Existing research suggests that pooling the civil war outcomes in a duration model might lead to misleading 
conclusions since different factors may be driving the duration of civil conflicts that end in each of these particular 
outcomes (see, for example, DeRouen and Sobek 2004).  
36 Data sample in the current study also confirms this finding from the existing literature. The average 
duration for peace agreements is much higher than those for rebel victory and for state victory outcomes.  
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the other two as censored cases.37 In addition, it allows incorporating censored cases that do not 
experience the termination for the duration of the study–i.e., at the end of the year 2012. These 
incomplete cases are specifically called right censored and still can be part of the analysis through 
CRDM (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).  
 Finally, CRDM is a class of Cox Models and therefore follows a semi-parametric approach 
in deciding the shape of the baseline hazard function. That is, it does not assume the shape of the 
baseline hazard function, as is the case in parametric models.38 Thus, CRDM allows predicting the 
effect of external intervention more flexibly without holding onto a particular baseline hazard 
function, such as monotonically decreasing or increasing in the cases of parametric models.  
4.2.3 Independent Variable  
All the hypotheses predict the role of external interventions in terminating civil wars 
through various outcomes. Thus, the main independent variable is the interventionary trajectories 
generated in the previous chapter. These trajectories vary from a “no-intervention pattern”–
baseline category–to “single-intervention ones” (only diplomatic, only economic, and only 
 
37 Other categories in the termination outcome variable involve ceasefire, low activity, and actor ceasing to 
exist. These categories are also operationalized as censored cases in the analysis (including the civil wars that were 
still ongoing as of the end of 2012).  
38 Some researchers suggested using competing risks parametric duration models in similar analyses (see, for 
example, DeRouen and Sobek 2004) 
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military intervention) to “multiple-intervention patterns” (such as economic-diplomatic, military-
diplomatic, and military-economic-diplomatic patterns). The categories are outlined in Table 1.39  
 These projected interventionary trajectories are matched with the observational data drawn 
from foreign interventions that took place in all civil wars spanning years between 1946 and 2012. 
Data for military interventions come from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset which identifies interveners 
that deploy military troops within civil war state (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). These are all 
biased military interventions in favor of either conflict parties and does not include either neutral 
interventions, such as UN peacekeeping operations, or other military activities, military aid etc., 
in which there is no direct troop participation.  
 Economic sanctions data is from Hufbauer (2007) dataset, which defines sanctions “to 
mean the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade 
[including both exports and imports] or financial relations.” (2007, 3). It excludes cases related to 
national security controls that are essentially designed to restrict the sale of weapons and military 
equipment. From Hufbauer’s global sanctions dataset, I used cases imposed in the context of civil 
wars where the explicit goal of the sender state(s) is provided as to bring an end to a civil war, to 
ease state repression, and to weaken or destabilize an incumbent government.  
Diplomatic intervention data mainly comes from Civil War Mediation (CWM) Dataset 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011), which uses the definition of mediation provided by 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991b, 8): “a process of conflict management where disputants 
seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or state, or organization 
 
39 One of the projected trajectories, diplomatic-economic interventions, is excluded from the analysis since 
there is no corresponding data point for it in the sample complied for this project. 
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to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking 
the authority of law.” The original dataset is updated by the authors to capture the years between 
1946-2012. In addition to the CWM dataset, diplomatic intervention variable is condensed by 
Svensson’s (2007a) updated replication dataset to span years between 1946 and 2012.  
Table 7 The Categories of Independent Variable (Interventionary Trajectories) 
Category 
Number Description of Trajectory 
Number 
(Percent) of 
Trajectories 
1 No Intervention Trajectory 321 (50.2%) 
 
2 Only Diplomatic Intervention Trajectory 88 (13.8%) 
3 Only Economic Intervention Trajectory 85 (13.3%) 
4 Economic-Diplomatic Interventions Trajectory  40 (6.3%) 
5 Only Military Intervention Trajectory 42 (6.6%) 
6 Military-Diplomatic Interventions 
Trajectory 
37 (5.8%) 
7 Military-Economic Interventions Trajectory 15 (2.3%) 
8 Military-Economic-Diplomatic 
Interventions Trajectory 
12 (1.9%) 
 
 Diplomatic intervention data mainly comes from Civil War Mediation (CWM) Dataset 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011), which uses the definition of mediation provided by 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991b, 8): “a process of conflict management where disputants 
seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or state, or organization 
to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking 
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the authority of law.” The original dataset is updated by the authors to capture the years between 
1946-2012. In addition to the CWM dataset, diplomatic intervention variable is condensed by 
Svensson’s (2007a) updated replication dataset to span years between 1946 and 2012.  
 Using the same variables as in the previous chapter, I control the effect of external 
interventions employing three sets of variables commonly used in the literature: features of civil 
war country, internal characteristics of conflict, and the settings for the international system. These 
are time-invariant variables only for the first years of each conflict. I operationalize the variables 
as follows: 
4.2.4 Control Variables 
4.2.4.1 Variables for the Features of Civil War Country  
Polity scores and GDP per capita are used as the key variables to capture the conflict-
country characteristics.  
 Polity Score: The level of democracy data are taken from the Polity IV dataset (p4v2015) 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2000). It is prorated and transformed to vary from 1 to 21, where 1 denotes 
the lowest score for a political regime (i.e., least democratic).  
 GDP Per Capita: This is the main measure in my models to capture the state strength 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). 
The data is taken from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2016). 
The data is only for the initial year of a given conflict and the values are transformed by taking the 
natural log of each observation.   
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4.2.4.2 Variables for the Characteristics of Conflict 
The intensity of civil war, type of conflict, and the relative rebel strength are the primary 
variables to control for the conflict characteristics. 
 The Intensity of Conflict: It is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the conflict 
has at least 1,000 battle-related deaths for the first year of each conflict. The data is from the UCDP 
Dyadic Dataset (Version 1-2015) (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008).  
 Type of Conflict: It is used to differentiate the type of conflict. In other words, the stated 
incompatibility is what the parties are fighting over (Themnér 2015). The data is from the UCDP 
Dyadic Dataset (Version 1-2015) (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008), and coded 1 for 
territorial, 2 for governmental conflicts.  
Table 8 Summary Statistics for the Variables 
Variables  N Mean SD Min Max 
Trajectory 640 2.41 1.87 1 8 
Pro-state Mil.Int. 652 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Pro-rebel Mil.Int. 652 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Polity score 649 10.30 6.08 1 21 
GDP per capita (ln) 643 6.15 1.35 3.04 10.46 
Intensity of conf. 652 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Type of conf. 652 1.58 0.49 1 2 
Relative strength 598 1.74 0.82 1 5 
Post-Cold War 652 0.54 0.50 0 1 
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 Relative Strength: It is a composite measure from the Non-State Actor (NSA) data set that 
includes relative troop sizes, mobilization capacity, arms procurement, and territorial control 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). It is an ordinal scale between 1 and 5, where 5 refers 
to rebels that are much stronger than the government. The measure is used only for the first years.  
4.2.4.3 The Variable for the Settings of International System  
 Post-Cold War: The role of interventions in various forms has changed during and after 
the Cold War mainly given the zero-sum politics of the era, bipolarity of international system and 
the primacy of sovereignty vs. human rights (see, for a broader discussion, Öberg and Strøm 2007, 
Sousa 2014). For the initial years, it is coded 1 for the post-Cold War period, and 0 for before. 
 Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 2.40  
4.2.5 Results and Discussion 
Overall, the results of the analysis support the theoretical argument that any intervention 
type deployed in civil wars is detrimental to the state, and advantageous to rebel-favoring 
outcomes. That is, interventions in any form increase the likelihood of rebel-victory and negotiated 
settlement outcomes; and decrease the probability of a state-victory outcome.  
 Findings from the statistical analysis are presented in Table 3. Each column in the table 
reports the findings for each war outcome. For simplicity’s sake, the models are presented in a 
 
40 Both state and rebel-biased military interventions in the interventionary trajectory variable are reflected by 
using dummies that are labeled in Table 2 as “Pro-state” and “Pro-rebel” military interventions.  
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condensed and simplified form.41 Figures are provided below to illustrate the findings in the 
table.42 
 The values reported in models are Standard Hazard Rates (SHR)–as average treatment 
effects–and standard errors (robust) in parentheses. SHR is the estimated subhazard ratios and 
interpreted similarly to hazard ratios in Cox regression (StataCorp. 2017b). When the SHR for a 
covariate is greater than 1, it is associated with higher incidence of conflict termination (i.e. 
increase in the probability of war ending in a particular outcome), controlling for individual and 
contextual control variables, and with the fact that other types of outcomes can also occur. 
  
 
41 Tables reporting complete models are provided in Appendix B.  
42 For each separate model, I test each of the variables for violations of the proportional hazards assumption 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Christopher 2001, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Variables that violate this assumption 
are interacted with natural log time, and are reported accordingly in Appendix B. 
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Table 9 Competing Risks Duration Model Standard Hazard Estimates for Each Outcome 
(1) 
Negotiated 
Settlement 
Outcome 
(2) 
State 
Victory 
Outcome 
(3) 
Rebel 
Victory 
Outcome 
INTERVENTIONARY PATTERNS 
Diplomatic Intervention  14.919*** 0.468* 0.536 
(8.53) (0.19) (0.26) 
Economic Intervention 2.929 0.542* 4.718*** 
(2.32) (0.18) (2.67) 
Economic-Diplomatic Interventions 11.360*** 0.100** 2.217 
(6.97) (0.10) (1.38) 
State-biased Military Intervention 1.512 0.392** 1.506 
(1.66) (0.18) (1.22) 
Rebel-biased Military Intervention 9.668** 0.867 0.000*** 
(9.10) (0.53) (0.00) 
Military (State-biased) - Diplomatic Interventions 10.612*** 0.269* 1.611 
(6.80) (0.20) (1.02) 
Military (Rebel-biased) - Diplomatic Interventions 7.389** 0.000*** 0.932 
(6.29) (0.00) (1.08) 
Military (State-biased) - Economic Interventions 0.000*** 0.729 4.165* 
(0.00) (0.39) (3.21) 
Military (Rebel-biased) - Economic Interventions 0.000*** 0.598 9.036*** 
(0.00) (0.45) (5.70) 
Military (State-biased) - Economic - Diplomatic Int. 4.254 0.322 3.860 
(5.07) (0.28) (3.18) 
Military (Rebel-biased) - Economic - Diplomatic Int. 0.000*** 0.000*** 3.744** 
(0.00) (0.00) (2.20) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Polity Score 1.010 0.987 0.958 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
GDP per capita 0.834 0.803** 0.863 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.13) 
Intensity of Conflict 1.162 0.606 4.168*** 
(0.49) (0.19) (1.68) 
Type of Conflict 2.233** 2.233*** 2.226 
(0.88) (0.53) (1.26) 
Relative Strength 1.223 0.840 4.353*** 
(0.24) (0.09) (0.67) 
Post-Cold War 1.756 0.613** 0.650 
(0.72) (0.14) (0.27) 
Observations 576 576 576 
Pseudo log-likelihood -223.380 -634.740 -208.212 
Note: Original models are reported as three separate tables in Appendix B. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figures below depict the findings from the table respectively based on the order of 
hypotheses. Probability (provided on vertical line–y) demonstrated in the figures is the Cumulative 
Incidence Function and indicates the probabilities for a particular outcome after a given 
interventionary pattern is introduced as compared to the no-intervention designated as the baseline 
category (StataCorp. 2017b). The name of the pattern, the statistical significance (* p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01), and the increase (or decrease) in percentages for each treatment are provided 
in the legend of the graph. 
 
Figure 2 Diplomatic interventions and negotiated settlement outcome 
 
 Hypothesis 1 focuses on the effect of diplomatic mediations on negotiated settlement 
outcome. As provided in Figure 1, the relationship is statistically significant (p<.01) and the 
probability of a civil war ending in a peaceful outcome increases by 1390 percent after a diplomatic 
intervention. Following the theory, the flow of information enabled through mediations decreases 
the overrate fraction for each side, thereby leading to a reduction of the probability of winning and 
therefore a decline in the expected utility of continuing to war. Ultimately, this increases the 
probability of reaching a peaceful outcome. 
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Figure 3 Economic interventions and negotiated settlement outcome 
 
 Hypothesis 2 overall conjectures about the impacts of economic sanctions on various 
outcomes. It predicts a positive relationship between a negotiated outcome and economic 
sanctions, especially followed by mediations. Figure 2 displays that the expectation holds and 
sanctions when ensued by diplomacy increase the odds of a peaceful outcome by some 1040 
percent (p<.01).  
 This particular result has implications for both research and practical purposes. From a 
research standpoint, it demonstrates the importance of incorporating multiple intervention types 
into the analysis since focusing only on a single type misses the synergistic impacts of 
interventions. And from a policy perspective, it denotes that an effective strategy to reach a 
peaceful settlement should involve diplomacy after initial sanctions imposed on the embattled 
government. Devising a strategy that incorporates diplomacy in conjunction with economic 
measures substantially gives rise to the hope of reaching a peaceful outcome in civil wars.  
 As expected, Figure 3 shows that the likelihood of a state victory decreases by 46 percent 
after economic sanctions imposed on a government (p<.1). Obviously, sanctions deny the state 
some resources that can be normally mobilized for backing up its military campaign. Moreover, 
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such external economic measures, in line with the theoretical discussion, also reveal state’s waning 
capacity–captured by the overrate fraction–through international disapproval of the state’s stance 
in perpetuating fight against the opposition. These two factors, therefore, undermine the state’s 
capacity to win the war.  
 
Figure 4 Economic interventions and state-victory outcome 
 
Figure 5 Economic interventions and rebel-victory outcome 
 
 The second hypothesis also predicts an increase in the probability of a rebel victory after 
economic sanctions imposed on the incumbent. Displayed in Figure 4, sanctions expectedly 
increase the odds of a rebel-victory outcome by 372 percent (p<.05). Overall, the results for the 
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second hypothesis indicate that outside economic measures reduce the chances of winning for the 
sanctions regime and fare well for the opposition, promoting both negotiated settlement and rebel-
victory outcomes.  
 
Figure 6 State-biased military interventions and negotiated settlement outcome 
 
 Hypothesis 3 broadly focuses on the effects of state-biased military interventions on 
different outcomes. It proposes a positive association between the negotiated settlement outcome 
and state-biased military interventions, especially followed by mediations. Figure 5 illustrates that 
military interventions in support of the state, notably ensued by diplomacy, increases the 
probability of a peaceful outcome by 961 percent (p<.01).  
 Hypothesis 3 also expects a negative relationship between the military interventions in 
support of a state and the odds of a state victory outcome. The findings, displayed in Figure 6, 
support the hypothesis and the likelihood of a war ending in a state victory reduces by 61 percent 
after a state-targeted military intervention (p<.05). 
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Figure 7 State-biased military interventions and state-victory outcome 
 
 This particular finding is very much supportive of the asymmetry discussion in the theory 
since interventions in favor of a government counter-productively backfires and thus undermines 
a state victory outcome. It indicates the inefficacy of a state-sided military intervention and also 
implies the role how it plays in disclosing state’s incapacity to deal with its own domestic dispute. 
 
Figure 8 State-biased interventions and rebel-victory outcome 
 
 Hypothesis 3 lastly predicts a positive correlation between state-biased military 
interventions and a rebel victory outcome. As depicted in Figure 7, the relationship is in the desired 
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direction, but not statistically significant. A possibility for the insignificance might be due to the 
low number of rebel-victory cases, which makes the relationship more of a hypothetical argument. 
 
Figure 9 Rebel-biased military interventions and negotiated settlement outcome 
 
 Finally, Hypothesis 4 mainly predicts the impacts of rebel-biased military interventions on 
each conflict outcome. It begins with conjecturing a positive association between a negotiated 
settlement and rebel-favoring military interventions, especially ensued by mediations. Figure 8 
depicts that the expectations are significantly met (p<.05). The probability of a peaceful outcome 
rises by 867 percent after a military intervention in favor of insurgency; and by 639 percent after 
diplomacy following military interventions. 
 Hypothesis 4 also expects a negative relationship between a state victory outcome and 
rebel-biased interventions, especially enhanced by economic sanctions on the government. As 
illustrated in Figure 9, the association is in the expected direction, but not significant. Again, one 
possibility for the insignificance might be the number of cases that experience rebel-biased 
interventions (just 8 in the dataset).  
 Another possibility here is that pro-rebel interventions occur mostly in cases where 
insurgents’ relative strength match their governments or in cases where state forces are not much 
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stronger (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). These cases, therefore, are not potentially 
the ones that could end in a state victory when compared to the ones in which state forces are much 
stronger than the opposition (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999). Under these circumstances, the 
state may not already be in a position of victory, and military intervention in support of rebels 
might push the sides towards a negotiated settlement (which is already found to be affirmative in 
the first part of the Hypothesis 4) as a competing outcome.  
 
Figure 10 Rebel-biased military interventions and state-victory outcome 
 
 Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts a positive relationship between a rebel victory and rebel-
biased military interventions, especially once ensued by economic sanctions. Figure 10 
demonstrates that, contrary to the expectation, pro-rebel military interventions are negatively 
associated with a rebel-winning outcome, decreasing the odds by almost 99 percent (p<.01). 
However, the association becomes positive and in the predicted direction once rebel-biased 
military interventions are followed by economic sanctions. This time, the likelihood of a rebel 
victory increases by 804 percent after a pro-rebel military intervention followed by an economic 
sanction (p<.01). Put together, it suggests that rebel-biased military interventions increase the odds 
of rebel victory only if they are followed by economic sanctions on the regime. One possibility is 
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that deploying only rebel-biased interventions might tip the balance of power just to the parity, 
which could pave the way for a negotiated settlement (this is already supported in Figure 8). And 
once rebel-targeted interventions are complemented by economic sanctions on the government, it 
considerably tips the power balance in favor of insurgents, thereby leading to a rebel victory. 
 
Figure 11 Rebel-biased interventions and rebel-victory outcome 
 
 Finally, several of the control variables have significant effects on the duration of civil wars 
ending in different outcomes. Polity Score variable is not significant at all across models. Scholars 
still debate the effect of democracy on civil war duration and outcomes, especially during the 
course of fighting (see, for example, DeRouen and Sobek 2004, Fearon 2004). GDP per capita is 
commonly used as a proxy for state capabilßity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 
2003). It is also associated with state resources that a government can bring to the battlefield and 
thus could absorb the costs of perpetuating a civil war–the idea of “hurting stalemate” (Balch-
Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). In the models, GDP per capita is significant and smaller than 
1 for state victory, indicating that relatively stronger states prevail over rebels in a shorter time.  
 The intensity of conflict is statistically significant and positively correlated with a rebel 
victory. The finding is consistent with some of the earlier research arguing that mounting casualty 
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rate without a state victory over time would undermine support for the government while providing 
grounds for a rebel victory (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999). In the literature, governments 
facing secessionist movements are considered less likely to concede (Walter 2003, DeRouen and 
Sobek 2004). Likewise, territorial conflicts are found to be decreasing the probability of a 
negotiated outcome. In the earlier studies, stronger rebel capabilities are associated with more 
likelihood for rebel victories (Hultquist 2013), which is also supported here.   
 Finally, more civil wars after the Cold War have ended in negotiated settlement than in 
military victory (Betts 1994, Mason 2009) and results of this analysis demonstrate that post-Cold 
War period is correlated with higher probability of negotiated outcome and lower likelihood of 
state victories.  
4.3 Robustness Checks  
As a robustness check, I first checked each model using only the interventionary pattern 
variable without controls. The results are largely similar to the original findings.43 Secondly, 
following Jones (2017), Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008), Brandt et al. (2008), I 
checked the proportionality assumption for each variable in the estimations and added the 
interaction of natural log of time and the variable(s) violating the assumption in the models.44 
Third, I employed bootstrapping in order to calculate more accurate standard errors. Bootstrapping 
is a resampling tool by using subsets randomly selected from the sample to emulate repeated 
 
43 Results are reported in Appendix B.   
44 Results are reported in the original models in Appendix B.   
  137 
random sampling from the population and thus produces reasonable results (Efron 1979). In other 
words, bootstrapping conducts the replication of the original data sample to simulate a larger 
population, which allows the computation of more robust statistical inferences. Following the 
latest Stata manual (StataCorp. 2017a), I performed bootstrapping and obtained similar results to 
the original data sample.45 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that civil war interventions in any form, including military, 
economic, and diplomatic activities, undermine state-favoring outcomes while they promote 
outcomes that are more advantageous to the opposition. Most conspicuously, a state-sided military 
intervention, for example, proves counterproductive to the state-victory, as it fosters the negotiated 
settlement and partly the rebel victory. These results mainly stem from the asymmetrical nature of 
civil wars, which is reflected in the analysis owing to the modification proposed in the existing 
bargaining model. 
 More specifically, I used the bargaining model to estimate the effects of different external 
interventions and proposed a change to the model by incorporating a new component–overrate 
fraction–in order to capture the information-revealing function of interventions–besides model’s 
regular use for capturing the impact on power distribution. Through this modification, I could 
estimate how interventions unevenly affect the combatants’ military capacities in the face of an 
 
45 See the Appendix B for the results. 
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asymmetric contestation between the state and rebels as each intervention type also reveal private 
information about parties’ real capacity. 
 Another important result in this study is the support for the claim that the opposition prefers 
a negotiated settlement over continuing the war once their chance of winning increases. It is more 
likely due to their awareness of limited resources and disadvantageous power distribution that lead 
them to a more realistic and cost-effective outcome. This is mainly a result of asymmetry in civil 
wars where there are disproportionate power distribution and disparity with respect to the 
legitimacy of parties. Overall, this finding extends Wittman (1979) and Wagner’s (2000) insights 
about interstate conflicts to internal strives that, at its origin, the phenomenon of war occurs 
between two unequal parties partly because there exists the possibility of a negotiated settlement 
outcome.  
 A unique contribution of this study is that it demonstrates how a trajectory-based analysis 
could be useful in understanding the effect of external interventions. By integrating and sequencing 
multiple interventions, it enables to operationalize the synergistic impact of third-party actions. In 
cases where there are multiple types of interventions involved, a conventional analysis focusing 
on the role of a single type might fall short of displaying the effect of external interventions on 
civil wars, reaching to under/overestimated inferences and misleading conclusions.   
 The trajectory-based analysis has also implications for policymakers interested in conflict 
resolution. First, trajectories tested in this study stand for interventionary strategies to deal with 
civil wars. Each strategy, comprising single or multiple interventions, has its own particular 
consequences as it relates to different conflict outcomes. Practitioners might choose the 
appropriate strategy according to their desired outcome of interest and become aware of the likely 
effects of the strategy prior to the implementation. This is a useful tool for policymakers.  
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 Secondly, multiple interventions in a concerted manner generate saliently significant 
consequences when a single intervention may not fare well. Rebel-biased military interventions, 
for example, become effective in increasing the odds of rebel victory once ensued by economic 
sanctions on the state. Economic sanctions, for instance, prove useful in producing a peaceful 
outcome when complemented by mediations. Thus, a comprehensive strategy including multiple 
components might fare much better where each of the components might fall short of generating 
a desired outcome.  
 Finally, one possible avenue for future research might be the integration of time dimension 
into the analysis. In this case, the analysis will incorporate predictors about the exact timing of 
interventions to produce any anticipated impact.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
5.1 Review of the Study 
The central question in this dissertation involved understanding the effects of foreign 
interventions in ending civil wars, especially when a variety of interventions—military, economic, 
and diplomatic—are deployed in a single conflict. The study aimed to answer this question by 
providing a comprehensive framework in which multiple interventions are first incorporated and 
then tested for their effectiveness. Beginning with integrating different interventions in the 
analysis, I developed the idea of the interdependence, arguing that multiple interventions deployed 
in a given conflict are interrelated, whereby an initial intervention informs the subsequent ones in 
particular directions. I empirically tested the idea of interdependence using statistical data and 
found support for it. The results demonstrated that each particular intervention type produces 
certain probabilities for likely subsequent intervention types.  
Based on the findings from the interdependence argument and drawing on its statistical 
estimates, I undertook a projection model using mathematic models, such as Markov chains, to 
produce certain interventionary patterns. These patterns constitute various intervention types—
sequenced according to their chronological order when employed in a dispute. They vary from a 
“no-intervention pattern” to “single-intervention ones” (only diplomatic, only economic, and only 
military intervention) to “multiple-intervention patterns” (such as economic-diplomatic, military-
diplomatic, and military-economic-diplomatic patterns). 
After the incorporation of multiple interventions, I started to the second phase of the 
project: testing the effects of certain interventionary patterns in the termination of conflicts with 
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various outcomes. In this part, an extensive form of bargaining framework was used to specify the 
effects of interventionary patterns, involving the material and informational impacts of each 
intervention type. Considering the implications of asymmetry in civil wars, I argued that although 
rebel-sided interventions usually produce their desired effect by enhancing the opposition’s 
military capacity, state-sided interventions tend to backfire and ultimately undermine the 
government. I tested the argument and found empirical support for it. Most significantly, state-
sided military interventions were found to reduce the possibility of a military victory by the 
government while increasing the likelihood of a negotiated settlement and partially a rebel victory.   
The next section summarizes the key findings on the interdependence between foreign 
interventions and the overall effects of third-party involvement in civil wars. The theoretical 
significance and policy implications are also discussed in the following sections. The final section 
outlines future research directions.  
5.2 Key Findings and Theoretical Implications  
This study mainly argued that foreign interventions largely undermine the government’s 
bargaining position while promoting opposition’s interests. It proposed that researchers could get 
more rigorous findings on third-party involvement when they incorporate multiple intervention 
types into the analysis. In addition, as part of the effort to integrate multiple interventions, the 
study also explored the interdependent association between interventions in a conflict, suggesting 
that preceding ones affect the occurrence of later ones.  
The findings from the analysis demonstrate that asymmetry is a crucial aspect of civil wars 
and it influences the impacts of external interventions depending on the side support is targeted. 
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When a government side is assisted by a third party—especially militarily—it backfires and 
undermines the odds of a state victory. This is mainly because of the informational asymmetry and 
the external military support in favor of the state makes the government appear needy and weak, 
undermining its claims of superiority in military capacity. The intervention sends a strong signal 
that the state cannot defeat the rebels on its own and also signals that the state cannot maintain the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence—considered by many scholars as the main pillar of 
the state characteristics.  
In addition to its informational aspects, the results confirm that asymmetry in civil wars 
also influences how efficiently outside support is translated on the battlefield. Rebels—as the 
inferior side—typically adopt irregular warfare tactics to absorb the differential in military 
capacities. Thus, military assistance in support of a government, especially in the form of 
conventional warfare capability, does not efficiently boost state’s capacity against rebels using 
unconventional tactics.  
The findings show the importance of incorporating multiple types of intervention into the 
analysis since focusing on only a single type fails to reveal the additive and interactive impacts of 
multiple interventions. The significant effect of economic sanctions in promoting negotiated 
settlement, for example, is revealed only when diplomatic mediations are included in the analysis. 
Similarly, the effect of state-biased military interventions in fostering negotiated settlement is 
displayed only if diplomatic mediations are incorporated in the model. Moreover, illustrating the 
interactive effects of multiple interventions in the analysis, rebel-biased military intervention alone 
is found incapable of promoting a rebel victory. However, the direction of the relevant coefficient 
significantly changes when economic sanctions are also included in the testing. Demonstrating the 
additive effects in the analysis, the impact of rebel-biased military interventions in undermining a 
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state-victory outcome is augmented significantly when the effect of sanctions is put in the model. 
Short of these interactive and additive effects, research focusing on a single type of intervention 
could lead to misestimations about the impacts of interventions.  
Relatedly, the results from the interdependence argument significantly demonstrate that 
external interventions in a conflict are interrelated, whereby prior interventions inform the later 
ones. This is an important finding since it implies the additive and interactive implications of 
multiple interventions in civil wars. When a military intervention is employed in a conflict, 
subsequent economic sanctions imposed in the same dispute are related to the initial military 
involvement, for example, to boost the pressure on warring parties for a certain policy. This 
suggests that interventions do not occur in a vacuum and each subsequent move is partly affected 
by the earlier involvement in the same conflict. This particular finding also squares well with the 
results in the later chapter about the effects of interventions, especially regarding the interactive 
and additive impacts of multiple interventions in a given conflict. Interventions in a conflict are 
interrelated, whereby they exert a joint impact on different outcomes of civil wars.  
The effects of foreign interventions are tested for proportionality and the results show that 
it did not violate the assumption. That is, the effects are not time-varying, and thus they do not 
vary over the years. In other words, the same level of effects occurs regardless of when each 
interventionary pattern is used during the war.  
An interesting finding is the effect of mediations on a negotiated settlement following the 
deployment of military interventions. The effect changes depending on the side to which military 
support is directed. When diplomacy is launched after a state-biased military intervention, it 
enhanced the effect, increasing the odds of a negotiated outcome. However, an adverse 
consequence occurred when diplomacy is initiated after a rebel-biased military intervention and 
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the effect of military support on a negotiated settlement is decreased in the wake of mediations. 
This is probably related to the identity of mediators, which is not currently incorporated in the 
analysis. It might be tied to the idea of biased mediation where the identity of mediator and military 
intervener could be the same (or allied), and thus affect the likelihood of a negotiated outcome 
depending on the side mediators are biased for (For a broader discussion, see, Kydd 2006, 
Svensson 2007b). 
5.3 Policy Implications  
The ability to test the effects of multiple, often interacting interventions have significant 
implications for policymakers. First, combinations of different types of interventions offer possible 
strategies for dealing with civil wars, depending on the desired outcome for each. These strategies 
largely suggest which particular intervention(s) to introduce in a given conflict. This is a practical 
tool for the practitioners of conflict resolution when they are looking for significant policy 
prescriptions for ending an individual conflict. Drawing on the findings from this study, they can 
foresee what possible outcome could be reached through the use of any particular interventionary 
patterns analyzed in the project. Furthermore, each interventionary pattern examined here is 
produced by chronologically ordering the interventions based on their date of deployment. Thus, 
this vests the practitioners with more precise prescriptions that suggest how to tailor each 
interventionary strategy according to each desired war outcome.  
 This study clearly shows that when used in a concerted manner, multiple interventions 
produce strongly impactful consequences that a single intervention could not. For example, rebel-
biased military interventions can help increase the odds of a rebel victory–but only once 
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complemented with economic sanctions on the state. Similarly, economic sanctions, become 
useful in producing a peaceful outcome only when accompanied by diplomacy. This study shows 
that integrating different interventions as part of an overriding strategy can significantly increase 
the likelihood of a particular outcome. 
 Another significant tool that this project offers for policymakers is the interdependence 
model that provides a prediction of likely subsequent interventions for the following period. This 
is a parsimonious model involving variables for current interventions, as well as individual and 
contextual characteristics of civil wars. Drawing on this factual information, the model produces 
predictions for likely interventions anticipated for the next period.  
 Relatedly, the mathematical model—drawing on Markov chains computations—can 
provide longer-term predictions about the trajectory of interventions in each conflict. Based on the 
knowledge of available interventions in a given civil war, policymakers can conveniently make 
projections about which interventions could be anticipated in the same dispute over the course of 
conflict.  
 Another important contribution of this study for policy spheres is revealing the implications 
of asymmetric warfare on the consequences of foreign interventions. The results demonstrate that 
military intervention in support of an embattled government undermines its bargaining position, 
much less boosting incumbent’s military capacity. This entire argument offers implications for the 
U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan and Saudi involvement in Yemen where foreign powers sided with 
the state against various opposition groups and the overall situations in both do not bode well for 
the government sides. The argument could also be stretched back to the U.S. involvement in South 
Vietnam and Cambodia.  
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 A counter case for the argument can be cited using the civil war in Syria where the Assad 
regime is supported militarily by Russia and Iran, and as of now, the government seems to hold 
the upper hand in the contestation. Partly, it is actually a counterexample to the argument in this 
study. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework here can still partly account for the developments 
in Syria.  
 The theory in this study argues that military intervention in support of the state is 
counterproductive and eventually backfires against the government. The main assumption of this 
argument is that third parties deploy essentially conventional troops to assist the government, 
which turns out to be unavailing in a fight against rebels using irregular war tactics. Second, it 
argues that the state receiving outside support reveals a piece of critical private information that it 
is essentially incompetent to fight against the insurgency. Considering the case in the Syrian War, 
neither assumptions hold in there.  
First, Iran primarily deploys Hezbollah-like paramilitary forces that can effectively fight 
irregular warfare against the rebels. Russia mainly deploys aerial attacks to bombard urban areas 
where insurgents are supposedly blended in civilians—a form of military engagement that is not 
included in the analysis.  
Second, the theory assumes that the state has some level of private information that is 
revealed when a supportive military intervention is introduced in a conflict. However, the Syrian 
government—prior to the Iranian and Russian involvements particularly in late 2015—had almost 
no further private information to reveal as the Assad regime was evidently incapable of dealing 
with its own domestic issue. With the advent of third parties in the conflict, the strife evolved to 
be a contestation between the rebels and foreign powers themselves, essentially excluding the 
government, at least for a long while in the conflict. Furthermore, the US-led coalition’s concurrent 
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campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also complicated the equilibrium 
in Syria, distracting the international community’s attention from the civil war between the regime 
and insurgent groups. These are some of the possible reasons why the Syrian case might be a 
counterexample for the argument.  
 Another important policy implication of the study is about tailoring external assistance per 
any desired war outcome. The odds of a rebel-victory outcome increase most when an opposition-
supportive military intervention is complemented by economic sanctions on the regime. The 
chance of a negotiated outcome is increased when initial military and economic interventions are 
followed by mediations—except after a rebel biased military intervention, partly discussed above.  
As for a government-victory outcome, policymakers need to overcome two main 
challenges—proposed in the theoretical framework: the revelation of the state’s private 
information about its capacity and the deployment of appropriate forces against insurgency. The 
violation of the first point leads to the insurgency blaming the regime as being the pawn of an 
intervening foreign power, such as the Taliban calling the Afghan government an American 
puppet. This undermines the legitimacy of the state while also exposing the government’s 
incapacity in fighting against the opposition. To avoid this challenge, potential third parties need 
to devise ways to prevent the disclosure of external support. The second issue regarding the right 
selection of force is critical for efficient transmission of external power on the battlefield. This 
requires, for example, the use of capable local forces—ideally—without deploying any concrete 
assets of foreign armed forces.  
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5.4 Future Research Directions 
The literature on foreign interventions in civil wars is growing, but the number of empirical 
studies analyzing multiple types of intervention is still quite small. Incorporating the multiplicity 
of intervention types, this study investigated the effects of military, economic, and diplomatic 
interventions on a variety of war outcomes. However, more research is still required to investigate 
further the implications of various third-party involvement in civil wars, studying both theoretical 
and policy implications.  
One likely future trajectory is to focus more on the interdependence association between 
different types of intervention in civil wars. While this project focused on the relationships between 
military, economic, and diplomatic interventions, it did not delve into the identity of third parties 
conducting these interventions. The interdependence argument can be extended to capture how 
interdependence plays out differently for cases when same external party conducts multiple 
intervention types vs. the ones in which a diverse set of third parties carry out various types of 
intervention. 
Similarly, this project did not focus on the identity of foreign powers when testing the 
effects of interventions. Future research can incorporate the identity component to examine how 
the effects differ when the same party or a group of different parties conduct a variety of multiple 
interventions. This should provide researchers and policymakers with more precise findings of the 
consequences of foreign involvement in civil wars.  
The interdependence argument is critical in understanding the interactions between a 
variety of external interventions in a given conflict. Consistent with the overall purpose of the 
project, this study drew on a basic-level theory—state dependence—to test the presence of an 
association between interventions. Future research could use a more sophisticated theory to capture 
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different aspects of interdependent relationship, including the role of third-party identity, the side 
to which interventions are targeted, and the idea of balanced interventions—in which both warring 
parties receive military support. This could give more insights into the interdependent association 
between interventions.  
Another possible way to improve the understanding of foreign involvement in civil wars is 
to collect data about the magnitude of military interventions. Currently, data are partially available 
for how many troops are deployed in each conflict, but it could be critical to know how the effect 
varies based on the level of engagement.  
This project overall attempted to contribute to the analytical examination of the effects of 
foreign interventions in civil wars. However, there are still more questions to address in future 
research. Some of the likely questions are outlined above. In essence, studies with more precise 
questions concerning the impacts of interventions and with the use of more granular data can 
contribute to both academic and policy spheres.  
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Appendix A Interdependence Between External Interventions in Civil Wars 
Appendix A.1 Explanations for the Alternative Variables 
Appendix A.1.1 Alternative Variables for Features of Civil War Country  
Life Expectancy: This is a proxy for development and state capacity (DeRouen, 
Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). Data are from World Bank (2016b) capturing years 1960-2014 
and the values are transformed by taking the natural log of each observation. 
 The Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC): This is a COW measure for 
material capabilities of each country from National Material Capabilities (v4.0) data (Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). It encompasses years 1946-2007 in my dataset. I use the natural logs 
of this score.  
 Relative Political Capacity (RPC) and Government Expenditure/GDP Measures: Fjelde 
and De Soysa (2009) suggest an alternative approach to associate the state capacity and civil war 
occurrences with respect to different forms of governance, including coercion, co-optation, or 
cooperation, and propose new proxies for measuring it. Two of their three measures are used in 
my analysis. RPC is a fiscal measure to assess the government’s efficiency at extracting resources 
from the population. According to Fjelde and De Soysa, an RPC score above 1 implies that the 
state is able to extract more resources than one would expect from its level of income, while a 
score lower than 1 implies that the state is extracting less than would be expected. The data is from 
Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (2011), and captures years between 1960 and 2012.  
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 Government Expenditure/GDP is an indicator of the economic capacity of states. It 
captures all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (Fjelde and De 
Soysa 2009). The data is from World Bank (2016a), spanning years between 1972-2014 and the 
values are transformed by taking the natural log of each observation. 
 Strategic Importance of a Country: Different measures were used to control for the 
strategic importance of a country at the international level. First, importance with respect to the 
trade is proxied by the total of each country’s import and export proportions of world trade. The 
more proportions imply for higher importance in world trade. The data is from Cross-National 
Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2016). It captures years between 1946-2013. I use 
the natural logs for this measure.  
 Two alternative measures for the strategic importance of the conflict country are oil and 
natural gas reserves. A larger quantity of reserves indicates a greater importance of a country. The 
data are taken from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015). I include the natural logs for 
the measures capturing between 1980 and 2014.   
Appendix A.1.2 Alternative Variables for Characteristics of Conflict 
Battle-Related Deaths: Casualties are recorded as the natural-logged best estimate of 
battle-related deaths from both sides in a civil war, reported for each conflict year. The data comes 
from the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset (v.5-2015) (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 
2016) capturing years between 1989 and 2014. A higher number of casualties is assumed to 
increase the urgency for conflict management (Toft 2010).  
 Ethnic Conflict: An alternative to the Incompatibility variable is differentiating conflicts 
according to their ethnic and non-ethnic types (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, Mason and Fett 
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1996, Sambanis 2001, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2006, Stojek and Chacha 2015). Ethnic 
wars are mostly viewed as less amenable to conflict resolution, and more importantly, outside 
involvement is seen as necessary to resolve such disputes conditional on the balance of power on 
the ground (Kaufmann 1996). The data come from The Categorically Disaggregated Conflict 
Dataset (Version 1.0, 2015.07) (Bartusevičius 2016). Ethnic conflicts are coded 1, and 0 otherwise.  
 Relative Strength: Following Gent’s (2008) method, relative strength is the yearly ratio of 
a number of rebel forces to government troops. The data are taken from UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopedia and capture years between 1970 and 2014 and values are transformed by taking the 
natural log of each observation. 
 Number of Dyads in the Same Conflict: This measure is calculated to account for the 
complexity of a conflict, which affects the likelihood of external involvement and conflict 
resolution (see, for a similar approach, Diehl 2006). It is the number of rebel groups fighting 
against a government in a given year.  
Appendix A.1.3 The Attributes of the Third Parties  
UN Economic Sanctions: Following an approach similar to Escribà-Folch (2010), 
economic sanctions are disaggregated and take the value 2 if a sanction is imposed by the UN and 
1 if a country is under sanctions not imposed by the UN in a given year.  
 Major-Country Military Interventions: Following Sullivan and Koch (2009), military 
interventions are disaggregated and take the value of 2 if a third party is a major country, meaning 
one of the permanent five countries in the UN Security Council, including China, France, Russia 
(or U.S.S.R. during the Cold War), the United Kingdom, and the United States. A value of 1 is 
allotted otherwise.  
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Appendix A.1.4 The Attributes of Interventions 
Disaggregated Military Interventions: Military intervention variable is unpacked into 
rebel and state biased interventions. The ones in support of rebel groups are coded as 1, and the 
ones in favor of the incumbent regime as 2.  
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Appendix A.2 Models for Alternative Variables and Model Specifications 
Appendix Table 1 Models for New Onsets of Interventions 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.871*** 0.458*** 
 (0.1) (0.1) 
   
Lag Economic Int 0.171* 0.112 
 (0.1) (0.1) 
   
Lag Military Int 0.731*** 0.584*** 
 (0.16) (0.14) 
   
Polity Score  -0.017** 
  (0.01)    
GDP per capita (ln)  0.072 
  (0.04)    
Conflict Intensity  0.223** 
  (0.11)    
Type of Conflict  0.358*** 
  (0.11) 
   
Rel. Strength  0.285*** 
  (0.09) 
   
Post-Cold War  0.904*** 
  (0.12) 
Observations 1914 1821 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.161 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 2 Alternative Control Variables for Conflict-Country Characteristics 
  Baseline  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.638*** 0.618*** 0.583*** 0.690*** 0.613*** 0.608*** 0.599*** 0.580*** 
 (0.09) (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) (0.14) (0.1) (0.14) (0.14) 
Lag Economic Int 2.058*** 2.034*** 2.138*** 2.169*** 2.038*** 1.981*** 2.062*** 1.819*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) 
Lag Military Int 2.958*** 2.918*** 2.984*** 3.103*** 2.739*** 3.016*** 3.293*** 3.236*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.46) (0.24) (0.4) (0.34) 
Polity Score -0.011  0 -0.002 -0.019 0 -0.023* -0.021*  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.070**     0.224*** 0.122** 0.061  (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CINC Score (ln)   -0.196***      
   (0.05)      
RPC    -0.11     
    (0.08)     
Gov't Exp/GDP (ln)     0.197    
     (0.13)    
Total Trade (ln)      -0.208***   
      (0.04)   
Oil Reserve (ln)       -0.023  
       -0.02  
Gas Reserve (ln)        -0.053** 
        (0.03) 
Conflict Intensity 0.181** 0.182** 0.262*** 0.200** -0.063 0.192** -0.1 0.279** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.2) (0.09) (0.17) (0.13) 
Type of Conflict 0.235*** 0.241*** 0.048 0.148* 0.242 0.005 0.186 0.227* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.15) (0.1) (0.15) (0.14) 
Rel. Strength 0.191** 0.155** 0.076 0.161** 0.289* 0.198** 0.421*** 0.129 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) (0.16) (0.14) 
Post-Cold War 0.086 0.123 0.162* 0.102 -0.047 -0.108 0.287** 0.221* 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) 
Observations 1849 1749 1661 1604 568 1741 843 1017 
Pseudo R-squared 0.341 0.334 0.359 0.345 0.296 0.356 0.346 0.355 
Note: Given the high correlation between the Polity score and Life Expectancy (.51), Polity variable is not used in Model 5  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
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Appendix Table 3 Alternative Control Variables for Conflict Characteristics 
  Baseline Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.638*** 0.571*** 0.559*** 0.555*** 0.614*** 
 (0.09) (0.1) (0.13) (0.12) (0.1) 
      
Lag Economic Int 2.058*** 1.789*** 2.160*** 1.823*** 2.052*** 
 (0.12_ (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) 
      
Lag Military Int 2.958*** 2.575*** 2.941*** 2.688*** 2.973*** 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.21) 
      
Polity Score -0.011 -0.022* -0.018** -0.016* -0.013* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
GDP per capita (ln) 0.070** 0.037 0.099** 0.018 0.053* 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
      
Conflict Intensity 0.181**  0.113 0.105 0.192** 
 (0.09)  (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) 
      
Type of Conflict 0.235*** 0.250**  0.091 0.206** 
 (0.09) (0.12)  (0.11) (0.09) 
      
Rel. Strength 0.191** 0.181 0.332***  0.151* 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)  (0.08) 
      
Battle-Related Deaths)  0.063*    
  (0.03)    
      
Ethnic Conflict   -0.023   
   (0.1)   
      
Relative Strength    0.136***  
    (0.03)  
      
Number of Dyads     -0.039* 
     (0.02) 
      
Post-Cold War 0.086 -0.07 0.196* 0.048 0.091 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) 
Observations 1849 880 1268 1118 1849 
Pseudo R-squared 0.341 0.294 0.349 0.315 0.342 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0 
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Appendix Table 4 The Attributes of the Third Parties and the Intervention 
  Baseline Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.636*** 0.735*** 0.732*** 0.782*** 
 (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
     
Lag Economic Int 2.121***  2.218*** 2.225*** 
 (0.12)  (0.13) (0.13) 
     
Lag Military Int 3.021*** 3.273***   
 (0.21) (0.22)   
     
Non-UN Eco Int  2.173***   
  (0.13)   
     
UN Eco Int  2.315***   
  (0.13)   
     
Non-major Country Mil Int   3.188***  
   (0.26)  
     
Major Country Mil Int   3.349***  
   (0.24)  
     
Rebel Biased Mil Int    2.320*** 
    (0.42) 
     
State Biased Mil Int    3.398*** 
    (0.23) 
     
Polity Score -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
GDP per capita (ln) 0.070** 0.051* 0.045 0.048 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Conflict Intensity 0.193** 0.272*** 0.260*** 0.279*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
     
Type of Conflict 0.212** 0.245*** 0.242*** 0.184** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
     
Rel. Strength 0.196*** 0.087 0.105* 0.111* 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
     
Post-Cold War 0.089 -0.014 -0.011 0.009 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations 1821 1650 1650 1650 
Pseudo R-squared 0.349 0.379 0.379 0.383 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
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Appendix Table 5 Multinomial Logit Results 
  Model 19 Model 20 
0     
(Baseline Category)   
   
1     
Lag Diplomatic Int 3.603*** 3.318*** 
 (0.26) (0.29) 
   
Lag Economic Int 1.843*** 1.929*** 
 (0.54) (0.58) 
   
Lag Military Int 0.955* 1.072* 
 (0.56) (0.61) 
   
Polity Score  0.01 
 
 (0.02) 
   
GDP per capita (ln)  0.094 
 
 (0.1) 
   
Conflict Intensity  -0.387 
 
 (0.32) 
   
Type of Conflict  -0.235 
 
 (0.25) 
   
Rel. Strength  0.881*** 
 
 (0.2) 
   
Post-Cold War  1.039*** 
 
 (0.3) 
   
Constant -2.661*** -4.988*** 
 (0.17) (0.8) 
   
2     
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.711 0.917* 
 (0.53) (0.56) 
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      Appendix Table 5 Multinomial Logit Results (Continued) 
   
Lag Economic Int 7.754*** 7.823*** 
 (0.47) (0.52) 
   
Lag Military Int 0.668 0.701 
 (0.76) (0.69) 
   
Polity Score  -0.060** 
 
 (0.03) 
   
GDP per capita (ln)  0.169 
 
 (0.12) 
   
Conflict Intensity  0.683 
 
 (0.44) 
   
Type of Conflict  0.217 
 
 (0.37) 
   
Rel. Strength  -0.241 
 
 (0.37) 
   
Post-Cold War  -0.285 
 
 (0.38) 
   
Constant -4.181*** -4.650*** 
 (0.25) (1.04) 
   
3     
Lag Diplomatic Int 3.787*** 3.418*** 
 (0.5) (0.55) 
   
Lag Economic Int 7.964*** 7.918*** 
 (0.63) (0.69) 
   
Lag Military Int 1.403* 1.239 
 (0.8) (0.77) 
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Appendix Table 5 Multinomial Logit Results (Continued) 
Polity Score  -0.016 
  (0.04)    
GDP per capita (ln)  0.187 
  (0.2)    
Conflict Intensity  0.924** 
  (0.47)    
Type of Conflict  0.576 
  (0.45)    
Rel. Strength  0.451 
  (0.44)    
Post-Cold War  1.235** 
  (0.51)    
Constant -6.433*** -9.834*** 
 (0.52) (1.61) 
   
4     
Lag Diplomatic Int -1.043 -0.175 
 (0.66) (0.67) 
   
Lag Economic Int 1.399 2.128** 
 (0.99) (0.85) 
   
Lag Military Int 6.575*** 5.715*** 
 (0.38) (0.45) 
   
Polity Score  -0.078** 
  (0.03)    
GDP per capita (ln)  0.238 
  (0.15)    
Conflict Intensity  0.880*** 
  (0.33) 
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Appendix Table 5 Multinomial Logit Results (Continued) 
Type of Conflict  2.507*** 
  (0.74)    
Rel. Strength  0.396 
  (0.34)    
Post-Cold War  -0.221 
  (0.42)    
Constant -3.904*** -9.729*** 
 (0.23) (1.6) 
   
5     
Lag Diplomatic Int 2.543*** 1.790** 
 (0.54) (0.72) 
   
Lag Economic Int -12.055*** -11.446*** 
 (0.66) (0.72) 
   
Lag Military Int 5.601*** 5.296*** 
 (0.69) (0.66) 
   
Polity Score  -0.104** 
  (0.05)    
GDP per capita (ln)  -0.229 
  (0.19)    
Conflict Intensity  0.065 
  (0.44)    
Type of Conflict  0.339 
  (0.7)    
Rel. Strength  1.254*** 
  (0.43) 
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      Appendix Table 5 Multinomial Logit Results (Continued) 
Post-Cold War  1.738*** 
  (0.63)    
Constant -5.385*** -6.558*** 
 (0.62) (1.33) 
   
6     
Lag Diplomatic Int 1.202* 1.585** 
 (0.65) (0.64) 
   
Lag Economic Int 6.727*** 7.104*** 
 (0.72) (0.79) 
   
Lag Military Int 5.074*** 4.429*** 
 (0.67) (0.63) 
   
Polity Score  -0.008 
  (0.04)    
GDP per capita (ln)  -0.494* 
  (0.26)    
Conflict Intensity  1.588*** 
  (0.56)    
Type of Conflict  0.072 
  (0.53)    
Rel. Strength  0.773** 
  (0.37)    
Post-Cold War  -0.095 
  (0.45)    
Constant -6.267*** -5.412*** 
 (0.62) (1.89) 
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     Appendix Table 5 Multinomial Logit Results (Continued) 
7     
Lag Diplomatic Int 2.381*** 1.928** 
 (0.73) (0.87) 
   
Lag Economic Int 21.284*** 20.737*** 
 (0.82) (0.81) 
   
Lag Military Int 5.481*** 5.712*** 
 (1.12) (0.94) 
   
Polity Score  0.044 
  (0.09)    
GDP per capita (ln)  0.473 
  (0.44)    
Conflict Intensity  1.486 
  (1.03)    
Type of Conflict  -0.314 
  (1.33)    
Rel. Strength  0.755 
  (0.9)    
Post-Cold War  1.192 
  (1.27)    
Constant 22.411*** 27.161*** 
 (0.92) (3.7) 
Observations 1914 1821 
Pseudo R-squared 0.583 0.622 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Appendix Table 6 Random and Fixed Effects Ordinal Models 
Baseline RE Model FE(1) Model FE(2) Model FE(3) Model 
Lag Diplomatic Int 0.636*** 0.487*** 0.385*** 0.573** 0.241*** 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.1) (0.27) (0.07) 
Lag Economic Int 2.121*** 2.088*** 1.751*** 2.913*** 1.461*** 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.38) (0.08) 
Lag Military Int 3.021*** 2.499*** 1.646*** 2.204*** 1.663*** 
(0.1) (0.13) (0.15) (0.38) (0.1) 
Polity Score -0.011** -0.011 0.015 0.013 0.009 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.070*** 0.143*** 0.297*** 0.512** 0.122*** 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.21) (0.04) 
Conflict Intensity 0.193*** 0.401*** 0.453*** 0.984*** 0.272*** 
(0.07) (0.1) (0.11) (0.36) (0.06) 
Type of Conflict 0.212*** 0.621*** 0.111 0 0 
(0.07) (0.16) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) 
Rel. Strength 0.196*** 0.198** -0.679*** -1.289** -0.438*** 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.18) (0.56) (0.11) 
Post-Cold War 0.089 0.122 -0.05 -0.305 -0.092 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.48) (0.08) 
Mlag_dipint 0.845*** 
(0.21) 
Mlag_ecoint 1.086*** 
(0.18) 
Mlag_milint 2.637*** 
(0.21) 
Mpolity2_conv -0.034** 
(0.02) 
Mlngdp_pc -0.217*** 
(0.08) 
Mintensity_1 -0.586*** 
(0.19) 
Mrel_reb_strength 0.913*** 
(0.2) 
Mpcw 0.156 
(0.18) 
Observations 1821 1821 1821 3218 1821 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix Table 7 Transition Matrices for 15 Years 
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No Intervention 0.8283 0.1152 0.0581 0.0014 
n=1 Diplomatic 0.6223 0.2143 0.1683 0.0094 
 Economic 0.1204 0.2986 0.5258 0.1936 
 Military 0.019 0.2742 0.4704 0.5143 
  
 
    
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n No 
Intervention 0.7648 0.1378 0.0987 0.0142 
n=2 Diplomatic 0.6693 0.1704 0.1651 0.0403 
 Economic 0.3525 0.2879 0.4248 0.2043 
 Military 0.2528 0.3424 0.5365 0.3582 
  
 
    
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.7314 0.1510 0.1262 0.0288 
n=3 Diplomatic 0.6811 0.1740 0.1734 0.0552 
 Economic 0.5262 0.2852 0.3884 0.1905 
 Military 0.4939 0.3609 0.5229 0.2917 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n No 
Intervention 0.7151 0.1610 0.1511 0.0430 
n=4 Diplomatic 0.6932 0.1855 0.1948 0.0692 
 Economic 0.6717 0.2803 0.3541 0.1650 
 Military 0.7114 0.3617 0.4818 0.2426 
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   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.7126 0.1718 0.1693 0.0537 
n=5 Diplomatic 0.7159 0.1949 0.2067 0.0755 
 Economic 0.7798 0.2871 0.3481 0.1553 
 Military 0.8814 0.3687 0.4662 0.2198 
        
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.7198 0.1822 0.1853 0.0627 
n=6 Diplomatic 0.7422 0.2048 0.2188 0.0811 
 Economic 0.8724 0.2961 0.3483 0.1495 
 Military 1.0240 0.3782 0.4592 0.2057 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.7345 0.1925 0.1999 0.0704 
n=7 Diplomatic 0.7719 0.2150 0.2309 0.0864 
 Economic 0.9546 0.3069 0.3529 0.1469 
 Military 1.1467 0.3903 0.4594 0.1976 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n No 
Intervention 0.7551 0.2029 0.2137 0.0773 
n=8 Diplomatic 0.8044 0.2257 0.2432 0.0916 
 Economic 1.0299 0.3191 0.3610 0.1467 
 Military 1.2557 0.4044 0.4655 0.1940 
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   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.7806 0.2135 0.2270 0.0835 
n=9 Diplomatic 0.8397 0.2367 0.2558 0.0967 
 Economic 1.1009 0.3325 0.3718 0.1485 
 Military 1.3554 0.4205 0.4760 0.1937 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.8101 0.2243 0.2401 0.0893 
n=10 Diplomatic 0.8775 0.2482 0.2686 0.1019 
 Economic 1.1694 0.3471 0.3849 0.1517 
 Military 1.4492 0.4381 0.4901 0.1959 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.8431 0.2355 0.2532 0.0950 
n=11 Diplomatic 0.9177 0.2602 0.2820 0.1071 
 Economic 1.2370 0.3627 0.3998 0.1562 
 Military 1.5398 0.4573 0.5072 0.2001 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n No 
Intervention 0.8792 0.2471 0.2665 0.1005 
n=12 Diplomatic 0.9602 0.2727 0.2958 0.1126 
 Economic 1.3046 0.3793 0.4164 0.1615 
 Military 1.6290 0.4778 0.5268 0.2058 
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   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.9181 0.2591 0.2802 0.1060 
n=13 Diplomatic 1.0051 0.2858 0.3102 0.1181 
 Economic 1.3732 0.3969 0.4344 0.1677 
 Military 1.7182 0.4997 0.5486 0.2129 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 0.9596 0.2717 0.2942 0.1116 
n=14 Diplomatic 1.0524 0.2995 0.3252 0.1239 
 Economic 1.4434 0.4154 0.4537 0.1746 
 Military 1.8087 0.5228 0.5723 0.2210 
       
       
   Subsequent Intervention 
   
No 
Intervention Diplomatic Economic Military 
 
Cu
rre
nt
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n  No 
Intervention 1.0038 0.2848 0.3087 0.1174 
n=15 Diplomatic 1.1022 0.3138 0.3408 0.1300 
 Economic 1.5157 0.4350 0.4744 0.1821 
 Military 1.9012 0.5473 0.5978 0.2301 
       
 
  
  169 
Appendix Table 8 Trajectory Probabilities (Conditional on the Initial Intervention Type) 
  Probabilities for Subsequent Interventions 
 Years  No Int. Diplomatic Economic  Military 
Initial Intervention: Diplomatic 1 0 1 0 0 
 2 0.6223 0.2143 0.1683 0.0094 
 3 0.6693 0.1704 0.1651 0.0403 
 4 0.6811 0.1740 0.1734 0.0552 
 5 0.6943 0.1827 0.1860 0.0646 
 6 0.7124 0.1924 0.1992 0.0719 
 7 0.7351 0.2025 0.2123 0.0784 
 8 0.7620 0.2130 0.2253 0.0843 
 9 0.7924 0.2238 0.2383 0.0901 
 10 0.8260 0.2351 0.2513 0.0957 
 11 0.8626 0.2468 0.2647 0.1012 
 12 0.9019 0.2591 0.2785 0.1068 
 13 0.9438 0.2719 0.2927 0.1126 
 14 0.9883 0.2852 0.3074 0.1184 
 15 1.0354 0.2992 0.3228 0.1245 
 16 1.0850 0.3139 0.3388 0.1308 
Initial Intervention: Economic 1 0 0 1 0 
 2 0.1204 0.2986 0.5258 0.1936 
 3 0.3525 0.2879 0.4248 0.2043 
 4 0.5262 0.2852 0.3884 0.1905 
 5 0.6637 0.2900 0.3724 0.1766 
 6 0.7784 0.2982 0.3663 0.1666 
 7 0.8776 0.3086 0.3664 0.1605 
 8 0.9661 0.3206 0.3710 0.1576 
 9 1.0474 0.3340 0.3793 0.1572 
 10 1.1241 0.3486 0.3905 0.1589 
 11 1.1981 0.3644 0.4041 0.1622 
 12 1.2709 0.3812 0.4197 0.1667 
 13 1.3436 0.3991 0.4371 0.1724 
 14 1.4172 0.4181 0.4561 0.1789 
 15 1.4924 0.4381 0.4767 0.1862 
 16 1.5697 0.4592 0.4987 0.1943 
Initial Intervention: Military 1 0 0 0 1 
 2 0.0190 0.2742 0.4704 0.5143 
 3 0.2528 0.3424 0.5365 0.3582 
 4 0.4939 0.3609 0.5229 0.2917 
 5 0.7022 0.3703 0.5016 0.2553 
 6 0.8773 0.3800 0.4870 0.2329 
 7 1.0262 0.3918 0.4805 0.2188 
 8 1.1558 0.4057 0.4812 0.2107 
 9 1.2718 0.4215 0.4875 0.2069 
 10 1.3784 0.4392 0.4985 0.2066 
 11 1.4789 0.4584 0.5133 0.2088 
 12 1.5760 0.4791 0.5312 0.2131 
 13 1.6716 0.5013 0.5518 0.2192 
 14 1.7671 0.5248 0.5747 0.2266 
 15 1.8638 0.5498 0.5998 0.2352 
 16 1.9626 0.5761 0.6268 0.2449 
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Appendix A.3 Figures 
 
Appendix Figure 1 Intervention trajectory after an initial no-intervention start 
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Appendix B The Effects of External Interventions in Terminating Civil Wars 
Appendix Table 9 CRDM Estimates for Negotiated Outcome Models without Control Variables 
    
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dip.Int. 18.367***   
 (10.23)   
    
Eco.Int. 2.818   
 (2.16)   
    
Eco-Dip Int. 15.159***   
 (9.39)   
 
  
 
State-biased Mil.Int.  2.071  
  (2.3)  
 
  
 
Rebel-biased Mil.Int.   9.901** 
   (10.58) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Dip Int.  21.401*** 
 
 
 (13.79)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Dip Int.   10.412*** 
   (9.36)     
Mil (State-biased)-Eco Int.  0.000***  
  (0)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Eco Int.   0.000*** 
   (0) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Eco-Dip Int.  8.508**  
  (9.12)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Eco-Dip Int.   0.000*** 
   (0) 
Observations 640 640 640 
Pseudo loglikelihood -237.752 -237.325 -235.05 
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Appendix Table 10 CRDM Estimates for State-Victory Outcome Models without Control Variables 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dip.Int. 0.349***   
 (0.13)   
    
Eco.Int. 0.613   
 (0.19)   
    
Eco-Dip Int. 0.094**   
 (0.09)   
    
State-biased Mil.Int.  0.711  
  (0.27)  
    
Rebel-biased Mil.Int.   1.574 
   (0.85) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Dip Int.  0.31  
  (0.22)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Dip Int.   0.239 
   (0.25) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Eco Int.  0.99  
  (0.54)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Eco Int.   0.998 
   (0.67) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Eco-Dip Int.  0.408  
  (0.39)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Eco-Dip Int.   0.000*** 
   (0) 
Observations 640 640 640 
Pseudo loglikelihood      -732.448 -730.672 -731.414 
Notes: The models in this table are presented in a condensed form 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 11 CRDM Estimates for Rebel-Victory Outcome Models without Control Variables 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Dip.Int. 0.718   
 (0.35)   
    
Eco.Int. 0.741   
 (0.36)   
    
Eco-Dip Int. 0.631   
 (0.46)   
    
State-biased Mil.Int.  0.641  
  (0.46)  
    
Rebel-biased Mil.Int.   0.000*** 
   (0) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Dip Int.  1.523  
  (0.9)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Dip Int.   0.793 
   (0.83) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Eco Int.  2.157  
  (1.52)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Eco Int.   5.135*** 
   (2.83) 
    
Mil (State-biased)-Eco-Dip Int.  2.737  
  (1.81)  
    
Mil (Rebel-biased)-Eco-Dip Int.   3.574 
   (3.31) 
Observations 640 640 640 
Pseudo loglikelihood     -310.521 -310.037 -307.768 
Notes: The models in this table are presented in a condensed form 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 12 Bootstrap Model for Negotiated Settlement Outcome Model 
  Neg.Outcome Bootstrap 
Dip.Int. 15.171*** 15.171*** 
 (8.56) (9.09) 
   
Eco.Int. 2.918 2.918 
 (2.31) (2.13) 
   
Eco-Dip Int. 11.581*** 11.581*** 
 (7.07) (6.83) 
   
Mil.Int. (Pooled) 1.472 1.472 
 (1.62) (12.22) 
   
Mil-Dip Int. 11.700*** 11.700*** 
 (6.97) (8.97) 
   
Mil-Eco Int. 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0) (0) 
   
Mil-Eco-Dip Int. 3.478 3.478 
 (4.19) (30.03) 
   
Type of Conflict 2.252** 2.252** 
 (0.88) (0.78) 
   
Intensity of Conflict 1.172 1.172 
 (0.5) (0.59) 
   
Relative Strength 1.212 1.212 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
   
Post-Cold War 1.849* 1.849 
 (0.67) (0.71) 
   
GDP per capita 0.831 0.831 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
   
Polity Score 1.01 1.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 576 576 
Log likelihood -223.415 -223.415 
Notes: Bootstrap performed only for the first model in each 
original table. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 13 Bootstrap Model for State-Victory Outcome Model 
  St.Vic.Outcome Bootstrap 
Dip.Int. 0.468* 0.468*** 
 (0.19) (0.13) 
   
Eco.Int. 0.542* 0.542* 
 (0.18) (0.19) 
   
Eco-Dip Int. 0.100** 0.1 
 (0.1) (0.75) 
   
Mil.Int. (Pooled) 0.526 0.526 
 (0.21) (0.3) 
   
Mil-Dip Int. 0.238* 0.238 
 (0.18) (1.91) 
   
Mil-Eco Int. 0.792 0.792 
 (0.37) (2.75) 
   
Mil-Eco-Dip Int. 0.301 0.301 
 (0.27) (1.96) 
   
Type of Conflict 2.233*** 2.233*** 
 (0.53) (0.43) 
   
Intensity of Conflict 0.606 0.606 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
   
Relative Strength 0.84 0.840* 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
   
Post-Cold War 0.613** 0.613** 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
   
GDP per capita 0.803** 0.803*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   
Polity Score 0.987 0.987 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 576 576 
Pseudo loglikelihood -634.74 -634.74 
Notes: Bootstrap performed only for the first model in each 
original table. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 14 Bootstrap Model for Rebel-Victory Outcome Model 
  Reb.Vic.Outcome Bootstrap 
Dip.Int. 0.360* 0.36 
 (0.22) (0.76) 
   
Eco.Int. 2.768** 2.768** 
 (1.37) (1.41) 
   
Eco-Dip Int. 1.003 1.003 
 (0.69) (5) 
   
Mil.Int. (Pooled) 0.683 0.683 
 (0.54) (3.72) 
   
Mil-Dip Int. 0.804 0.804 
 (0.39) (3.47) 
   
Mil-Eco Int. 2.047 2.047 
 (1.34) (10.61) 
   
Mil-Eco-Dip Int. 0.929 0.929 
 (0.72) (4.16) 
   
Type of Conflict 2.833* 2.833 
 (1.66) (8.57) 
   
Intensity of Conflict 4.037*** 4.037*** 
 (1.5) (1.55) 
   
Relative Strength 3.847*** 3.847*** 
 (0.45) (0.6) 
   
Post-Cold War 0.718 0.718 
 (0.3) (0.38) 
   
GDP per capita 0.924 0.924 
 (0.14) (0.16) 
   
Polity Score 0.943 0.943 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Observations 576 576 
Pseudo loglikelihood -215.076 -215.076 
Notes: Bootstrap performed only for the first model in each 
original table. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 15 Full Model for Negotiated Settlement Outcome Model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dip.Int. 14.919***   
 (8.53)   
    
Dip.Int.  15.024***  
  (8.56)  
    
Dip.Int.   14.700*** 
   (8.27)     
Eco.Int. 2.929   
 (2.32)   
    
Eco.Int.  2.971  
 
 (2.36)  
    
Eco.Int.   2.878 
   (2.28)     
Eco-Dip Int. 11.360***   
 (6.97)   
    
Eco-Dip Int.  11.472***  
 
 (7.04)  
    
Eco-Dip Int.   11.317*** 
   (6.91)     
Mil.Int. (Pooled) 1.453   
 (1.6)   
    
Mil. Int. x Pro-St. Dum=0  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil. Int. x Pro-St. Dum=1  1.512  
 
 (1.66)  
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Appendix Table 15 Full Model for Negotiated Settlement Outcome Model (continued) 
 
Mil. Int. x Pro-Reb. Dum=0   0.000*** 
 
  (0.00) 
    
Mil. Int. x Pro-Reb. Dum=1   9.668** 
 
  (9.1) 
    
Mil (Pooled) -Dip Int. 11.526***   
 (6.85) 
  
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  16.219***  
 
 (14.89)  
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  10.612***  
 
 (6.8)  
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0   13.992*** 
 
  (8.74) 
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=1   7.389** 
 
  (6.29) 
    
Mil (Pooled)-Eco Int. 0.000***   
 (0.00) 
  
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0   0.000*** 
 
  (0.00) 
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=1   0.000*** 
 
  (0.00) 
    
Mil (Pooled)-Eco-Dip Int. 3.363   
 (4.1) 
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Appendix Table 15 Full Model for Negotiated Settlement Outcome Model (continued) 
 
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  4.254  
 
 (5.07)  
    
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-Reb. Dm=0   4.551 
   (5.41) 
    
Mil-Eco-Dip I x Pro-Reb.Dm=1   0.000*** 
   (0.00) 
    
Polity Score 1.01 1.013 1.011 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
GDP per capita 0.834 0.825 0.832 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
    
Intensity of Conflict 1.162 1.141 1.221 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.5) 
    
Type of Conflict 2.233** 2.355** 2.191** 
 (0.88) (0.94) (0.85) 
    
Relative Strength 1.223 1.223 1.205 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) 
    
Post-Cold War 1.756 1.74 2.002* 
 (0.72) (0.7) (0.75) 
    
Post-Cold War x ln(t) 1.065 1.06  
 (0.21) (0.21)  
Observations 576 576 576 
Pseudo loglikelihood      -223.38 -223.011 -220.931 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 16 Full Model for State-Victory Outcome Model 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dip.Int. 0.468*   
 (0.19)   
    
Dip.Int.  0.461*  
 
 (0.18)  
    
Dip.Int.   0.66 
   (0.27)     
Eco.Int. 0.542*   
 (0.18)   
    
Eco.Int.  0.544*  
 
 (0.18)  
    
Eco.Int.   0.631 
   (0.21)     
Eco-Dip Int. 0.100**   
 (0.1)   
 
 
  
Eco-Dip Int.  0.099**  
 
 (0.1)  
    
Eco-Dip Int.   0.186 
   (0.19)     
Mil.Int. (Pooled) 0.526   
 (0.21)   
    
Mil.Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  3.373***  
 
 (1.25)  
    
Mil.Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  0.392**  
 
 (0.18)  
    
Mil.Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0   0.693 
   (0.33) 
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Appendix Table 16 Full Model for State-Victory Outcome Model (continued) 
 
    
Mil.Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=1   0.867 
 
  (0.53) 
    
Mil (Pooled)-Dip Int. 0.238*   
 (0.18) 
  
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  0.269*  
 
 (0.2)  
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0   0.644 
 
  (0.48) 
    
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=1   0.000*** 
 
  (0.00) 
    
Mil (Pooled)-Eco Int. 0.792   
 (0.37) 
  
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  1.047  
 
 (1.02)  
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  0.729  
 
 (0.39)  
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0   1.112 
 
  (0.55) 
    
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=1   0.598 
 
  (0.45) 
    
Mil (Pooled)-Eco-Dip Int. 0.301   
 (0.27) 
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Appendix Table 16 Full Model for State-Victory Outcome Model (continued) 
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  0.322  
 
 (0.28)  
    
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0   0.986 
   (0.94)     
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1   0.000*** 
   (0.00)     
Polity Score 0.987 0.988 0.991 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
GDP per capita 0.803** 0.802** 0.871 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
    
Intensity of Conflict 0.606 0.623 0.651 
 (0.19) (0.2) (0.22) 
    
Type of Conflict 2.233*** 2.262*** 1.972*** 
 (0.53) (0.54) (0.49) 
    
Relative Strength 0.84 0.851 0.693*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
    
Post-Cold War 0.613** 0.624** 0.440*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) 
    
Rel. Strength x ln(t)   1.471** 
   (0.24)     
GDP per cap x ln(t)   0.761*** 
   (0.05) 
Observations 576 576 576 
Pseudo loglikelihood      -634.74 -632.089 -614.772 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 17 Full Model for Rebel-Victory Outcome Model 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Dip.Int. 0.536   
 (0.26)   
    
Dip.Int.  0.538  
 
 (0.26)  
    
Dip.Int.   0.501 
   (0.24)     
Eco.Int. 4.718***   
 (2.67)   
    
Eco.Int.  4.677***  
 
 (2.66)  
    
Eco.Int.   5.061*** 
   (2.98)     
Eco-Dip Int. 2.217   
 (1.38)   
    
Eco-Dip Int.  2.197  
 
 (1.38)  
    
Eco-Dip Int.   2.213 
   (1.46)     
Mil.Int. (Pooled) 1.516   
 (1.22)   
    
Mil.Int x Pro-St.Dm=0  0.000***  
 
 (0.00)  
    
Mil.Int x Pro-St.Dm=1  1.506  
 
 (1.22)  
    
Mil.Int x Pro-Reb.Dm =0   2.873 
   (2.52) 
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Appendix Table 17 Full Model for Rebel-Victory Outcome Model (continued) 
 
Mil.Int x Pro-St.Dm=1 0.000*** 
(0.00) 
Mil (Pooled)-Dip Int. 1.795 
(1.02) 
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=0 2.518 
(3.45) 
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1 1.611 
(1.02) 
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0 2.386 
(1.51) 
Mil-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=1 0.932 
(1.08) 
Mil (Pooled)-Eco Int. 4.958** 
(3.24) 
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.Dm=0 6.814** 
(6.63) 
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.Dm=1 4.165* 
(3.21) 
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0 0.000*** 
(0.00) 
Mil-Eco Int x Pro-St.D=1 9.036*** 
(5.7) 
Mil (Pooled)-Eco-Dip Int. 4.349** 
(2.79) 
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=0 5.089*** 
(2.82) 
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Appendix Table 17 Full Model for Rebel-Victory Outcome Model (continued) 
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1 3.86 
(3.18) 
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-Reb.Dm=0 4.068 
(3.71) 
Mil-Eco-Dip Int x Pro-St.Dm=1 3.744** 
(2.2) 
Polity Score 0.958 0.957 0.961 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP per capita 0.863 0.866 0.851 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Intensity of Conflict 4.168*** 4.087*** 4.511*** 
(1.68) (1.64) (1.88) 
Type of Conflict 2.226 2.379 1.729 
(1.26) (1.8) (1.06) 
Relative Strength 4.353*** 4.322*** 4.560*** 
(0.67) (0.71) (0.78) 
Post-Cold War 0.65 0.63 0.667 
(0.27) (0.28) (0.3) 
Intensity x ln(t) 1.762 1.797 1.694 
(0.77) (0.79) (0.78) 
Rel. Strength x ln(t) 0.599*** 0.608*** 0.651** 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13) 
GDP per cap x ln(t) 1.009 1.006 0.981 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Observations 576 576 576 
Pseudo loglikelihood     -208.212 -208.02 -205.18
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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